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ABSTRACT

CONSECRATE THE WORLD TO GOD:
MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON THE “SECULAR” AND
VATICAN II’S THEOLOGY OF THE LAITY

By
Anthony Marco
May 2021

Dissertation supervised by Radu Bordeianu
Post-Conciliar ecclesiological reflection in the United States has been largely critical of
Lumen Gentium’s description of the laity. The criticism is focused around two concepts used to
differentiate the lay state from clergy and religious: that the lay vocation takes place principally
among the life and work of the world, having a “secular character” and that the activity of the
laity, as a participation in the priesthood of Christ, is the consecration the world itself to God.
According to this critique, these concepts are problematic because they juxtapose the task of the
laity in the world with the task of the clergy who are the sole proprietors of the sacred. This is
compounded by 20th Century theologies of grace. Acknowledging a human task of mediation
(consecration of the world) would be the equivalent to arguing that the world was not already
filled with the grace of God. Together these issues set up a series of unacceptable dichotic pairs:
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the separate activity of laity/clergy implies a division between secular/sacred and ultimately of
God and the world.
I assert that Maximus the Confessor’s theological vision is a corrective to the views
expressed in post-Vatican II literature. Maximian thought resolves the aporia introduced by
these dichotomies not because it refutes specific premises, but because it approaches the problem
of God and the world from a different standpoint altogether. I argue that within Maximus’
theological worldview, the goodness of creation is entrusted to humanity for consecration. The
offering of creation to God arises from creation’s own goodness, based within the maximian
concept of the logoi. It is this priestly act that unites humanity with creation and constitutes their
shared deifying communion. The maximian lens also serves to deepen and enrich Lumen
Gentium’s description of the laity and is a basis for further exploration of the lay vocation.
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INTRODUCTION

From 2008 to 2017 I had the honor of serving Catholic students at the University of
Central Florida as a campus minister. During that time, I was constantly inspired by the students'
eagerness to grow in their faith through prayer, study, service, and outreach to one another. The
success of the ministry hinged upon the dedication made by the students who had accepted
positions of service and leadership. The generous response of these students often led them to
discover new gifts. Gifts that they were more than happy to share with their faith community.
As one would expect, an overarching concern of these young men and women was
discerning their own vocation. There was always a palpable thirst for a firm identity of who they
were and who they were called to be. Many of my most cherished experiences from this time
were moments when students shared their lives with me and allowed me to be a witness to their
walk with God as they made decisions for life after college.
Many times, their aspirations were formed by their experience within the campus
ministry community. They had tasted the fulfillment that comes from earnest self-giving. Some
translated their experience into work as missionaries in a variety of contexts while others decided
to pursue full-time ministry or a celibate vocation. The majority of students would discern to
lead lives that did not revolve around work in or for the Church. They would go on to have
careers in their field of study, entering competitive environments of corporations, academic
research, and raise families.
Conversations with these men and women after they had become alumni centered around
how to become involved in the parish they were moving to or how to best use their gifts to form
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a community if they were to find themselves in a place where they were not finding spiritual
nourishment. We would speak about how they could continue to foster their gifts in their new
environment, everything from looking for a role in their new church to sharing their faith through
personal evangelization. Despite efforts to highlight God's presence in their daily realities, there
was a tangible difficulty for them to see how they could serve God in these new circumstances as
they had during their time on campus.
On occasion, a young man or woman would decide to leave their new careers behind to
pursue a lifestyle with an explicit missionary calling - to positions of service or a lifelong
vocation. Whether this was the genuine discernment of a vocational calling or a longing to
recapture enthusiasm they once had is beyond my ability to say. What is certain is that there was
a disconnect between the life lived within the community and their experience of faith as a
person working in a non-ecclesial profession. Their stories demonstrate for me how difficult it is
to communicate the spiritual and theological worth of activities that are not explicitly connected
to ministerial work in the Church.
At the center of this experience is the question of the relevance of the Church to everyday
life and activity.
A Pre-Conciliar Dilemma
My experience reflects a personal discovery of the ambiguities surrounding the life of the
laity described by Jacques Maritain in his 1965 note to Pope Paul VI on “The Spiritual Mission
of the Laity”:
I sometimes ask myself if … under the pressure of circumstances and practical needs, this
question of the role of the laity in the life of the Mystical Body has not been developed in
too empirical a manner from too partial a point of view without having been sufficiently
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thought through for itself and in all its fullness … What we need is a study of the whole
question, in all its ramifications in which consideration is given not only to that form of
witnessing and that spiritual mission (apostolic mission) which are peculiar to laymen,
but also to those modalities peculiar to their interior life, to their spiritual trials, to their
prayer (liturgical as well as private), and to their progress toward union with God and the
perfection of charity, which is evidently what must come before all else … we have never
been able to escape from the perspective of a participation in the apostolate proper to the
clergy, a perspective which has been broadened more and more (as if it were ultimately
capable of encompassing the laity in its entirety) all the while retaining from the same
specific perspective and continuing to see everything from the same original point of
view. 1

While Maritain’s insights are couched in the language of pre-conciliar ecclesiology, they
remain an accurate representation of the tension that has persistently vexed theologies of the laity
and are just as relevant as they were over fifty years ago. Fleshing out the theology behind the
layperson’s place in the Church and their relationship to the apostolic mission was a task that
demanded the attention of the theological luminaries that would shape the Second Vatican
Council. Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, Gerard Philips, and Yves Congar were among the
prominent periti who offered guidance to the council Fathers on the issue of the laity leading up
to and throughout the conciliar proceedings. The discussion was colored by the pontificates of
Pius XI, Pius XII and Paul VI with their expansive vision for lay activity incarnated in groups
like Catholic Action. The increase of lay activity in and on behalf of the Church along with
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Jacques Maritain, "The Spiritual Mission of the Laity," Communio 14, no. 2 (1987).

3

renewed interest in ecclesiology made the laity a crucial topic for the coming council. At issue
were fundamental questions: What is the nature and theological status of the laity? Could the
laity be said to have a mission distinct from the apostolate of the clergy? Or is their Christian
activity merely an extension of the extant apostolic mission of the hierarchy?
The prominence of lay issues was a major reason for the jettisoning of the council’s
original schema for the Church’s constitution. The outline inherited from the unfinished
business of the First Vatican Council and was based upon late 19th Century concerns. Gerard
Philips who chronicled the development of the Second Vatican Council’s Constitution on the
Church, Lumen Gentium, notes that the fathers collectively realized a serious need for a
declaration on the laity. 2 Demonstrative of the views that would influence such a declaration was
the insightful elocution of Cardinal Suenens who declared that in her ecclesiology the Church
must shift from “Ecclesia ad intra to the ecclesia ad extra.” 3
Over the course of the document’s development the topic of the laity only grew in
importance. Whereas the laity was not a heading mentioned in the schema that Vatican II
inherited from Vatican I, it rose in the early proposals to being one of twelve chapters and
eventually was judged to be a central issue. The final document concerned itself with the laity as
a part of the whole of the Church in chapter two and dedicated all of chapter four to a deeper
discussion of the role of the laity in the Church and the world. As we shall see, the task
undertaken by the conciliar fathers was an attempt to demonstrate “a new understanding for the
actual life of the overwhelming majority of Christians.” 4 But for many the expression of the

Gérard Philips, "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church: History of the Constitution," in Commentary on the
Documents of Vatican II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1967), 105.
3
Cardinal Suenens quoted in Philips, "History of the Constitution," 107.
4
Philips, "History of the Constitution," 121.
2
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council demarcates a point of departure.

Argument of the Dissertation
The ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council is an attempt to present the Church’s life
and mission as a shared task of clergy, religious, and laity alike. This emphasis can be discerned
through the statements and structure of Lumen Gentium, Vatican II’s Constitution on the Church.
The document highlights the laity in particular, attempting for the first time in a conciliar
document to outline the task and life of the lay faithful. LG describes the laity in a twofold
manner. First, a negative definition by which the laity are distinguished as not being the
ordained clergy or members of religious orders; second by the description of the lay vocation as
taking place principally among the life and work of the world. This “secular character” was
complemented with a demonstration of how the laity share in the threefold office of Christ as
priest, prophet, and king. Of these descriptions the best developed was the priestly action of the
laity who in their daily lives are called to make offerings through Christ, “consecrating the world
itself to God.” 5
Post-conciliar ecclesiological reflection in the United States of America was largely
critical of this description of the laity. While the council clearly intended to express a Church
unified in mission and action, many authors questioned whether the texts of the council
guaranteed this equality. The epicenter of this criticism was the continued use of the negative
definition of the laity as non-clergy. Compounding the issue, the laity were described almost
exclusively in an extra-ecclesial fashion. The description offered in LG characterized the lay
vocation as taking place within the world. The laity are concerned with secular work, juxtaposed
Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, ed. Norman P. Tanner, vol. 2,
Decrees of the Ecumentical Councils, (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1964), 32. From this point abbreviated as LG.
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with the clerical work of the hierarchy who work in the realm of the sacred within and for the
Church. The post-conciliar literature was critical of a sacred/secular distinction and cautioned
against reinstating an ecclesiology that defined clergy as the sole active ministers and reduced
the laity to passive receptivity.
To solve this apparent contradiction between the intention of the conciliar fathers and the
text born from the fruit of the proceedings many theologians outlined what they perceived to be
the intended trajectory of conciliar thought. This trajectory favored further development of the
laity’s role within the Church as a reaction to the council’s emphasis on secularity. A turn
toward intra-ecclesial workings and ministry, the discussion of action in the world was left by the
wayside. Some authors prescribed doing away with the concepts of the secular and sacred
altogether, with the unintended consequence of reducing much of the conversation to internal
church affairs. Extra-ecclesial human activity was rarely discussed.
In my analysis of the post-conciliar texts, I will argue that we can discern the formulation
of two distinct but oft associated dichotic pairs. First, the couplet of laity/clergy, which discerns
an inequality within the Church’s mission and activity. The distinction of laity and clergy is
often downplayed or argued against since it is perceived to perpetuate a laity who remains
passive as unequal participants in the Church’s life and mission. In place of this, emphasis is
placed upon the common dignity derived from Christian baptism. Intra-ecclesial organization is
described in terms of relationships within the community rather than being based upon a special
status of the clergy. This concern for equality often highlights ministerial activity as a shared
reality among all Christians.
A second dichotic pair is causally connected to the first: if clerical action takes place in a
sacred sphere and the laity act within a secular sphere there must be a strong delineation between
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the realm of the sacred and the secular. The delineation between secular and sacred is
interpreted as a real separation between spheres of activity and ultimately has implications for
the relationship between the world and God. Often the second dichotomy is nested within the
first as the clergy are seen to be actively handing on grace through their ministry while the laity
are portrayed as passive recipients. Such a model is seen to perpetuate the understanding that
there is a two-caste system within the Church with the clergy always being above the laity who
rely on the clergy for access to the sacred, including God.
Underlying this second dichotomy is a critique of the concept of mediation as it is
expressed in the texts of the council. If, as the Council affirms, the world has been created by
God as good, then the consecration of the world to God seems tautological. This criticism is
aimed both at the clergy’s role as sacramental ministers as well as the laity’s bespoke task of
world consecration. In post-conciliar literature the apparent contradiction forms the basis of the
argument that language regarding a Christian mission to the world leads to the perception that
the world itself is separated from God. Acknowledging a human task of mediation would be the
equivalent to arguing that the world was not already filled with the grace of God. These
criticisms effectively mute any theological possibility of lay consecration of the world to God
because of fundamental presuppositions about God’s relationship to the world.
I assert that Maximus the Confessor’s theological vision is a corrective to the views
expressed in various post-Vatican II literature. I will endeavor to showcase the Confessor’s
theology of creation and human vocation, rather than a point-by-point comparison with
contemporary theologies. I believe that maximian thought resolves the aporia introduced by
these dichotomies not because it refutes specific premises, but because it approaches the problem
of God and the world from a different standpoint altogether. I will argue that within Maximus’
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theological worldview, the goodness of creation is entrusted to humanity for consecration. The
offering of creation to God arises from creation’s own goodness, based within the maximian
concept of the logoi. It is this priestly act that unites humanity with creation and constitutes their
shared deifying communion.
There are four key characteristics within Maximus’ conceptual framework that stand in
service of this line of argumentation: mystical apophaticism, Chalcedonism, freedom, and
Maximus’ vision for the liturgical unity of humanity and the cosmos. These concepts are woven
into the seam of the Confessor’s thought and interact in a way that forms a cohesive unity.
Maximus’ distinction between God and creation is rooted in the apophatic acknowledgement of
God as incomprehensibly Other. The Chalcedonian adverbs used to define the hypostatic union
are applied to this cosmological distinction and grant clarity to Maximus’ view of how God and
creation can exist communally yet without division, without change, without separation and
without confusion. These qualifiers preserve freedom within communion. They allow for a free
exchange between the participants of that communion since they do not admit one dialogic
partner to be assimilated into the other. This free exchange reaches its consummation in the
collective offering of the cosmos back to God. The whole of Maximus’ cosmological and
anthropological thought can be viewed in relation to these four pillars.
Maximus’ cosmology describes a creation that is inherently good and filled with God’s
presence. The Confessor’s view is most clearly stated in his response to Origen’s claim that the
world is a result of sin perpetrated by spiritual beings. The exchange allows Maximus to present
his cosmology in depth. Neither movement nor creation are a result of any sort of corruption but
are parts of God’s original plan. The Confessor emphasizes the goodness of creation and
explains that creation ex nihilo is nothing less than a free, loving act of God. Due to the nature of
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creation, as Maximus presents it, there is a real and inviolable ontological distance between God
and contingent beings. This distinction is not problematic for Maximus who, taking cues from
Gregory of Nyssa, sees it as the setting for perpetual ontological movement toward participation
in God. This movement is facilitated by the embedded wills of God in all created things, the
logoi. The logoi participate in the one Logos as their origin and as the means of their
eschatological fulfillment. God’s will for each individual being, their individuated logos,
includes an eschatological invitation built into the very nature of that being. The logoi remain
permanently embedded within creation. It is up to the freedom of created beings to respond to
them and facilitate their return, thus orienting them back toward God. The concept of the logoi,
for Maximus, is qualified by the Chalcedonian mode of communion. As already mentioned, this
preserves beings in their individuality and avoids assimilation. Maximus describes a communion
that is without change, without division, without separation, and without confusion that allows
for the free movement of created beings back to God as their origin and eschatological
fulfillment.
The whole cosmological vision as encompassed in this maximian doctrine of the logoi is
indispensable for understanding Maximus’ view of the human person and the central role of
humanity within creation. The vocation of all human persons is to offer creation back to God
through humanity’s deification and the deification of the entire creation, the conversion of the
logoi. This is not a task that humanity can carry out alone. Drawing on the Christological
tradition of his time, Maximus holds that humanity must participate in the new theandric energy
made possible by the hypostatic union of divine and human natures in Christ. The mutual
communion and participation of the human and the divine allows humanity to cross the
ontological distance without violating the status of God as apophatically Other. This union
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draws together all that is properly human. Within his schema, Maximus affirms the goodness of
the human body and human freedom describing their crucial role in the process of deification.
The communion of logoi is not limited to what is present within humanity. Through the
conversion of the logoi embedded in creation by Christ, and in Christ’s humanity, all of creation
is offered back to God. On account of the framework Maximus develops based upon the logoi,
Maximus depicts the unity of a single person, the whole of the Church, and all of creation as a
Eucharistic sacrifice of praise to God.
We can characterize the relationship between God and creation as the eucharistic
exchange of gifts. 6 This dialogic reciprocity takes place as the corporate unity of creation and
humanity, but it can also be understood on the individual level. It is in this framework that we
are enabled to present Maximus in a manner that is applicable to the ecclesial vocation of
individual lay persons. Logoi are presented as a free gift of God embedded within creation to
which the human person responds freely. An affirmative response to the logoi, in other words, a
free choice to return them as a gift to God is the act constitutive of a “micro-dialogue” between
God and that individual within the framework of a logoi-laden creation precisely as the means of
that dialogue.
I contend that this theology as a whole brings us to key insights that are applicable to the
current state of the theology of the laity on a number of grounds. First, Maximus shares a
concern for unity within the Church — and beyond the Church, the whole cosmos — as equal
participants in the praise of God. Second, the definition of the logoi and the understanding of
human mediation as a dialogic reciprocity between God and creation demonstrates that for

The summation of Maximus’ theology as a Eucharistic Ontology is masterfully presented by Loudovikos in
Nikolaos Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology: Maximus the Confessor’s Eschatological Ontology of Being as
Dialogical Reciprocity, trans. Elizabeth Theokritoff (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2010).
6
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Maximus the difference between God and the world is not one of separation based on mutually
exclusive realities but, rather, one of a distinction permitting communion without confusion.
With these insights in hand, I will address the dichotic concerns of the literature responding to
Vatican II in a way that not only de-problematizes them but reproposes them as distinctions
constitutive of the divine/human communion.
Using Maximus’ framework to answer the post-conciliar criticism has ramifications for
our interpretation of the conciliar documents. Returning to the description of the laity offered in
Lumen Gentium I will argue that viewing the priesthood of the laity through the maximian lens
expands upon the definition in ways that are helpful for understanding the laity as a concrete
vocation. The Confessor’s insights into the participative nature of theandric dialogical
reciprocity grant the tasks of the laity within the world eternal significance while striking the
proper theological tension between human and divine action. I argue that their daily selfoffering holds creation in communion with God as dialogic participants that can be experienced
now in a proleptic manner but await their final ratification in the eschaton.

Method
This project will adopt a synoptic method with the intention of developing a lens based
on the philosophical/theological system developed by Maximus the Confessor to address
questions that have arisen from contemporary ecclesiological discussions about the role of the
laity. There will be a historical component in regard to both of the topics being presented. First,
I will trace the discussion of the secular character from Vatican II to the current state of the
question. I will note the concerns that arise over the course of this analysis in order to provide
points for dialogue with Maximus’ thought. The second historical element will be the retrieval
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of Maximus’ thought, relying on primary texts and prominent maximian scholars to produce
insights beneficial for theological conversations outside of historical theology.
This task is a comparative one insofar as it seeks to juxtapose notions of secularity and
consecration from the discussion of 20th and 21st century theologies of the laity with those
developed by Maximus within his seventh century Byzantine milieu. The goal of this project is a
synthesis that augments the contemporary discussion with the hope of reconciling the concepts
of the goodness of creation with the human activity of consecrating the world to God.

Chapter Summaries
In the first chapter I will trace the state of the question of the theology of the laity from
Vatican II to the present. I will analyze Lumen Gentium, Apostolicum Actuositatem, and
Gaudium et Spes with the intention of drawing out their understanding of lay activity in the
world. I will discuss Lumen Gentium’s description of the laity and the exercise of the lay
priesthood as the consecration of the world to God. I will seek to contextualize this description
by taking account of the different ways the council describes the world and secular activity.
Properly understanding the way the conciliar documents use the lay priesthood and the world is
crucial because these issues are often problematized in the post-conciliar literature. The
remainder of chapter one will be spent considering responses to the council, in turn. I will
analyze the work of Leonard Doohan, Thomas O’Meara, Aurelie Hagstrom, Pope John Paul II,
Richard Gaillardetz, Paul Lakeland, and Edward Hahnenberg. In this analysis I will summarize
the contribution made by each author to the discussion on the laity. I will pay particular attention
to how each author interprets the concepts of the world and the exercise of mediation or a lay
priesthood within the world. Over the course of this analysis I will demonstrate how each author
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contributes or responds to the formulation of the dichotic pairs of laity/clergy, secular/sacred,
and world/God. These dichotomies become the foundation for the critique of the conciliar
description of the laity, functionally short-circuiting any understanding of the laity as Christians
with a priestly role.
In chapter two, I will describe Maximus’ cosmology in depth. Without a firm grasp on
how the Confessor understands the world, his thought on mediation and the human relationship
with God is incomprehensible. At the core of his view is the conviction that the world is good
while at the same time being other than God. Maximus clarified this thought in response to
Origen’s proposal that the world was created as a punishment for the sins of pre-incarnate
beings. With Origen as his foil, the Confessor outlines his vision for a world that participates in
God, is free, good, and brimming with eschatological promise that it will one day share in divine
activity. Far from a simple rejoinder to a competing argument, Maximus’ cosmology is based in
the monastic apophatic tradition and the definitions of the Council of Chalcedon (451 C.E.). The
Confessor’s cosmological tapestry coalesces in the notion of the logoi, the divine wills of God
embedded in creation and indissolubly bound to the good nature of each created being. It is by
these logoi and the possibility of their eschatological fulfillment that God seeks to fulfill the
desire to be embodied within creation.
With Maximus’ cosmology in hand, chapter three will focus on the vocation of humanity
and the human task of mediation. Behind Maximus’ anthropology is the claim that all humanity
is drawn up into the communion of God and humanity found in the person of Jesus Christ.
Maximus demonstrates how Christ fulfills the human vocation in himself and opens the way for
all of humanity to participate in the same task of offering the whole of creation to God through a
change in its mode, or tropos. The Confessor’s concept of deification as the progression from
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being, to well-being, to ever-well-being is key. The process is one that promotes unity through
participation and not assimilation. This includes the preservation of particularity within
deification. I will highlight specifically how the human body and freedom factor into Maximus’
vision for deification. The free communion of persons that includes all of creation is an apt
description for divinization. This dynamic takes place corporately within creation and liturgical
worship. The same can be said of individual beings. We will explore the expression of this
dynamic in its smallest scope through Loudovikos’ synthesis of Maximus as Eucharistic dialogic
reciprocity.
In the fourth chapter, I hope to achieve a creative synthesis between Maximus and
Vatican II’s theology of the laity. I will begin by applying Maximus’ worldview to the
aforementioned dichotomies and using Maximus as a foil for the views of post-conciliar
literature. The focus of this discussion will be whether Maximus can provide fitting answers to
the aporia raised by the dichotomies of laity/clergy, secular/sacred, world/God and how his view
impacts ecclesiology and the notion of mediation. Much of this will concern recognizing
distinctions in place of mutually exclusive division. One area that we will give substantial
attention is the concept of hierarchy in the work of Maximus and the influence and interpretation
of Dionysius the Areopagite. The second half of the chapter revisits the documents of the
Second Vatican Council and places them in dialogue with Maximus’ formulation of Christian
life as a dialogic encounter with God. It is my belief that the Confessor’s thought enriches the
Second Vatican Council beyond traversing the bespoke dichotomies. Viewing the priesthood of
the laity through a maximian lens leads to a number of conclusions about the manner of
communion, the redemption of creation, eschatology, and proleptic participation in these
realities.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE THEOLOGY OF THE LAITY IN VATICAN II AND ITS RECEPTION

This chapter will attempt to retrieve the Second Vatican Council’s theology of the laity
then trace its reception through the post-conciliar period into the 21st Century. There are two
objectives driving this analysis. First it will establish the state of the question of the theology of
the laity. This entails a survey of representative theologies of the laity within which we will
highlight key issues: their descriptions of the laity and the roles that they assign to the laity. An
issue interwoven throughout the discussion of the laity is their relationship to the role of the
clergy. The ubiquity of this lay/clergy distinction makes it a central point to follow in the
development of these theologies.
The second objective is to observe how the concepts of world and consecration relate to
each theological expression of the laity. The way a theology approaches the world often dictates
whether it is fitting to include the world in a dynamic of offering or consecration. As we will see
below, a theology’s description of the world is frequently tied to themes such as the relationship
of God and the world, the secular, the sacred, nature, grace, and mediation. After tracing the
contours of each authors thought our analysis will highlight their view of the world,
consecration, and mediation.

I. The Laity in the Documents of Vatican II
The Second Vatican Council’s teaching on the laity can be found in three key documents:
Lumen Gentium (LG), Apostolic Actuositatum (AA), and Gaudium et Spes (GS). AA and GS are
15

built upon the foundation laid by LG within the respective contexts of ministry and interaction
with the world. LG serves as the primary locus for our understanding of Vatican II’s teaching on
the laity. The Constitution on the Church thoroughly discusses the laity in an ecclesiological
context and provides the clearest reflection of the laity’s relationship to the world. Subsequently,
AA will help us see how the council envisions the laity in ministerial roles while GS will assist us
in seeing the laity’s concrete relationship to the world as well as describe the council’s attitude
toward the secular.
The council as a whole and these texts specifically occupy a turning point in Catholic
thought about the laity. They are the fruit of a century’s long conversation on the role of the laity
in the Church that began with the rise of lay activity in movements such as Catholic Action.
Rahner, Congar, Schillebeeckx, and Philips were among the notable periti who had already
published extensively about the laity before the calling of the council. 1 The role of the laity
within the Church occupied prominent place in the thought of these major influencers of the
council. These authors echoed the lay movement’s desire for involvement in the mission of the
Church and speculated upon a role for the laity that broke with theological assessments of the
laity as passive. The conciliar teaching found its nascent formulation in this conversation and the
prominent place the laity received in the documents granted this newfound understanding
legitimacy and permanence.

For a sampling of the conversation that lead to the shift in language at Vatican II see Yves Congar, Lay People in
the Church, (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1965). Karl Rahner, "The Lay Apostolate," Cross Currents 7, no. 3
(Summer 1957). Karl Rahner, Christian in the Market Place (London: Sheed & Ward, 1966). Edward
Schillebeeckx, "The Layman in the Church," in Vatican II: The Theological Dimension, ed. Anthony D. Lee
(Washington: Thomist Press, 1963). Edward Schillebeeckx, The Definition of the Christian Layman (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1970). Hans urs von Balthasar, The Laity and the Life of the Councils, trans. Brian McNeil
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003). Gérard Philips, The Role of the Laity in the Church, (Chicago: Fides
Publishers Association, 1956).
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As we shall see, in its formulation of the role of the laity in the Church, Lumen Gentium
acknowledges that the clergy and laity have an equal share in the Church’s life and mission. The
revolutionary nature of this statement alone can be appreciated if we contrast it with the thought
of Pope Pius X who, in the 1906 encyclical, Vehementer Nos, expressed an ecclesiological vision
that would be later contradicted by the council: “…the Church is by essence an unequal society,
that is, a society comprising two categories of persons, the pastors and the flock… the one duty
of the multitude is to allow themselves to be led, and, like a docile flock to follow the pastors.” 2
The sharp departure from the ecclesiological vision expressed within 19th Century
magisterial statements underscores the need to contextualize Vatican II’s texts. To this end, our
analysis of the documents will be supplemented with insights from the relatios that informed the
writing of the documents. This will help us understand the mind of the council fathers,
especially when it comes to the relationship between the laity and clergy as well as their attitude
toward the world as it is expressed in the totality of creation and “secular” realities.

A. The Structure of Lumen Gentium and the Unity of the Church
One of the overarching goals of the council fathers was to create a sense of equality
among all members of the Church. This was realized in two ways: the structure of the document
itself and the description of each position within the Church. Lumen Gentium describes the
whole Church together before moving on to discussing specific roles. Every member of the
Church holds a common identity in the sacramental witness of the Church: each is a member of
the “People of God,” the document’s dominant image of the Church which includes all of its

"Vehementor Nos: Encyclical of Pope Pius X on the French Law of Separation," accessed December 9, 2020,
2020, http://www.vatican.va/content/pius-x/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_11021906_vehementer-nos.html.
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members as the faithful. 3 The document is intentionally structured to emphasize an indivisible
unity among the members of the Church. It is only once this unity as the “People of God” is
established that LG moves on to address particular callings within the Church. 4
The groups that make up the People of God are here meant to offer distinctions within the
unity of the Church which acts as a whole: “All natural and functional differences are absorbed
into the same grace of redemption, love and hope, and the exercise of authority is only
permissible in the service of the universal calling of the new chosen people.” 5 The desire of unity
was also a rejection of an unequal ecclesial society. The fathers wanted to avoid “the danger of a
separation between rulers and subordinates” by expressing the mission and life of the Church in
a way that emphasized solidarity in Christ and only allowed distinctions that expressed
complementarity, bringing about a deeper unity. 6
The three groups named in LG are the ordained, the laity, and religious. The order of
these sections seeks to promote unity and correct preconceptions. The placement of the sections
on the ordained and vowed religious can serve as a demonstration. The hierarchy is only
discussed after the relationship between Christ and the whole People of God has been thoroughly
defined. The first paragraph defines the role of the hierarchy not as governance but as service. 7
This ensures that we understand the hierarchy’s role as servants of the Church and guards against
clericalism, the understanding that clergy are in themselves the only true members of the Church.
The section on the consecrated life follows the chapter on the Universal Call to Holiness. This
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demonstrates that this high calling is not reserved for religious life alone. Vowed religious are
committed to particular expressions of holiness to which the whole People of God is called.
This structure highlights the communion within distinction that the council fathers
desired. It is notable that the chapter on the laity does not have a similar complementary theme.
However, there may still be some logic in the placement of the chapter: if the chapter of the laity
came before the chapter on the hierarchy and subsequently the chapter on religious it could have
been interpreted as a move from non-specificity to particular calling. Placing the laity in line
with treatments of the hierarchy and religions life ensures that it is understood as an equal but
distinct calling and role in the Church’s life.

B. The Secular Character of the Laity
Chapter four of the constitution is exclusively devoted to the laity. This is novel for a
number of reasons. The council fathers worked to express a unique description of the laity,
offering a statement about their theological situation that went beyond membership in the
Church. 8 Previously, the laity may have been given mention in ecclesiological descriptions but
only in relation to the Church as a whole, they were “the faithful.” LG describes all Christians as
“faithful” within which the laity take up a distinct role.
Lumen Gentium 31 contains the clearest description of the laity’s role in the Church.
First, there is a negative definition that distinguishes the laity from other groups: the laity are all
the faithful who are neither ordained nor religious. 9 This in itself creates a fine distinction.
Previously, non-ordained members of religious orders would have been part of this definition. If
religious had been included in the lay group the definition would be a simple dichotomy: the
8
9
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laity are simply those who have not received the sacrament of Holy Orders. The defining
character of each group is here related to the role that each plays in light of one another and the
Body of Christ as a whole. This being the case, the positive definition of the laity begins with
what is held in common by all members of the Church: through baptism the laity share in the
threefold office of priest, prophet, and king, a share in the ministry of Christ. The laity’s share in
those offices is notable and novel. The offices of priest, prophet and king had previously
reserved for the role of the ordained, specifically the bishop. According to Gerard Philips,
recognizing that these offices are universal guarantees that “any form of clericalism is rooted out
from the start.” 10 The laity bear these offices in their own expression of the Church’s mission to
the world.
The secular nature of the laity is named as their distinctive character. The document is
careful not to create an exclusive realm for lay activity: the whole church has contact with the
world and is therefore a sense secular. Members of the clergy may have secular professions but
their identity is bound to their role as sacred ministers. Professed religious encounter the secular
but as a part of their call to testify to the world. What sets the laity apart is not that they have a
permanent relationship to the world but that as a norm their identity and mission is to “seek the
kingdom of God by engaging in temporal affairs and by ordering them according to the plan of
God.” 11 There are two complementary functions of the laity in their role: they work to bring
about God’s reign through their own work and give testimony through their life in the
theological virtues. These two tasks are woven together so as not to grant priority of one over
the other. The secular activity of the laity cannot be reduced to a form of work deprived of
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witness. Conversely it cannot seek to offer testimony without working for the right order of
secular affairs.
The secular character is not a means for limiting lay activity but reveals the theological
import of human activity that lies beyond the scope of traditional ecclesial action. Much of what
is described in the mission of the laity has to do with activities beyond explicit action in, for, or
on behalf of the Church. The vast majority of the People of God consists of lay persons who do
not identify as ministers, teachers, or professional volunteers at work in the Church. In their
description of the secular character, the fathers desired to give “a realistic description of the life
of the layman (sic) who is called to give testimony to Christ and to radiate his spirit everywhere,
especially in his home.” 12 Hence, the “temporal affairs” and their ordering to the plan of God are
not limited to occupations but encompass the whole life of the layperson, their family life,
relaxation, and hardships. 13
The life of the laity is framed with pneumatological imagery: the implication that the laity
are the instrument of the Spirit. The laity are not simply “in the world,” called by God, they are
“led by the Spirit.” Their collective action within the world works as a leaven. The leaven image
can be interpreted pneumatologically. Yeast, folded into dough makes the dough rise and
expand by releasing air into it. The process creates a multitude of tiny air pockets that stretch the
dough. In this light, the laity breathe God’s Spirit into the ordinary affairs of life that would be
impossible without the interpenetration of their whole selves with these realities.
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C. Laity and Clergy: Distinct Groups with Shared Tasks
The inclusions of daily realities in the list of lay activity demonstrates that the lay task
emphasizes the particularity of their circumstances over the uniqueness of the activity. They
hold many of these activities in common with the other groups that make up the Church but
engage them in their own particularity. Gaudium et Spes states clearly: “secular duties and
activities belong properly although not exclusively to laymen.” 14 Admitting anything less would
imply that clergy and religious somehow do not have “daily occupations” or partake in “physical
and mental relaxation.” In an expansion of the leaven image, the laity are not doing something
different than the other members of the faithful, they are breathing the Spirit into their specific
part of the dough in a way that only they can. 15
While the discussion of mutually exclusive realms of activity for laity and clergy
dominates the post-conciliar literature, attempts to find a sharp distinction within the text itself
ultimately fail. The closest the documents come to this is within the description of Christ’s
redemptive work in Apostolicum Actuositatem. Therein, the fathers distinguish between the
spiritual and temporal orders to underscore their ultimate destiny: to be unified in the singular
plan of God. 16 The distinctions are meant to be held in an overarching unity of activity. This
unity was the intention of the document’s authors, who battled the temptations to adopt an
approach that would result in “extreme positions” of totally breaking down the distinction of the
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clergy and the laity or separating them so much that they would become totally disconnected
from one another. 17
This being so, the ecclesiology of Vatican II does not bar the laity from being active in
internal church affairs but encourages their involvement. Just as LG acknowledges that clergy
act within the world, so AA describes lay activity within the Church. The laity, to differing
degrees that depend on practical circumstances, can share in the inner workings of the Church
including catechesis and the management of Church affairs. 18 It is only by pooling the resources
of the clergy and laity that the mission of the Church is realized. This involvement of the laity in
the internal life of Church and the activity of the clergy in the secular world do not cancel out
their distinct identities. These exceptions weaken claims to mutually exclusive spheres of the
sacral and secular. In short, the descriptions of the clergy, laity, and religious are not draconian
norms to be enforced. They describe the normal way by which the Church works as a body
toward the same mission. The result is a fulness of work and witness accomplished in the Spirit:
“Thus in their diversity all bear witness to the wonderful unity in the Body of Christ. This very
diversity of graces, ministries and works gathers the children of God into one, because ‘all these
things are the work of one and the same Spirit’.” 19

D. Lay Priesthood and the World
The laity’s contribution to this shared task, the secular character of the laity, is most
clearly expressed in two prominent themes: the exercise of the priesthood of the laity and their
relationship with the world. The laity, having a share in the threefold office of Christ make
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manifest Christ’s priesthood in their own way. Their priestly function is one that gathers their
work and experiences, offering them as “spiritual worship for the glory of God and the salvation
of men.” 20 This is not an encouragement toward an individualistic mindset of the laity, as though
their offering remains hidden in the obscurity of private living. The laity’s role is liturgical: they
unite these realities to the “offering of the Lord's body, they are most fittingly offered in the
celebration of the Eucharist. Thus, as those everywhere who adore in holy activity, the laity
consecrate the world itself to God.”
The definition of the lay priesthood is both pneumatological and christological. The
pneumatological permeates the description given in LG 34: the priesthood of the laity is “vivified
in the Spirit,” “anointed by the Holy Spirit,” the laity “bear fruits of the Spirit,” their activities
“carried out in the Spirit” all become “spiritual sacrifices.” 21 Christ is likewise active in the laity,
willing to “continue his witness and service” in them, sharing “His life and His mission,” the
laity are “dedicated to Christ,” their sacrifices made “through Jesus Christ” and reach the
pinnacle of their expression untied with “the offering of the Lord’s body” at the Eucharistic
table. 22 The Christological and pneumatological imagery does not represent a confluence of
theological register, an issue that we will return to later in the chapter. The perichoretic account
of the lay priesthood is pleromatic. The theological impetus for lay activity comes from the
fulness of the divine unity. This definition does not allow for a conflict between Christic and
pnuematologic elements but rather expresses their unity.
The words that the council uses for these actions are cultic. The laity offer, adore, and
consecrate. 23 The council places the liturgical and the daily activities of the faithful into a
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profound dialogue with one another. Sacrasanctum Concilium confirms this from its liturgycentric perspective. The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy demonstrates the centrality of the
celebration of the Eucharist for lay life. It is there that they make their own offering “not only
through the hands of the priest, but also with him, they learn to offer themselves; through Christ
the mediator.” 24 Earlier in the same document, the liturgy, “most of all in the divine sacrifice of
the Eucharist,” is described as the place “through which the work of redemption is
accomplished.” 25 Keeping in mind the council’s use of the term “faithful” to connote every
member of the Church, we can conclude that the lay action and offering make up a crucial
element of the one sacrifice offered by the Church which gathers all into a redemptive act, an
expression of life, made manifest to others. 26
The common sharing in the redemptive act is a participation in the priesthood of Christ.
The laity exercise this priesthood by virtue of their baptism in which they were “plunged into the
paschal mystery of Christ.” 27 Being caught up in the redemptive work of Christ himself and in
the spirit of adoption that brings about sharing in the life of the Father and Son, the faithful
become “true adorers whom the Father seeks.” 28 The participation in the mystery helps uncover
the active mode of this adoration which is itself a participation in the Eucharistic sacrifice. SC
contextualizes and affirms the teaching of LG that the laity exercise their priesthood as “those
everywhere who adore in holy activity, the laity consecrate the world itself to God.” 29
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The priesthood of the laity demonstrates an exitus/reditus structure. Their action in the
world is a procession and the gathering and coming together as an offering is itself a return. This
same dynamic is present in the council’s description of the liturgy which “is the summit toward
which the activity of the Church is directed; at the same time it is the font from which all her
power flows.” 30 Lay men and women go out into the world and make Christ and the Church
present in places that none else are able, bringing the same life and mission that invigorates the
body to those they encounter. 31 They also gather the world up through their daily living, making
of it an offering constitutive of the Eucharistic sacrifice. 32 This outward and inward movement of
the laity and the secular character that distinguishes lay life imply a mission to the world. What
does the council say about the world?

E. Vatican II on the World
LG in particular refers to the primary realm of lay activity using three words: the world,
the secular, and temporal. The “temporal” can refer to resources, ostensibly commodities and
monies necessary for carrying on the Church’s mission. 33 The laity are said to order “temporal
affairs” to God’s plan, which is closely related to social realities, including professions. 34
“Temporal service” is also used to describe charitable works of serving the sick and poor. 35
Similarly, “secular” is used as a qualification for human activity that is not directly linked
to religious activity. The term describes training, business, professions, occupations, and
activity. While these activities do not occur within an overtly religious sphere and are
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distinguished from the sacred activity undertaken by the Church they cannot be separated from
the sacred: “even in secular business there is no human activity which can be withdrawn from
God's dominion.” 36 Both temporal and secular seem to be dealing with human activity - they are
characterized by human interactions and give rise to human experience that can be subsequently
offered as a spiritual sacrifice.
The term “world” (mundi) is used with a diverse range of meaning. Following is a study
of these usages from the conciliar documents directly relevant to this project. We shall consider
the council’s overall attitude to the world after having catalogued the various ways of addressing
it.
The world as setting. As a backdrop for human action, the world can be seen as a
location in which humanity lives and works. This is often accompanied by setting the Church
apart from the world. The world is a sphere in which the Christian faithful live but without
belonging to. 37 It is from the world understood as a setting, a sphere of action, that lay action can
be described as having a secular character. The witness of the Church is said to be “before the
world.” 38
The bespoke characteristic of “other” projected upon the world by the Church might lead
us to conclude that the council fathers maintained a negative evaluation of the world as a whole.
Particularly, passages from LG contain phrases such as “persecutions of the world” 39 and names
“the world-rulers of this darkness.” 40 Indeed the same document states that the world is in need
of revelation that comes from God through the actions of the Church. 41 These terms do not apply
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to the world as a sphere of activity or to the natural world as such but to human actors within the
world. Those who commit persecution or rule the world in a way that rejects the light cast upon
the world by God through the Church. LG does not reject the world but calls the faithful not to
be attached to it because of its contingent nature. The Church as a whole and the laity in their
concrete interactions does not seek out the goods of the world for their own sake nor come to
terms with the world because the world is “passing away.” 42
The world as humanity opposed to the Church. In a second way of understanding the
council’s use of the term, the world is not only the setting for human action but is itself the
subject of the Church’s mission. There is a desire that the “whole world” might enter into a
relationship with Christ. 43 The world is addressed in a way that draws attention to the occupants
of the world over the understanding of the world as a place. The Church works that the “entire
world may become the People of God...” 44 As with the world-rulers mentioned above, “world” is
used as a euphemism for sinful occupants in need of redemption. 45
The world as the subject of God’s plan. The world is addressed in a way that does not
label it as a background for human activity or as an indirect way of addressing its occupants.
Many passages bring this usage into clarity. The People of God are urged to “love God the
Father as well as the world and men in Him.” 46 This shows intentional use of the world as
distinct from humanity. In like passages, the world is addressed as a subject of God’s plan. 47
This includes mentions of the natural world as such, created by God in his goodness. 48 It is in
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this sense of the world that the laity act within it and offer it up for consecration. 49 The world is a
participant in the drama of salvation that shares in the liminal nature characteristic of that drama.
GS emphasizes the goodness of the world while yearning for its redemption: “that world which
the Christian sees as created and sustained by its Maker's love, fallen indeed into the bondage of
sin, yet emancipated now by Christ.” 50 There is still something to be accomplished in the process
of this redemption as the world can still be sanctified and has yet to undergo its final
transformation. 51
This highlights the eschatological destiny of the world. Though the council
acknowledges the passing nature of the world, the ultimate end of the world is its redemption.
This is in the sense of the world understood as distinct from its occupants. The world itself is not
a temporary setting to be abandoned. It will be created anew by Christ: “He Himself intends to
raise up the whole world again in Christ and to make it a new creation, initially on earth and
completely on the last day.” 52 The whole of creation has a lasting place in God’s plan and is to
be valued. Its final destiny to be “permeated by the spirit of Christ.” 53 This consummation is
accomplished by God Himself. The world will undergo “renovation” at the Eschaton. 54
There is a reciprocal relationship between the goodness of the world, the goodness of
humanity and humanity’s activity within the world which includes its consecration. GS joins the
eschatological destiny of the world to human life and makes the goodness of the world one of the
reasons for humanity’s dignity:
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Though made of body and soul, man is one. Through his bodily composition he gathers
to himself the elements of the material world; thus they reach their crown through him,
and through him raise their voice in free praise of the Creator. For this reason, man is not
allowed to despise his bodily life, rather he is obliged to regard his body as good and
honorable since God has created it and will raise it up on the last day. 55

Here the goodness of the world as expressed in Vatican II informs the consecration of the world
of LG 34. The world that God has created and redeemed as good finds its culmination not on its
independent goodness but by the gathering up into human action and its recapitulation as praise
to the Creator. Reciprocally, the task itself elevates humanity’s activity which cannot be
confused with a gnostic world/matter rejection. On the contrary, GS links human dignity to the
goodness of creation of which humanity is composed and acts within.
The veracity of Vatican II’s positive valuation of the world as good, created, natural order
is confirmed by key contributors to LG. We can discern that the above passage takes many cues
from Congar who brought the goodness of the created order to the forefront of his thought about
lay action in the world. For Congar, the world does not simply serve as a backdrop of
humanity’s salvation but is itself transformed and renewed. 56 Against any dualist schema,
Congar declares that “final salvation will be achieved by a wonderful refloation of our earthly
vessel rather than by a transfer of survivors to another ship wholly built by God.” 57 God is
already accomplishing this work in the world but remains only “transiently, precariously,
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fragmentarily, and generally unperceived.” 58 Gerard Philips shares the same attitude and in his
recounting of the formation of the document describes the goodness of creation, permeated by
grace as the raw material that the laity offer up in their sacrifice. 59 Ordinary life is consecrated as
a participation in this dynamic of divine transformation.

F. Conclusion – Vatican II
The major theme of unity steers Vatican II’s ecclesiology. The structure and content of
the Constitution on the Church demonstrates a renewal of that unity that is expressed by three
distinct yet complementary groups. By virtue of their baptism, all share in the mission of the
Church. The recognition of distinction is not intended, therefore, to result in divisions between
states of life or a picture of the Church consisting of higher or lower “classes.”
As sharers in the one mission of the Church to the world, the laity are called by the
council to embrace a distinctive role within the temporal realities of the world. This does not
forbid the laity to be part of internal Church affairs but as a matter of distinction names the
secular professions as the normal location in which lay life is lived.
Lay activity in the world gains profound theological significance when we consider the
exercise of baptismal priesthood as a participation in eschatological world renewal. The
consecration of their daily realities interpenetrates their own journey in which they gather up
creation and make of it an offering. The consecration of the world does not here negate the
goodness of the world but gathers it up into the Eucharistic offering instituted by Christ.
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II. Post-Conciliar Theologies
The development of post-conciliar theologies of the laity can be framed in the register of
reception. Views on the laity’s role change based upon how the fourth chapter of LG is
interpreted. The view of the magisterium and theological schools aligned with it accepted the
language of the secular character as the definitive mission for the laity. This is can be clearly
seen in the works of Pope John Paul II. The positive reception holds that theological reflection
on the lay state should start with the terms set by this document and remain firmly within the
categories expressed therein.
A parallel school of lay theology developed which view the council as a new starting
point for reflection on the lay state. This form of reception differs from the first in that the
teaching of LG is not seen as a limit but the provider of momentum for a new trajectory. I will
call this school the “developmental” school of lay theology because it sees the texts of Vatican II
as a crucial yet provisional point of development. For this school, Lumen Gentium is a step away
from the subservient understanding of the laity that had pervaded the Church in the past. As a
trajectory, the connotation taken up by the developmental school is that there is something yet to
be grasped about the lay state. LG paved the way for a journey that could not have been
completed during the time of the council. Further exploration was not only possible, it is
required it if this new trajectory is to arrive at a fruitful destination. Based upon the
understanding that LG did not provide the last word on the matter of the laity, developmental
thinkers engaged the text of LG with an evaluatory lens. Some concepts, such as the equality of
all the faithful derived from baptism, would be underscored and further developed. Others would
be criticized or jettisoned altogether.
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The secular character of the laity became the prominent subject of such criticism. Even
though it was the central facet of the document’s role for the laity, those who sought to further
develop an ecclesiology focused on the laity discarded the language due to its assumption of a
mutually exclusive dichotomy between the sacred and the secular. This view was underwritten
by developments within 20th Century theologies of grace which would reject such a dichotomy.
In the following, I will outline the discussion on the laity from the 1980s to the 21st
century literature on the laity. The development of thought on the laity is less a discussion and
more of an expression of two parallel schools that formed as a result of the aforementioned
modes of reception. While the magisterial school remains constant in its insistence upon the
lay/clergy distinction and the upholding of ecclesial structures, the developmental school begins
by questioning the usefulness of the lay/clergy distinction. At first the laity/clergy distinction is
associated with the sacred/secular dichotomy in a passing manner. Near the turn of the 21st
century, the developmental school became insistent that the secular/sacred and God/world
dichotomies were central reasons for rejecting the laity/clergy distinction. These texts
demonstrate an incompatibility of the goodness of the world with the concept of
consecration/mediation which connects the latter to the lay/clergy dichotomy.

A. Leonard Doohan
In his 1984 monograph The Lay Centered Church, Leonard Doohan describes an
ecclesiological vision that frames the very identity of the Church in the key of mission. He
regards the conciliar teachings on the laity as a starting point for reflection on the lay vocation.
Vatican II did not offer a “finished theological evaluation of the layperson’s life and ministry”
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but brought to the surface a new way of approaching ecclesiology. 60 Doohan claims that the
conciliar documents bear this process out. He compares the definitions written in 1962 with
those of 1964, calling the former a “negative and clerical definition of the laity” and the latter an
“ecclesial vision of the layperson.” 61 Seeking to further explore this new understanding, Doohan
places baptism at the center of his ecclesiological reflection. From this shared initiation into the
Christian community Doohan derives a shared mission: every baptized Christian has a mandate
for ministry. Doohan’s reflection on the baptismal call is an invitation for the whole Church to
rediscover the universal call to ministry.
At the outset of his work, Doohan embarks on a detailed analysis of different
ecclesiological approaches. He evaluates six models that attempt to describe the role of the laity
which span the development of thought on the laity from before Vatican II to works
contemporary to his writing. Doohan’s account of these theologies does not simply catalogue
each view but includes his own evaluations of their strengths and weaknesses. A brief
consideration of these six models will serve as a bridge spanning the twenty years between the
conciliar documents and the time of Doohan’s writing.
First, Doohan reviews the concept of the work of the laity as “Instrumental Ministry.”
The laity participate in the mission of the Church as the instrument of the clerical hierarchy. The
laity acts as instruments of the clergy whether the work concerns internal works of the Church,
assisting in tasks that are properly the work of the clergy, as well as when they participate in the
outward facing work of the Church within the world. The concept of “instrument” is borrowed
from Aristotelean philosophy. The laity work but only in participation with and at the behest of
the clergy. At the basis of this ecclesiological model is the assumption that the Church’s mission
60
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is the mission of the hierarchy and that the most the laity can do is share in this work as an
instrument. 62
Doohan recognizes the ability of this ecclesiology to express the unity of the Church and
describes the interplay between the clergy and laity as a “dynamic interrelationship ... [that]
brings the liturgical, sacramental, transformational, and sanctifying essence of the Church to the
world.” 63 His criticism of this approach is framed by a quote from Gerard Philips, one of the
architects of Vatican II’s description of the laity, in which the Belgian priest wonders in the guise
of a hypothetical protestant whether “in the presence of such authority there remains any liberty
for the harassed and stifled Catholic.” 64
The critique of this position gained momentum during and after the council. Doohan
relates the reservations of both Schillebeeckx and Congar. In his own words, Doohan rejects this
position since it “can easily lead to clericalization and power positions ... and to a lack of
initiative and personal responsibility among the laity.” 65 An instrumental approach was “the best
approach for its time.” The post-conciliar Church would require something different.
Doohan notes that the second ecclesiology he evaluates is based upon a positive view of
the world. The theology of the “Ecclesial Presence to the World” is itself a “new approach to the
theology of the laity,” one which was supported by many of the theologians who heavily
influenced the council, including Congar, Rahner, and Schillebeeckx. The thrust of this view is
that the laity “are seen as the bridge between the world Church and the world, the Church’s
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presence in the world.” 66 Doohan praises the rejection of a Christian spirituality that glorifies a
flight from the world. 67 The action of the laity is world-affirming and serves as an expression of
the laity in their mundane, daily tasks.
Despite his praise, Doohan thinks that this view expresses a fundamentally errant
theological distinction. By portraying the lay person as “worldly,” proponents of the ecclesial
presence view assumes the “superficial distinction between ‘priest/sacred’ and ‘lay/temporal’.” 68
Doohan rejects this false sacred/secular dichotomy on the grounds that there are no mutually
exclusive and distinct spheres for action of the laity and clergy.
Doohan includes in this criticism the kernel of his own thesis: “the laity are not a bridge
between the Church and the world; the laity are Church.” 69 Here we can discern Doohan’s deep
concern that there be no divisions within the body of Christian believers based upon a
sacred/secular distinction. Doohan’s desire is for a universal description of the faithful. He
rejects the ecclesial presence model that would necessitate a lay/clergy distinction in favor of a
theology that includes all the baptized.
Doohan distinguishes between this ecclesial presence model and a second position that
can be derived from the conciliar documents: Theology of World Transformation. Doohan
suggests that conciliar periti are not the principal authors of this view but “lay people, who, once
committed to the life-style implied in [the ecclesial presence model], realized that one is not truly
present to the world without attempting to transform the world.” 70 These lay people are “for the
world.” 71 Those who are active within the world see that the world is not how God intended it to
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be and thus set out to transform it. In accord with the view that Congar expressed in Lay People
in the Church, this ecclesiology acknowledges that the world is not only the context of salvation
but itself needs to be redeemed. Quoting LG 34, Doohan explains that “in this theology,
laypersons are agents in the consecration of the universe to God. They are committed to the
world, use it with detachment, heal it of sin, animate it with Christ’s spirit, transform it into what
it is capable of being, dominate it, and consecrate the world to God in Christ.” 72 The project of
world consecration brings about both individual and collective action reflected in a concern for
social justice and political involvement.
Despite his positive description of world transformation, Doohan ultimately rejects this
theology. He lauds the approach as “strong and satisfying,” affirming something of a secular
character. This view describes action that is “specific of lay life.” 73 The critique that Doohan
offers does not come from the theological reasoning of this position but is based on practical
grounds. He claims that this way of conceiving the world is so different from a common
understanding of how the life of the laity has been previously described that it would make it too
difficult for the laity to understand their role. He worries that there is a risk that they may lose
faith and become too invested in secular affairs. Finally, he offers a caution that those involved
in world-transforming ministry should “keep clearly in mind the distinction between our work
and God’s” - lest the faith be forgotten and a new form of Pelagianism develop. 74
The final three models represent post-conciliar developments that reframe the discussion
of the laity through a variety of emphases: one on community rather than the hierarchy (Ecclesial
Restructuring), a concentration on the particularity of each individual lay call (the Self-
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Discovery of the Laity), and the abandoning of a specific lay “role” within the Church (Laity as
Integrally Church). Each of these views progressively shifts the discussion from Church
structure to the life of the lay person.
The first shift, in Ecclesial Restructuring is based upon the whole Church as the People of
God and the common call to mission but maintains a focus that is decisively intra-ecclesial. This
view focuses on the laity not in the midst of what the council would have called their “secular”
activities but instead how they contribute to the ministry of the Church. Doohan notes that this
view poses a danger in that it “has a touch of narcissism” and would be difficult to develop in a
way that included those who do not do consciously participate in ministry. 75
The Self-Discovery of the Laity is far more flexible than Ecclesial Restructuring since it
describes a wider scope of human activity. This approach is more a spirituality than a theology,
carrying with it an invitation for reflection on the myriad of situations lay persons find
themselves in. The fuel for this reflection is a laity who have embraced their own particular life
and mission. These are often situational, eliciting responses to specific needs. Doohan makes it
clear that this approach is one that is on the way to producing deeper understandings of the life of
the Church but is not yet fully developed. Similar to his critique of ministries that attempt world
transformation, Doohan cautions that embracing such particularity may lead to a loss of a sense
that these actors belong to a structured Church. Focusing too directly on particular situations
may lead to a “psychological opting out of structured Church.” 76
The critique of the Self-Discovery model reveals one of Doohan’s key concerns: he
wants to protect against the laity being somehow separate from the life of the Church as it was
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expressed in the Instrumental Ministry model wherein the laity only had a share in the Church’s
ministry - and to a point the Church’s life - as an extension of hierarchic activity.
Doohan’s own position makes the separation impossible. He rejects the notion that the
laity have a role within the Church that could somehow be delineated and distinguish them from
the whole. The final view that Doohan considers in his overview of ecclesiologies is his own:
the Laity as Integrally Church. In essence, Doohan proposes a breaking down of any intraecclesial distinction, “convinced that the term laity is now theologically dead.” 77 This is because
for Doohan there is no quest for the lay identity, the laity are Church.
Doohan declares lay theology dead for three reasons: first, the term laity, as it was
originally derived from laos, meaning people has lost its original intent of describing the people
of God. Cordoning off a select membership of the Church that has a role to be active in the
world “emphasizes the distinction between sacred and profane.” 78 The result of this distinction
communicates a separation between these spheres and leads to an image of God that is only
indirectly accessible. Due to these problems, Doohan concludes that a lay/clergy distinction only
serves to oppress the laity.
Reimaging the Church without this distinction ensures that every member has an equal
share in the Church’s life and mission. Doohan’s continued use of the term “laity” to describe
non-ordained members of the Church serves to underline his point. He uses the term in a way
that is all-encompassing. The mission of the laity is the mission of the Church. Doohan
identifies the laity with the Church: “There is no particular vocation for the laity in the Church,
no need of a quest for lay identity. Being Church in its fullness is the spirituality for the laity.” 79
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The breaking down of distinction yields a universality of mission: The Church’s mission
is one. The mission embraces a total ecclesiology that Doohan presents as a mission in the heart
of the world: “to be Church means to live as a community in the world for the service of the
world. It means to live as a member of the Church at the heart of the world, and also as a
member of the world community at the heart of the Church.” 80 At its most basic level for
Doohan: the Church is a sacrament of unity.
Doohan’s project is aimed at one overarching goal: to shore up the Church’s identity as a
non-divisible unity which results in an equal value of the ministry of the Church’s members. In a
sense, Doohan reframes all of Christian activity as ministry. He distinguishes between work that
that is done for “ecclesial community’s own internal needs” calling this work both important but
secondary. 81 He is far more concerned with the ministry of the Church to the world. This is the
mission of all of the baptized, a ministry without distinction, a mission that is done in Christ’s
name in and for the world. Yet every member of the Church participates in the ministry of the
Church ad intra and ad extra as a matter of “right and responsibility.” 82
The lay/clergy distinction resists the ecclesial unity that drives Doohan’s thesis so it must
be done away with. Any positive formulations for either would be a rejection of a total
ecclesiology. Bracketing this division, the theological position Doohan presents, prima facie,
seems no different than some of the views he evaluates at the outset of his work. The Church
presents Christ to the world in the mode of sacramental presence and witness in a way that is
very similar to both the Ecclesial Presence in the World and the Transformation of the World
models. The difference lies in Doohan’s difficulty in expressing the connection between the life
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of the Church in sacrament and prayer and the Church’s action in the world. He replaces the
idea of connection with identity. The members of the Church serve as the ministers to the world
by their life as worshippers as well as actors within the world. When he does speak of dedicated
action in the world, he cautions repeatedly against two extremes: an assumption that the work
done by the Church in the world is done by humans alone as well as the danger that actors in the
world may become too individualistic and forget their place in the larger Church community. 83
Similarly, there is no detailed discussion about the Church’s liturgical life as such, simply
that the whole Church has a sharing in it. Doohan here omits the discussion about the underlying
concepts that gave rise the clergy/laity distinction in the first place. Doohan does not reject the
Church’s sacramental life but proposes that there is an inordinate emphasis on the ordained
priesthood without a properly developed view of the priesthood of all the baptized. 84 This
underscores the issue that was at the center of Doohan’s focus: equality within the Church and
the universal sharing in her mission. The nuances of this and its theological impact would be
worked out by subsequent authors.

B. Thomas O’Meara
In Theology of Ministry, first published in 1983, Thomas O’Meara seeks both to clarify
the term ministry and to cement its place at the center of the life of the Church. O’Meara revised
the book in 1999 with an emphasis on the centrality of the parish for contemporary
ecclesiologies. The impetus for writing this work and the subsequent revision is the postconciliar experience of the Church. O’Meara seeks to provide a theological explanation of the
growing number of laity engaged in ministry. Like Doohan, O’Meara does not view the Second
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Vatican Council as a definitive statement of ecclesial realities but sees it as a foundation to build
upon, “a ‘tradition-event.’” 85
O’Meara’s thesis is that ministry makes up the central “facet of baptized life.” 86 Through
the course of the work, he unpacks a specific definition of ministry in place of ever-increasing
use of the term, protecting it from becoming “confused, sterile, even duplicitous” by its universal
adoption and overuse. 87 Ministry is specific activity to which each Christian is called but does
not encompass all of human activity. 88 There is a note of particularity in O’Meara’s description:
the call to ministry happens at certain times in life and is a call that originates in the Spirit.
O’Meara is so concerned with defining and applying ministry because it forms the heart
of his ecclesiological vision. The Church exists for ministry and the organization of the Church
is based on the expression of ministry within the contemporary social context. O’Meara
describes the Church as a social reality and as such, the Church must “live out the dynamic of
their people, ... [or] die.” 89 Ministries are an expression of social reality for O’Meara. There can
be no theoretical office without a ministry carried out in praxis. The naming of an office
detached from such an expression, O’Meara decries as nominalism. 90 Among the manifestations
of nominalism in the Church the key example for O’Meara is the lay/clergy distinction: “an
arbitrary designation of some ministries and ordinations as given by divine institution and as
worthy of sacramental liturgy.” 91 Outlining historical developments as well as prominent preconciliar ecclesiologies, O’Meara presents a convincing case that the balance of power expressed

Thomas O’Meara, Theology of Ministry (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), 15.
Thomas O’Meara, Theology of Ministry (Paulist Press, 1983), 3.
87
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 83, 144.
88
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 83, 4.
89
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 83, 11.
90
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 83, 145.
91
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 83, 192.
85
86

42

in the exclusivity of governance and practice of ministry by the clergy has resulted in a laity who
have resigned themselves to a passive reception and inaction.
In the course of his historical analysis, O’Meara reflects upon a model of ministry
centered on the hierarchy. He traces this understanding to the Parisian school which during the
middle ages adopted the teachings of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. 92 The thought of a sixthcentury Syrian monk “held a singular position” due to the belief that it was really the writings of
Denys, converted by Paul in the book of Acts. 93 This hierarchical way of thinking is at the root
of the active clergy and passive laity. In the neo-platonic schema, the clergy formed a triad that
had the responsibility of passing on the ability to become divinized through a process of
purification, illumination, and unification. These powers were conferred from one rank of
hierarch to the next until they reached the passive monk, laity, and catechumens. 94 This ensured
that the role of ministerial mediation rested solely within the activity of the clergy. Noting
O’Meara’s understanding of Pseudo-Dionysius is pertinent due to the temporal proximity and
theological influence he had on Maximus’ work. It is also important to note that O’Meara
represents a specifically Neo-Scholastic interpretation of Dionysius and the concept of hierarchy.
I believe that this is a misinterpretation of the Areopagite’s work and argue for an opposing view
in chapter 4.
O’Meara traces the influence of this hierarchical mode through Aquinas and a continual
“ministerial reduction” that focused on the power of the clergy to communicate these realities
through the sacraments, especially the Eucharist. 95 The apex of this understanding, O’Meara
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marks as “sacerdotalization” or “Christification.” These terms acknowledged the clergy as the
sole sharer in the ministry of Christ. 96 Coupled with the social framework inherited from a feudal
understanding of the class rank, the clergy became not only those who were entrusted with
mysteries that sanctify but superiors, ex officio to the laity.
O’Meara’s analysis of the historical relationship between clergy and laity as class
differences and subsequent call to dissolve the distinction is marked by the conclusion that the
lay-clergy relationship will always result in inequality. During a synopsis of the historical
development of the terms clergy and laity, O’Meara notes that “class distinctions come in pairs.
While the clergy became an elevated, sacral state, the laity became a passive group.” 97 He treats
this disparity as a matter of necessity despite softening the logic by stating that “dualism usually
means that one pair has an inferior position.” 98 O’Meara does not entertain a re-imaging of the
clergy-lay relationship without this imbalance.
The term “lay” has changed from connoting the member of a wider people to
distinguishing one who is in the lowest place. “Layperson” is a phenomenologically pejorative
term: it can only be defined in a negative comparison to the bishop, priest, and deacon. In place
of layperson, O’Meara’s ecclesiological register embraces pneumatologically gifted charisms,
sacramental in their own right.
O’Meara’s own definition of ministry develops out of his reception of the definitions of
Vatican II. He critiques the council’s use of the term ministry, claiming that it is too imprecise.
One such shortcoming is a focus on witness. Witnessing does not fall under his definition of
ministry, especially the “sign ministry” of those that witness in the course of their ordinary
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lives. 99 O’Meara admits that this witnessing certainly takes its cue from the sort of lay apostolate
encouraged by Vatican II though it is not specific enough. He labels the call of LG 31 for the
laity to bring the Gospel into their own particular, exclusive circumstances a “metaphorical
vision.” 100
O’Meara links this vaguery to the passivity of the laity in activities that are internal to the
Church, especially the liturgical roles surrounding the sacraments and preaching. He claims a
strong connection between ministry in one’s own life and active liturgical participation.
Liturgical roles that minister to the Church community cannot be compartmentalized from their
outward expression in the world. O’Meara cites this in a negative fashion, as a hindrance to
further developing the laity in the Church: “The theologies of the laity in this century failed in
their attempt to give the laity a place in the community precisely because they joined a liturgical
role that was passive or routine to a vaguely defined role of witnessing in the world.” 101 He
judges Vatican II’s stance on the laity to be passive on both counts.
The church’s mistaken focus on ordinations and offices gives rise to nominalism.
Instead, ministries come from pneumatological gifts, charisms. “Christian ministry is the public
activity of a baptized follower of Jesus Christ flowing from the Spirit’s charism and an
individual personality on behalf of a Christian community to witness to, serve and realize the
kingdom of God.” 102 As the basis for Christian initiation and the fundamental encounter with the
Spirit, baptism is the only qualification for the exercise of charismatic gifts in ministry. The
common source of these gifts does not make every baptized Christian a minister all of the time.
Nor does O’Meara’s rejection of the lay-clergy distinction mean that he sees no strata within

O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 83, 139.
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 131.
101
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 143.
102
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 83, 143.
99

100

45

ministry. O’Meara provides a ministerial schema that retains certain community leaders at its
core. Those who express leadership as a matter of action and exercise of charism correspond to
the role of bishop and priest. 103 His ecclesial structure is not one of sharp distinction as with the
lay-clergy model but is based upon concentric circles. These encompass all Christians who are
called during certain times in life to participate in public ministry. Closest to the center are the
trained, professional ministers. Furthest from the center, then, are those who engage only in sign
ministry. The metric at work is how much of the life of the Christian is dedicated to ministry.
This model is beneficial in that it recognizes in every Christian life the capacity to exercise the
charisms they have received.
There is an underlying emphasis on activity over passivity in O’Meara’s work. We
encountered this already as O’Meara diagnoses the serious shortcomings of previous ecclesial
models as restricting the laity to a passive role. The same concern for activity colors his
discussion of contemplative religious. Though he affords the contemplative life “its own identity
and value,” ministry is secondary to this form of life. 104 Contemplatives participate in ministry
but only inasmuch as they take direct ministerial action to visitors, preach, or minister internally
to one another. The outwardly passive life of contemplatives raises an issue that O’Meara does
not address. Would it be fair to assume cloistered religious would not have liturgical roles by his
estimation? That O’Meara sidelines not only lay but religious passivity makes sense when we
consider the ecclesiological model that he is seeking to upend. He summarizes his reasons for
rejecting passivity succinctly:
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When we look at neo-scholastic textbooks up to Vatican II and their picture of the church,
we find a neatly drawn Aristotelian ecclesiology. In that theology, the form, the cause, and
the goal of the church are all the same: the hierarchy of bishops and church administrators.
People, even presbyters and deacons, are only the material cause, the passive stuff to
which a super-natural ministry comes. When we recall how passive the material element is
in Aristotelian philosophy, we appreciate how marginalized in the ecclesiology of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are baptism, charism, and Christian person. 105
O’Meara’s intention is to reevaluate this Aristotelean model based upon recent
developments in the Church and show how this post conciliar ecclesiology can be linked to a
theology of ministry compatible with the witness of the New Testament. 106 He desires an
engaged, active Church in which a diversity of ministries flow from the charisms given to each
individual by the Spirit. As we have seen, his reflections are not simply a matter of defining
ministry as such, they reach out to every facet of Christian life, liturgy, preaching witness, and
service. O’Meara’s theology of ministry has wide sweeping ecclesiological impact. In phrasing
the Church’s overall success or failure as the success or failure of ministry, O’Meara has
implicitly defined the whole Church’s life and mission as ministry. Forms of Christian living
“have their own value” but O’Meara does not elaborate upon what this value is or how nonministerial activity fits into his broader schema.
It is apparent that O’Meara seeks to develop the ecclesiological vision of Vatican II in a
new direction. This includes a negative assessment of the council’s statements about the secular
role of the laity. His rejection of this description is due in part to disagreeing with negative
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definitions of the laity, discussed above. How does he evaluate the call for the laity to consecrate
the world to God? While O’Meara does not address the content of LG 34 directly, we can
anticipate his reception of this description by analyzing his thought on mediation and priesthood.
There is a conscious reduction of sacral language within O’Meara’s work. He distances himself
from the structures that glorify priestly action and uses the term priesthood to describe a
dominating caste far more than to describe a priesthood shared by all believers. When he
discusses the universal priesthood he does not address individual actions but the Church in
aggregate. He briefly mentions that as a whole, baptized Christians carry out their activities with
a “‘priestly attitude’ of sacrificial service.” 107 The one priesthood of Christ is unique and “there
remains nothing more, objectively, to be enacted for the human race.” 108 The consecration of the
world at the center of the secular character of the laity is not included in these reflections. In
keeping with his rhetorical tone O’Meara sets priestly language in opposition to his definition of
ministry: “Ministry approaches the reign of God not as high priest or banker but as servant.” 109
O’Meara prefers to speak of Christian action, especially ministry, in the key of service. The goal
of this service is an individual turning of every person to a relationship with God so that they
might become what God intends them to be. 110
O’Meara does not addressing LG 34 and the subject of world transformation, instead he
writes about ministry to the world. Ministry happens at the service of the world. This begs the
question: how does O’Meara use the term “world?” In the discussion on Vatican II’s view of the
world we considered three basic approaches to this: the world as a setting or backdrop of a drama
that principally concerns God and humanity, the world as humanity in opposition to God’s plan,
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and the world as a subject of God’s plan. O’Meara clearly sees the world as the setting for the
Church’s life and mission.
The world as a setting adds complexity to the Church’s mission: O’Meara uses “the
world” to denote a diversity of cultural encounters, across both time and space, which elicits a
need for a diversity in ministry. The world encompasses the social realities that the Church must
respond to and is itself the mission ground of the Church. We can see the the world as setting
and not the subject of God’s plan in the way O’Meara formulates the mission of the Church.
This mission is to propose the Gospel to all of the men and women of the world so that they are
able to respond “to the presence of the Gospel and the Spirit.” 111
We can learn about O’Meara’s view of the world by analyzing what he opposes. He
denounces the Baroque, pre-Conciliar attitude “that the fallen world could receive only so much
redemption, and that all not under orders or vows remained in a secular sphere capable not of
ministry but of a vague witness.” 112 For O’Meara, there is no “secular sphere” that is able to
remain untouched by grace. O’Meara cites Karl Rahner’s theology of grace, which has
inaugurated “a world marked by circles of God's gift of eschatological life.” 113 The world itself is
an expression of realized eschatology and contrasts with the idea of a world in need of
redemption. The world is not to be addressed as sinful, consigning the kingdom of God to the
privacy of churches and personal spirituality. The mission is a public mission to humanity. It
serves to heal both intrapersonal guilt for sin and the injustices and tragedies that affect the wider
community. These injustices flow “not only from natural or social causes but from sin.” 114 Evils
present in the world are not part of the Father’s plan and the Christian mission is to challenge
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them in the world. This is an evangelical call to the world that carries as much import as
ministering to the Church community, “Each church should be as intent upon witness in the
world as upon its own inner life.” 115
The world, in O’Meara’s estimation is not the subject of some future divine or human
action. The call to ministry is not a call to bring about a yet to be accomplished salvation but an
expression of an already realized salvation for the world. The Church is the fundamental
sacrament of grace that leads the world to this realization. There is then no need for a slow,
secretive infiltration of the secular order by Christians to transform the world. 116 O’Meara gives
four reasons to reject an infiltration of the sacral into the secular: the task becomes very
individualistic, focusing on the soul of the individual at work, “it implied that grace was absent
from the world,” it would have been a lay infiltration into science and politics, and “it divided
grace from nature, handing over soul and sacrament to priests but world and history to laity.” 117
Though O’Meara writes in terms of “infiltration” we can easily see parallels between this
dynamic and the consecration of the world described in LG.
Of O’Meara’s reasons for rejecting “world infiltration” as a task for the laity address his
view of the world, two are of critical import for our discussion. These are intimately connected,
addressing the presence of grace in the world and the means by which that grace is made present.
Each is rooted in a distinction that would be ultimately rejected by the 20th century theologies of
grace: that there is a possibility of separating God’s grace out from creation. A need for
infiltration into the world to bring grace implies that there is a lack of grace. O’Meara sees the
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world as encompassed in “circles of grace.” The most potent and apparent of these is the Church
itself. Beyond the Church, O’Meara encourages openness toward the redeemed world and the
presence of grace as it is expressed in other religious traditions. The second point is the working
out of this separation in the sphere of ministry. The pre-conciliar sacramental economies that
O’Meara discussed are prime examples: the clergy are the sole proprietors of graced reality,
which they introduce into the wholly secularized world. Pointing toward individual sacraments
as the vehicles of this grace in place of embracing the whole Church as sacrament would cement
the role of the ordained as officiants of the sacred to the not-sacred. O’Meara’s depiction of the
world as graced is intimately connected with his argument against the lay-clergy distinction.
O’Meara sees the whole Church as a “basic equality in grace.” 118
O’Meara’s theology of ministry begins as a theological reflection upon the rising
phenomenon of ministry in the church and expands to a total ecclesiology 119. From his thought
we can derive three points pertinent to our discussion that will significantly impact those that
come after him: first, he has a deep concern for valuing the active ministry of all the baptized.
O’Meara stresses this point throughout the whole course of his work. He does so in a way that
devalues witnessing in anything but the most overt way. This necessitates the deletion of the
lay-clergy distinction drawn throughout much of church history. Second, he does not see world
consecration or transformation as a fundamental role of the Church in the world. He deemphasizes Vatican II’s universal priesthood language and does not think that an infiltration in
the world adequately describes ministry. Finally, he is the first of our thinkers to root his thought
in the relationship between nature and grace. O’Meara views the world as graced, holding a
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positive view of the world. There is tension in his position since the world is both in need of the
saving mission of the church and is already encompassed in a circle of grace.

C. The Magisterial School Response
The growing number of lay ministers and the critical tenor of the development school are
two keys to understanding the view of the laity expressed by the magisterium and their
theological allies. Since these authors accepted the description of the laity found in the Vatican
II documents as authoritative and definitive, their own writings are largely apologetic. Pope
John Paul II and theologian Aurelie Hagstrom are prevalent voices within this school. John Paul
II’s approach is to clarify practices based upon the conciliar view and to offer exhortation for the
laity in their secular work. Hagstrom is concerned with demonstrating the consistency of
magisterial statements about the laity along with identifying why the secular character had been
largely abandoned by post-conciliar ecclesiologists. As a defense of conciliar teaching, neither
John Paul II nor Hagstrom make statements that elaborate on the nature of world consecration or
the God/world relationship beyond what is already expressed in the conciliar documents. Their
work adds rhetorical texture to the magisterial position and sets the stage for the conversation
surrounding the laity that takes place at the turn of the 20th Century.

Pope John Paul II
Promulgated in 1988, Pope John Paul II’s Post-synodal document Christifidelis Laici
(CL) reiterated the description offered by Vatican II and responded to the increased role of the
laity in ecclesial ministry. As a Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, CL was written shortly
after the Synod on the Laity that occurred in 1987. Many of the concerns of the synodal fathers
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are mirrored in the document with one notable exception. At the head of the propositions,
representative of the fruits of their meetings, the bishops requested that there be a definitive and
universal papal declaration on the vocation of the laity. 120 This implies that the synodal fathers
did not view the teaching on the laity represented in the conciliar documents as a definitive
statement. John Paul II did not fulfill this request. Instead, CL is a representation of the
teachings of LG through the late Pope’s own ecclesiological lens along with cautions regarding
the confluence of laity and clergy.
Aurelie Hagstrom argues that CL fulfills its role as a Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation:
it is the purpose of the document to urge, exhort, advise, and encourage, not to solve points of
theology. It would be inappropriate for the Pope to use the exhortation as an opportunity to
develop the dogmatic understanding of the laity or to offer some new dogmatic definition. 121
Against the expectations of the Synod fathers, Hagstrom asserts that to fulfill its role CL simply
had to affirm and expand upon the themes presented in the concluding propositions.
Despite the lack of new teaching, CL should not be confused with mere repetition. John
Paul II reframes LG’s description of the laity not as a role but as a dynamic. The laity’s place in
the world is the condition for the exercise of their secular character. 122 The world is not simply a
framework for lay action but is itself the subject of lay work. The lay task is to transform since
the world is “a reality destined to find in Jesus Christ the fullness of its meaning.” 123 The laity
can only fulfill this mission if they are in the world, a point that is clearly emphasized.
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Receiving baptism does not take Christians from the world or invite them to abandon it. Citing
Paul the Apostle, John Paul II encourages the lay faithful to fulfill their vocation “in whatever
state each was called.” 124 Lay life in the world is not an accident of societal circumstance but “a
theological and ecclesiological reality.” 125
The dynamic that the laity participates in contributes to the unity and the diversity that is
needed if the Church is to be a fully functional body. John Paul II calls the Church an “‘organic’
communion … the complementarity of each part must be joined together and every unique
contribution recognized as done on behalf of the body. (CL 20) This complementarity is enabled
by the “unmistakable character” that marks each of the states of life lived in the Church which
must be “seen in relation to the other and placed at each other’s service.” (CL 55)
John Paul II’s ecclesiological view emphasizes distinction for complementarity. A
confusion of roles and a breaking down of distinctions would be detrimental to his project. This
leads the Pope to address lay activity within ministerial roles, a concern that was shared by the
synodal fathers. At the center of the cautions and correctives in CL are two points (1) The laity’s
role within the world is a necessary one. (2) Confusion over the proper roles, especially the role
of minister in the Church, threatens the complementarity and effectiveness of each state of life.
The Pope distinguishes between the exercise of liturgical, evangelistic, and catechetical
roles that are proper to all of the baptized and a creeping trend to expand the responsibilities of
the laity within intra-ecclesial affairs. The latter may so occupy the laity that they forget their
mission toward the world. In place of this, the Pope advocates for Gospel-oriented lives in the
midst of the world as a witness to the transcendent. 126
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This is not only a matter of dereliction of duty. Many concerns shared by John Paul II
and the synodal fathers revolve around the definition and actions taken by “ministers.” During
this period, there was a fervent discussion about the extent to which lay persons could be called
ministers. 127 John Paul II adopts a narrow and specifically sacramental definition of minister.
The term cannot be used to describe someone based upon their activity but is instead a matter of
sacramental ordination. 128 This rules out the identification of any of the laity as ministers. In
support of this point, the Pope recalls the difference between the priesthood shared by all the
faithful and the ministerial priesthood which is “different, not simply in degree but in
essence.” 129
This strict definition of minister is based upon the complementary ecclesiology that John
Paul II has laid out. Though CL includes passages that could be interpreted as stifling the
expansion of lay involvement in the Church, many of the correctives made are in service of the
distinctions expressed in this ecclesiology. The concern for the overuse of laity in the liturgy, for
instance, does not offer additional restrictions on lay activity. On the contrary, the document
cites the founding of a commission to reevaluate the lay role above and beyond those already
offered in the exercise of instituted acolytes and readers.
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the document ends. The brief mention of the trends, noted by the synodal fathers, are
overshadowed by the application of the lay call to various areas of life. Within the context of the
broader theological conversation about the laity, CL is a simple reaffirmation and application of
the teachings found in LG. CL does not offer a definitive theological treatise on the laity. The
text reiterates the ecclesiology of a clergy/laity distinction which John Paul II frames within the
conceptual category of a reciprocal complementarity.

Aurelie Hagstrom
In her 1994 book, The Concepts of the Vocation and the Mission of the Laity, Aurelie
Hagstrom offers a theological defense of the magisterium’s ecclesiastical schema. She outlines
the preconciliar, conciliar, and post-conciliar conversation regarding the laity’s theological
definition and mission with the aim of demonstrating the consistency of the magisterial view that
the laity are to be characterized by the secularity and the task of world consecration. Hagstrom’s
critical thrust is that the post-conciliar theological conversation has focused on the work of the
laity within the Church to a fault. Her corrective revolves around the thomistic principle agere
sequitur esse (“doing follows being”), resulting in her claim that the ontological character of the
laity and their place in the Church should distinguish their action. This character, received at
baptism, determines the life and work of the laity. Hagstrom engages with a comprehensive
collection of magisterial texts to support her analysis. Notably, these include the different drafts
of the Vatican II texts that address the laity, the synodal proceedings of the 1987 Synod on the
Laity, and a comparison of the 1917 Code of Canon Law with the revised code of 1983.
Hagstrom’s historical survey of the preconciliar discussion demonstrates the dramatic
change that took place within the Church’s ecclesiological consciousness before the council.
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The result of this development was a new ecclesiology that directly related the laity to the
mission of the Church, which she contrasted to former theological understanding of the laity as a
mere appendage of the clergy. 131
For Hagstrom, the development reaches its pinnacle in Vatican II. The vocation and
mission of the laity is expressed clearly in the conciliar documents and this is borne out by the
consistency of that teaching in canon law as well as the post-conciliar magisterium. Congruent
with this stance, she is highly critical of the post conciliar developmental school. According to
Hagstrom, there are three problematic tendencies within the current ecclesiological conversation,
each logically connected to the others. First is a rejection of anything sacramental or hierarchical
in favor of the charismatic. This “pneumatological approach” highlights the call of baptism
without addressing how that call is complemented by the exercise of holy orders. 132 There is a
dividing line drawn between the charismatic, which is considered good, and the hierarchical
structure of the Church which is seen to be in conflict with the spirit of Vatican II. The result is a
perspective that always casts the hierarchy in an authoritative light, creating an environment that
stifles ministry.
This results in her second concern, that the ecclesiological conversation addresses a
fractured Church caught in a power struggle among its members. She criticizes views that see
the Church as “a battlefield for rights.” 133 The focus of this battle tends to be a fascination with
intra-ecclesial roles for the laity. This pits the clergy against the laity, the former always out to
defend their own interests to the detriment of the latter. Preoccupation with expanding lay
activity within the Church leads to the third tendency: a deemphasis of the secular vocation and
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mission. 134 The growth in lay rights within the Church results in the tragically ironic
abandonment of the mission to the world.
Hagstrom sees a common thread between these three tendencies: there is preoccupation
of what the laity can do over who the laity are. She proposes the thomistic principle of agere
sequitur esse as a corrective to authors who do not ground the mission of the laity in their
ecclesiological identity. 135 Among the authors Hagstrom addresses are Congar, who has
reevaluated his approach toward the laity in the time following the council, O’Meara, Robert
Kinast, and Richard McBrien. These thinkers have identified the experience of the laity
following Vatican II as one of ministry and are attempting to reinterpret the lay state in light of
this experience. 136
Hagstrom responds to her contemporaries by reiterating the magisterial teaching through
the lens of her chosen thomistic dictum. She does not bar the laity from participating in the life
of ecclesial ministry but sets limits based upon her ecclesiological perspective. Beginning with
who the laity are means interpreting their role through the secular character as stated in LG. The
being of the laity includes the secular dimension which should be allowed to color the intraecclesial activity that the laity carry out. 137 This secularity makes what the laity offer in service
of the Church different than the office carried out by the ordained minister. This renders the two
roles distinct, based upon their identity rather than their ability.
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D. Richard Gaillardetz
Richard Gaillardetz is a prominent North American theologian whose work focuses
chiefly around ecclesiology and magisterial authority. In his article “Re-Thinking the
Lay/Clergy Distinction” he expresses reservations about the 1997 Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith’s statement “Certain Questions Regarding Collaboration of the Lay Faithful in
Ministry of Priests.” 138 Gaillardetz seeks to demonstrate that the document is the magisterium’s
attempt to walk back progress made since the Council and to provide his own way forward. He
views “Collaboration” as a reaffirmation of the text of the conciliar documents which do not
fully express the intent of the council. Like Doohan and O’Meara, Gaillardetz holds that the
Vatican II documents were the first step in a developmental process. The conciliar fathers were
engaged in the herculean task of proposing a new way of understanding the Church’s life and
mission and could not predict the situations in which the council would be implemented. 139
Gaillardetz claims that “Collaboration” is incongruent with the ministerial realities
present within the Church. 140 The time since the council has seen an increase in the number of
laity involved in ministerial roles. This increase is not simply one of quantity of ministers but an
expansion of the ministerial roles available to lay men and women. Gaillardetz considers lay
opportunities that would have been unthinkable in the time before the council. For instance, a
lay woman who has been formally educated for her role of service and now engages her
community as a full-time minister. Such examples, as well as the existence of the permanent
diaconate blur the line of the lay/clergy distinction. 141
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“Collaboration” approaches the teachings of Vatican II with two crucial presuppositions:
that the laity are defined by their secular character and that the fullness of ministry resides in the
clergy. In response to the secular character, Gaillardetz reasons that it would necessitate the
existence of a sphere of action that is “purely lay.” 142 Regarding ministry, Gaillardetz takes issue
with the “fullness of ministry” being reserved for the ordained who by nature of that ordination
receive the sacra potestas required for that ministry. He unpacks ministry into distinct tasks of
munera (the sharing in the threefold ministry of Christ by all the baptized), officia (the result of
the deputation by the Church), and servitium (“in which the Church carries out the work of
Christ within her and the world”). Each of these make up an aspect of the fullness of ministry.
Gaillardetz seeks to demonstrate that both the secular character and the reservation of the
fullness of ministry to the clergy flow from a common font: a clear delineation between the
sacred and the temporal. 143
Conceptualizing the sacred and temporal as distinct spheres of activity has led many to
misinterpret the conciliar texts and results in a contrastive theology that is only capable of
identifying the laity in comparison to the ordained. Gaillardetz does not recognize any positive
theology of the laity in the documents despite a popular claim that there is one “based on their
unique vocation to consecrate the world to Christ.” 144 For Gaillardetz, this description is merely
contrastive since it is still based upon “hierarchological premises.” 145 Language that reinforces
the lay/clergy distinction within the conciliar documents betrays the intentions of the council
fathers, making the conciliar teaching ambiguous and confusing. 146 In place of the hierarchical
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interpretation, Gaillardetz claims that the laity and clergy should always be seen within the larger
context of the “common matrix” found in LG and its use of christifidelis. 147 Gaillardetz
concludes that the intention of the fathers was not to establish a contrastive definition but to
move “strongly in the direction of simply identifying laicus as the normal situation of the
practicing Christian who seeks in their daily life to bring all of history to its fulfillment in
Christ.” 148 He brings this universal definition into contrast with one described by Schillebeeckx
in which the baptized received their worth “only from the standpoint of the status of the
clergy.” 149
Taking a second cue from Schillebeeckx, Gaillardetz looks to the New Testament for an
essential definition of ministry. An essential distinction between clergy and laity cannot be
identified in the biblical text. Scripture and early church documents paint a picture of a
charismatic community which included ordained ministers. The primary biblical role of these
ministers was community leadership. 150
For Gailliardetz, identifying clergy as community leaders resolves the tension introduced
by the language of the council. This should be the primary way of understanding the unique role
of the clergy who act in persona Christi capitis. 151 In the past, the ordained’s cultic role in the
celebration of the sacraments, specifically the Eucharist, was the predominant function by which
the clergy’s role was recognized. The former model was based on an unacceptable inequality
between the laity and clergy. Vatican II had moved beyond this model; Gaillardetz cites the
strong conciliar language that the common priesthood is not inferior to the ordained
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priesthood. 152 The council’s affirmation that the two priesthoods differ in “essence” should be
understood as a concession to bishops who desired to protect the role of the ordained. 153
Gaillardetz purports that the universal and ordained priesthoods are not essentially
different, but the clergy still have a unique role in which they act in persona Christi capitis. The
role of the clergy should not be defined by a cultic sacramental act of consecration but by their
active role in bringing unity to the community. 154 The role of the apostolic office according to
Gaillardetz’s description is twofold: it is to preserve the apostolic faith in the community and to
preserve the union among those communities. 155
The identification of the clergy’s role as community leader respects the diversity of
ministries in the church while affirming a unique role for the ordained. It represents for
Gaillardetz an attempt to integrate the Christological approach to ecclesiology, which stresses
ordination and hierarchy with a pneumatological approach that sees the church as a collection of
the baptized who exercise a diverse set of charisms in equality of dignity. 156
Gaillardetz’s project is fueled by his concern for the equality of ministry. Unique to his
approach is his desire to maintain the distinction made between the clergy and the laity. The
identification of the unique role of the ordained with an apostolic one that preserves the faith and
unity of the church does not lead to the same difference in essence named by the council. In
effect, Gaillardetz’s ecclesiological view affirms a real difference in the exercise of the role of
the clergy while preserving an overall unity within the christifidelis.
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A second theme is that of the identification of sacred and temporal spheres of action.
This is an auxiliary argument that Gaillardetz uses to support his case. Gaillardetz warns against
assuming a delineation between sacred and temporal realities. Avoiding this language proves
difficult because it is present in the council documents. The defining feature that distinguished
the clergy from the laity in the conciliar text is the exercise of sacra potestas received at
ordination. As we have seen, this is contrasted with the actions of the laity who are concerned
primarily with the temporal sphere. For Gaillardetz, this does not set up a distinction but
mutually exclusive spheres of action. 157
Gaillardetz reframes the discussion in such a way that there is only one united arena of
activity. The Church and not the ordained is the principle of sacramental life, making the sacral
as much the concern of the laity as the clergy. 158 Similarly, the ordained do not forfeit their
responsibility toward the temporal by receiving the new relationship to the community that
Gaillardetz describes as their unique role. 159 The results of this shift are clear. Gaillardetz
deemphasizes an identity of the laity as a distinct group who consecrate the world and cautions
against a too strong identification of the laity at work in the temporal order. Conversely, the
loosening of this distinction has an effect on how Gaillardetz sees sacramental action. Since any
empowerment is a result of a relationship formed in the community, he does not see any reason
why the empowerment must be limited to the recipients of ordination. This, he notes, would
require a study on the relationship between sacramental and non-sacramental grace.
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E. Edward Hahnenberg
Edward Hahnenberg’s contribution to lay theology comes in the form of two monographs
with differing emphases, namely his 2003 work Ministries: A Relational Approach followed by
Awakening Vocation: A Theology of Christian Call in 2010. These works demonstrate a shift in
approach toward the laity, the former explains the conversation on the laity with reference to
ministerial action while the latter has a broader scope which includes elements that are not
directly related to intentional ministry.
In Ministries, Hahnenberg’s central concern is providing an ecclesiologically sound
description of the emergence of lay ecclesial ministry. 161 He argues in line with the development
school that continued use of the lay-clergy distinction only harms the Church’s understanding of
ministry. In place of what he calls the “dividing line” that reserves some things for clergy and
others for the laity, he argues for a concentric circle model based upon relationship. 162
The dividing line model is always detrimental to developing a theology of the laity.
Whether one adopts a distinction between the activity of the ordained priesthood or the secular
character of the laity as a point of departure does not matter. A sharp distinction between lay and
clergy always brings about the same result. One group performs active ministry, leaving “the
other largely inactive.” 163 The fruit of this approach is a “host of dichotomies” that spring up as
corollaries: “Christ vs. Spirit, institution vs. communion, ordination vs. baptism.” 164 The same
can be said for beginning with the understanding that laity act in the world. An approach that
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takes the secular character as its starting point only “frustrates a comprehensive theology of
ministry.” 165
Hahnenberg notes that the Second Vatican council supports both sides of this issue. The
secular character of the laity as expressed in LG limits the council’s vision of how the laity can
act within the Church while Gaudim et Spes’s very title as the “Pastoral Constitution of the
Church in the Modern World” [emphasis added] does away with dualistic roles. 166 Moving
beyond these dichotomies is important for Hahnenberg. He writes that the characterization as
“secular” can lead to an understanding that the voice and work of the laity are separate from the
Church. 167 The conciliar intention was to affirm the goodness of the lay state, the laity’s full
membership in the Church and the godly work done in the secular world and their family lives.
Hahnenberg charges that the magisterial statements, however, have interpreted the council in a
way that hardens the distinction between laity and clergy, backtracking on the softening done by
the council. 168 This includes John Paul II’s CL, which, while stressing the laity’s role in the
transformation of the world, is more concerned with protecting the special place of the hierarchy
in the church. 169
In place of the dividing line, Hahnenberg posits the use of concentric circles. These
circles express the relationship that ministers have to their community. 170 The Trinity is both
Hahnenberg’s theological locus for reflection and the lens through which he understands the idea
of relation. 171 Trinitarian reflection gives Hahnenberg the opportunity to reconcile the Christ vs.
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Spirit dichotomy. Ministry should not be thought of in terms of a Dionysian hierarchical
mediation, the result of the exercise of a sacra potestas. 172 This Christocentric approach
deemphasized the role of the Spirit and the charisms accessible to all the baptized. 173 The
charismatic framework recognizes the Holy Spirit at work in the community. The giving of these
gifts is not seen as an extrinsic or occasional act of God but is the constant action of the Holy
Spirit which permeates the whole world. 174 Just as there is no contradiction implied by speaking
of the missions of the Word and of the Spirit within Trinitarian theology, the ministry of Christ
does not contradict charismatic activity. 175
This relational approach reinterprets ordained ministry. The ministry of the priest cannot
be comprehended without the ecclesial community. For Hahnenberg, the priest does not
represent Christ in a way that places him “over and above” the community. 176 The very concept
of ordination, the ordering of the priest as minister, is ordered toward the relationship the priest
has with the community. 177
Ordination is the recognition of a new relationship and an ecclesial repositioning of the
priest as the leader of a community. Relationship dictates the place and activity of every
member of the Church. While there might be different levels of involvement and commitment,
each baptized person falls somewhere on Hahnenberg’s concentric circle schema. These
relationships result in a diverse set of roles and types of ministry that he describes in a concentric
circle of initiations into ministry. 178 Hahnenberg still places the clergy at the center of the circle,
though this corresponds with their role as community leaders from which their special liturgical
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function is derived. The different ministries progress from this center until they reach the outside
circle, depicting the “General Christian Ministry” that results from baptism.
The opposite ends of this schema, clergy at the center with a generalized group of the
“baptized” at the periphery, seem derivative of the dividing line model that Hahnenberg wants to
avoid. The two circular layers in between two extremes are novel to his approach. First there is
the diaconate and official installation and second there are “Occasional Public Ministries” that
are initiated by a Commissioning Blessing. 179
These second and third circles demonstrate the focus of Hahnenberg’s thesis. By
allowing for the formal, liturgical recognition of the ministry that arises charismatically in the
community, he does away with the strict line of delineation of the previous model. Just as the
priestly and episcopal ordinations change the relationship of one who could be identified in the
outermost circle, so the training and installation of a minister should be recognized as a change
in relationship within liturgy, acknowledged as official ministry. “The ultimate goal is to affirm
the diversity and distinction among ministerial roles.” 180
Hahnenberg discusses the priesthood of the laity only as a stop along the way to his
conclusion that all the baptized have a place in ministry. His analysis includes the theological
development of the laity as a priesthood with equal share in the priesthood of Christ as explored
by the liturgical movements of the 20th Century. 181 In this period the laity were given an active
role in the liturgy in place of their passive one. Hahnenberg sees the roles of the liturgical
assembly as manifestations of the participants’ place in the community. This means the nonordained have a corresponding active ministerial role outside of the liturgy by virtue of their
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baptismal priesthood. Precisely what this role is or how it is to be carried out in praxis is not
addressed in Ministries. By omitting this, Hahnenberg does not offer an alternative to the
description of secular laity in LG. He notes that the council is right to recognize the goodness of
family and ordinary life lived by the laity but generally regards the “secular character” as a limit
on ministry. 182
In Awakening Vocation, Hahnenberg’s focus shifts to the life of individual Christians and
their response to God’s calling. Viewed synoptically with Hahnenberg’s previous work,
Awakening is a broadening of Hahnenberg’s reflection. The 2010 work is most concerned with
Christians who would have been placed on the outermost circle in Ministries. This is coupled
with a shift in register: In place of seeing Christian activity in relation to ministry, Hahnenberg
discusses the Christian life as a response to God’s call. The resounding message of Awakening is
that vocational calls are not limited to religious or clergy. Every human person is invited to
respond to God’s call, all have an invitation in the form of vocation. 183
The first half of the work is a historical study on theologies of vocation. Hahnenberg
traces arguments that guide him between two extremes. He wants to avoid approaching vocation
as something that is utterly supernatural, something that requires a special revelation. He also
wants to guard against the over secularization of vocation understood as faithfulness to one’s job
or trade. 184 These poles developed as the result of two different emphases. The former
supernatural-mystical understanding of vocation Hahnenberg links to a dualistic nature-grace
relationship. 185 The secularized view of vocation developed from the Protestant attempt at
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valorizing the secular. This second approach became unmoored from its theological origins and
evolved in a way that one’s calling did not refer back to God as its source. 186 Each of the above
derive from a nature/grace dichotomy. The first valued grace over nature, the second nature over
grace. Hahnenberg’s approach seeks to affirm both “as deeply intertwined realities in the
vocational dynamic.” 187
Karl Rahner’s theology of grace provides Hahnenberg with the lens for his vocational
reflection. It also grants him the solution to the nature/grace dichotomies and refutes “modern
Catholic theology of vocation.” 188 Grace is understood to be not a reality that is super-added to
the created world but imbedded within creation itself: “God’s pervasive presence in the
world.” 189 The pervasiveness of grace means that it is not limited to the church, official
revelation, or mystical illumination. 190
Hahnenberg understands the vocational call as a unity of nature and grace, of creation
and redemption. 191 God’s self-communication is described as a unique offer to every human
person in the form of a call, a vocation. 192 The offer is made to human persons in their
particularity and invites a response in freedom. Free response distinguishes between the offer
God makes and the fulfillment in every human life. 193 The reality of grace is not a fated one but
takes the form an offer.
The presentation of nature and grace as the unified vehicle of God’s self-communication,
here placed in terms of the individual vocational call, frames sin in a wholistic context. God’s
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offer is not something extrinsic from the person so a rejection of this offer is a type of selfrejection. The graced call is one that comes from within creation and to a certain extent from
within the person. Hahnenberg describes the rejection of God’s call through sin as “a rejection
of reality, a kind of self-destruction.” 194 Conversely, the acceptance of God’s call, a response in
freedom that signals the reception of God’s self-communication is an entering into friendship
with God. God’s offer is a plan that is both written into each human life and provides that life
with meaning. 195
Hahnenberg pivots from considerations about the individual calling to the calling of the
Christian people as a whole. While he does not couch the discussion in the vocabulary of laity or
the secular, it is chapter six of Awakening wherein Hahnenberg considers the praxis of the ideals
he has discussed. He links two thinkers that give the final chapters of his work their trajectory:
Johann Baptist Metz and Ignacio Ellacuria. Metz is a student of Rahner who interprets the
historical reality of human suffering in a way that does not accept an atemporal distancing. To
do so would tempt us to ignore the call of the suffering for justice. He posits that the voice of the
suffering is an authoritative voice of Christians since they represent the crucified in our midst. 196
Ellacuria, similarly concerned with suffering, was killed for his political activity in 1999
while ministering and teaching in his native El Salvador. 197 Theologically, Ellacuria’s project
was to ground liberation theology in the transcendent. To this end, he interpreted the cry for help
of the poor and suffering as the call of God’s action in history. The response to this call plays out
as a response to God in history: “salvation history is salvation in history.” 198 A student of

Hahnenberg, Awakening Vocation, 156.
Hahnenberg, Awakening Vocation, 122.
196
Hahnenberg, Awakening Vocation, 199.
197
Hahnenberg, Awakening Vocation, 201-2.
198
Hahnenberg, Awakening Vocation, 202.
194
195

70

Rahner, Ellacuria wanted to protect against a dualism that separates God from the world while at
the same time not reducing the transcendent to the historical. Hahnenberg relates that Ellacuria’s
emphasis was protecting against the former more than the latter and in doing so he was after an
explanation of the God-world relationship that demonstrated God’s action in history while
accepting human freedom. 199 Ellacuria adds the work of Xavier Zubiri to his interpretation of
Rahner and produces a lens that sees the transcendent God as always present within historical
reality. Theology does not remind humanity that they must reconnect to something outside of
history, but that the transcendent is already intrinsic to the events of history. In a potent biblical
example, Ellacuria asks who brought “the people out of Egypt: Yahweh or Moses?” 200 The deeds
done in Exodus are identified as God’s deeds, even the ones that necessitated the exercise of
human freedom. Ellacuria saw this as the resolution to the same problem tackled by de Lubac
and Rahner but for the Salvadoran salvation history represents “grace” and salvation in history
“nature.” 201 The result is a view of the Christian call as one that follows the cry of the suffering
into history not asking what Jesus would do but doing what Jesus did with all of its sociopolitical connotations. 202
The suffering of the other is a call outward. Hahnenberg unites this principle to Rahner’s
invitation to a theology of openness and the theologian’s reflections on the Spiritual Exercises.
The result is an open-ended assent to the call without grasping the end to which that call would
lead. 203 God’s call does not affix an identity on the baptized from afar but is what constitutes
their identity from the outset. 204 The klesis Hahnenberg describes has two elements: to be
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ourselves and to accept the challenge of the call. The challenge is first and foremost love of
neighbor, the response to the suffering of the world. 205

F. Paul Lakeland
Paul Lakeland’s The Liberation of the Laity is both a thorough treatment of the
development of lay theology and the consummation of the development school. The first half is
comprised of a comprehensive survey of the history of lay theology through the Second Vatican
Council to the time of Lakeland’s writing. Among the theological trends that Lakeland
highlights are the contest between modernism and scholasticism and the reinterpretation of the
thomistic account of grace offered by de Lubac in his Surnaturel. These themes foreshadow
Lakeland’s own views. The first corresponds to his stance on theological development while the
second signals his rejection of language that hints at a secular/sacred dichotomy.
As a pastoral council rather than a dogmatic council, Lakeland sees the work of Vatican
II as a continuing effort to bring to completion Paul VI’s desire to let fresh air into the Church. 206
As a whole, he considers the council to be “an unfinished project whose final outcome remains
uncertain.” 207 This has significant bearing on how he approaches the conciliar documents.
Considering the theological and political tensions which produced them, he does not think that
the pastoral vision that resulted is well developed.
Lakeland posits that the ambiguity of the roles outlined by the conciliar documents could
be interpreted in two ways depending on the reader’s predisposition. Conservative thinkers
would see a clear demarcation between clergy who act in the church and laity who act in the
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world. Liberal-minded interpreters could see the same texts as an invitation to a new
ecclesiological vision in which the laity and clergy are “co-responsible for the life and ministry
of the church.” 208 According to Lakeland, the former are embracing what Gutierrez calls a
“distinction of planes” that drives a wedge between what happens in the world and what happens
in the church, a corollary of the secular/sacred separation while the latter would not identify such
a distinction. 209
For Lakeland, the documents of Vatican II present a description of lay action, dominated
by an examination of the lay apostolate, rather than a theological definition of the laity as
such. 210 This betrays the clergy-centric approach that the council embraced. Instead of asking
who the clergy are in relation to the laity, the council asked who the laity are in relation to the
clergy and how much we can say the laity work in and on behalf of the church. 211
A notable departure from the theme of lay apostolic work is LG’s description of the lay
priesthood. Lakeland emphasizes that the notion of lay priesthood communicated therein has
nothing to do with lay ministry. The priesthood of the laity is distinct from the ordained
priesthood. The sacramental functions are different: the clergy presiding over the eucharistic
assembly and the laity being a priesthood held in common and not the result of a vocational
calling. Putting this difference aside, Lakeland hones in on their common conceptual framework
which is determinative of their activity: both priesthoods are acts of mediation. The priest is the
intermediary between God and the laity in their activity whose task it is to “[ferry] back and forth
between God and the world.” 212
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These priesthoods act among and are an expression of the distinctive planes of the secular
and sacred, between God and the world. Priestly action, the need for intermediary activity,
would affirm the difference between the sacred and the secular. In defining priestly action in this
way - with the emphasis of the consecrator as a mediator between two separated realities Lakeland has set the stage for his own argument against the concept of mediation in his chapter
on secularity:
Talking about ‘the secular’ from a religious standpoint means considering the world,
dependent on God for its existence and suffused with divine presence through Christ and
the Spirit, but not in such a way that the presence of God changes or suspends the natural
laws of the universe. 213

He differentiates this understanding of secularity from other approaches that contrast the secular
with the sacred, inherently excluding God from the secular. Three dualisms can be linked: the
sacred/secular, God/world, and church/world. Accepting one of these dichotomies easily gives
way to the rest and the creation of truly separate realms of reality. Lakeland connects the
breakdown of these dualisms to de Lubac’s explication of the relationship between nature and
grace. 214 As with the debates against the scholastics, the end result is a single reality with nothing
superimposed by God.
Lakeland proposes a vision of the world that acknowledges two fundamental principles.
Catholic theology is both creationist and incarnational. Creationist is not here used in the sense
of an evolution/creation debate but to connote that the world as created by God is good. For
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Lakeland this makes the world “the enfleshment of God in earthly reality.” 215 Against the
sacred/secular distinction which threatens this understanding, Lakeland writes that the world is
not a mere symbol of God’s love, it is God’s love.
The second principle, incarnation, is decoupled from its traditional soteriological
framework. Lakeland does not think that incarnation is a “ruse to subvert the deplorable effects
of human freedom gone awry,” it is a demonstration of human freedom. 216 Herein lies the center
of Lakeland’s thesis: the exercise of human freedom, human autonomy is to be lived out within
the limits of the world. All human activity, regardless of whether that human is religious or not,
contributes to a single task: “to make the world a more and more truly human reality.” 217
This is a radical affirmation of the secular. God’s actions in revelation serve to affirm
and promote the goodness of the world as such. Human activity images God’s activity by
imitating God’s “no-strings-attached” love for the world. For Lakeland the love of the secular
and the exercise of human freedom is characterized by unconditionality.
Lakeland formulates secular unconditionality, the total acceptance of secular reality as
such, from his readings of post-conciliar theologies. He founded his views upon consensus that
begins with de Lubac and includes Chenu, Congar, Daniélou, and Rahner. These theologians
represent a paradigm shift away from the above-mentioned dichotomies. There is no longer
nature and grace but a nature that is already graced. This changes the tone of the Christian
conversation in many ways: there is no godless reality in need of special divine action, the desire
for God is already imprinted within the inhabitants of the world in a natural manner, and the
natural order need not obey any special rules in order to fulfill its intention within the order of
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grace. In place of a divine project with a modus operandi that extends from outside of creation,
salvation history is instead a struggle toward “the humanization of the world.” 218
This is not a project of perfection for the world but of the transformation of human lives.
Lakeland describes a secular world, a natural order that is complete, “sufficient if not selfsufficient.” 219 The self-sufficient nature of the secular even applies to the search for the meaning
of the world. Lakeland describes the secular world as a mystery. This is not a mystery that can
be solved by looking at how the various parts interact, an understanding of the details, but a
mystery of contemplating the whole. Though the Christian story proposes the world’s meaning
founded in its nature as gift even this makes the world about something else.

To say, for example, that secular reality can only really be understood in a transcendent
frame of reference is inevitably to reduce secularity, to compromise its graced character
in the name of something supposedly more fundamental. The history of Christian
spirituality is replete with examples of this world-hating attitude. 220

The challenge for ecclesiologies, particularly a theology of the laity is to affirm this radical
unconditionality, the self-sufficiency and ultimately self-referential character of the world while
at the same time allowing for the act of faith. Lakeland precludes any understanding that would
interpret the problem from the standpoint of revelation. Normally treated as a “message from
another planet” the traditional understanding of revelation as God’s secret message is supplanted
by the acceptance of God’s constant presence and activity within human history, the apex and
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perfection of revelation being not the message of Jesus’ life but the encounter with the human
being Jesus. 221 With the exercise of human freedom as the ultimate task of the human person he
engages in less an ecclesiology and more of an anthropology. The secular project in which both
believer and non-believer share is to affirm “the goodness of the human and the natural
world.” 222 Though the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus affirmed the goodness of the world
the goodness of the world is not dependent on these events.
God’s activity is reinterpreted in light of the unconditionality of the secular. At the most
basic level, God is understood as the grounding of secular reality. Salvation and redemption
become categories of the secular dynamic of struggle and liberation. These categories are not to
be applied as an epilogue to the present reality but within the human struggle for freedom from
structural and personal sin. Lakeland states clearly the premise that undergirds his other
theological claims: “God does not have a plan for the world that goes beyond the unconditional
freedom of the human as God created it. The secularity of the world is the divine plan.” 223
Christianity has distracted itself with metaphysical and otherworldly concerns. This unhealthy
preoccupation leaves Christianity with dualistic obsessions that are not part of the worldview
characteristic of Jesus or the early church. Secularity is affirmed by the God described in the
Jewish theological vision which understands the unfolding of historical events as the sole stage
of divine activity. 224 Lakeland tersely rejects any understanding of God as an entity above or one
that subsumes creation. The metaphysical God envisioned by such philosophical and theological
systems is “the enemy of human freedom” and “delimits human possibility.” 225

Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 154-5.
Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 156.
223
Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 173.
224
Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 173-4. See also Lakeland, 154-155.
225
Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 169.
221
222

77

The role of the church is to support the secular project. As the pivotal revelational events
of the life of Jesus and the action of God in history is interpreted as a display of God’s
commitment to human freedom, so the mission of the church is to work toward the same goal of
unhindered freedom. Lakeland circumscribes the mission of the church around the focal point of
human freedom. The prophetic role of the church promotes the responsible undertaking of the
secular project which must always be pursued in light of the human character which is its
goal. 226 This implies that the diversity of action characteristic of human freedom be respected
and that violation of those freedoms not be tolerated. The church is subject to these criteria and
must respect the unconditionality of the secular. This means that in no way can any religious
symbol be imposed thus interpreting “the world in terms of some other, more fundamental
reality.” 227 In place of religious symbols and theological categories is a general affirmation as
mission: “The church is that part of secular reality that is convinced that it is affirmed in the free
unconditionality of the secular.” 228
Lakeland’s secular project extends to the worship offered by the church which is directly
linked to the affirmation of secular reality. The act of faith is an acknowledgement of God’s gift
of the world. Worship is placed in service of the humanization of the world. The faithful gather
to be reminded of God’s affirmation of the world and strengthened for the furtherance of the task
of humanization. This worship cannot be self-referential and is only valuable if it results in
engagement with the world.
With worship leading out into the secular, the laity are the primary executors of the
church’s mission. This cannot be understood in an intra-ecclesial or instrumental sense. The
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promotion of freedom and world affirmation happens as the free action of adult Christians within
the world. The Christian narrative keeps the laity grounded in the goodness of the secular with
the Church behind them as a support and source of strength for secular action. This support is
intended to help the laity make the many difficult decisions that they face daily, enabling them to
act in a consistently pro-human way. The mission is carried out by the “countless millions” of
laypeople who exercise their freedom wholly independent of magisterial oversight. 229 This life is
most clearly manifest in projects of justice, human solidarity, preferring the human over realities
that threaten to devalue humanity. 230
Lakeland’s project is a paradigm shift. Where many post-conciliar attempts at
developing a theology of the laity found difficulty in providing satisfactory accounts of lay
action in the world without referring them to intra-ecclesial realities, the unconditionality of the
secular frames every ecclesial action as a support for the secular. The secular which was
consigned to the periphery of the conversation in favor of the discussion of lay apostolic work at
Vatican II is placed at the center. The two pillars of Lakeland’s thought are the goodness of the
world - created good and inherently imbued by God’s grace and the right exercise of human
freedom. These form the foundation from which Lakeland’s conclusion of the church as a
community at the service of the unconditionality of the secular is formed.
The radical affirmation of the secular is both a continuation and a correction of the
conciliar project as it is expressed in the documents of Vatican II. It is a continuation insofar as
Lakeland has found creative ways to express the importance and centrality of the secular. His
work shares in the affirmation of the world found within the council’s desire to emphasize the
work of the laity in a world that was created good by God. Lakeland believes the texts
229
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themselves are confused in their reaffirmation of a traditionally held secular/sacred distinction.
He decries notions of revelation, an emphasis on the spiritual, or the idea that there is anything
over and above creation as incompatible with unconditional secularity. In fact, these would be
the source of a conditional secularity that would only be understood in reference to an outside
reality, namely the metaphysical God.
We can conclude that the correction Lakeland would offer to conciliar teaching on the
laity would strip it of the inside/outside referent indicative of a secular/sacred distinction. His
thought forbids the use of priestly language as he has defined it. For Lakeland priesthood serves
only as the courier between the two realms. Whether we are speaking of the ordained priesthood
or the common priesthood of all believers, they would equally function as representatives
ferrying back and forth either God to the world or the world to God.
The exercise of such a priesthood would necessitate a conditionality of the world. For
Lakeland this heralds a return of the theological position that devalues anything related to the
secular. Ostensibly this was a major misstep of Vatican II and the chief reason why the fathers
were unable to clearly affirm the secular. Vatican II does not only uphold the teaching that the
ordained introduce something sacred into the world, something inaccessible without sacramental
action, the central expression of lay action in the world is framed within the practice of lay
priesthood. In direct contrast to Lakeland’s view of unconditionality, the task of laypeople as
described by Vatican II is the consecration of the world to God. They are to refer all elements of
the secular order to God through spiritual sacrifice. The task of the laity outlined in LG is
incompatible with Lakeland’s view. The world, sufficient unto itself, is in no need of
consecrating. As created good it needs no exterior reference to a larger framework. There is no
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further plan for the secular order that requires lay action to bring in the sacred. As Lakeland
writes: “The secularity of the world is the divine plan.” 231

G. Conclusion – Post-Conciliar Lay Theologies
In summary, we can recognize several points of tension that arise between the magisterial
and development schools. These points are most lucidly stated in the literature that arose as a
critique to the secular description of lay life. Though these critiques do not coalesce into a
homogenous view they share certain characteristics which pose serious issues for the
ecclesiology as outlined in the Vatican II documents themselves and have particular
repercussions for the description of the laity as “secular” or for attempting to describe the laity as
a distinct state within the Church whatsoever.
These concerns are rooted in dichotomies that are ostensibly causally connected. The
first of these dichotomies is ecclesiological, the second is ontological, addressing God and the
world. The ecclesiological dichotomy appears under the guise of many contrastive pairs:
clergy/laity, institution/charism, an ecclesiology that flows from Christology versus one that
arises from pneumatology. Each expresses the same basic dichotomy between what is
administered or held by the few versus what is held in common by all. The consensus of the
development school is that this dichotomy, enshrined within magisterial documents leads to the
elevation of the former terms over the latter: the clergy over the laity, the institutional over the
charismatic, the Christological over the pneumatological.
Far from disarming the dichotomies, the common thread within these authors is the
affirmation of the second term in place of the first. For Hahnenberg this meant placing a new
231
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emphasis on the ignored role of the Spirit and the exercise of the charisms within the Church by
all the baptized. Likewise, Doohan recognizes the baptism and the reception of the Holy Spirit,
as the sacrament of Christian ministry. In their thought, the Christ/Spirit Lay/Clergy
dichotomies amalgamate into an active/passive bifurcation in which the clergy minister in an
active manner to a laity who can only passively receive. The consensus is that this is not only
harmful to the trajectory of an ever-increasing role of the laity in the activity of the Church, it is
contradictory to that same council’s claims to have recognized the laity as equal sharers in the
Church’s life and mission.
The solutions proposed by these authors are varied. A common outcome of these
proposals is that the distinction between laity and clergy is weakened if not done away with
altogether. There seems to be no task that is distinctly lay. Positing an exclusive clerical task,
rooted in the sacra potestas, perpetuates the disparity. Doohan uses the strongest language here:
“the term laity is now theologically dead.” 232 In its place, Doohan proposes the recognition of a
universal call to ministry. Hahnenberg rejects the same categories as a dividing line model to be
replaced with a Trinitarian based model of mutual relationship. O’Meara decries any attempt to
distinguish between lay and clerical ministry as “nominalism.” Gaillardetz, while not calling for
the complete dissolution of these categories sees the continued use of ecclesiologies that employ
a “contrastive model” as a contradiction of the trajectory set by Vatican II.
We can characterize this common thread as a concern for an ecclesiology of equality.
This does not mean that each author advocates for an erasure of the distinction between ecclesial
states as such. Hahnenberg and Gaillardetz, for instance, both value the unifying ministry of the
clergy, particularly bishops. What they are calling for is an equal valuation of all Christian
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activity, sometimes described as vocation, sometimes ministry, that would unmistakably value
the life and work of all Christians equally.
Many of the authors analyzed in this chapter draw a strong correlation between ecclesial
inequality and separation within the Church and dichotomies that envision the cosmos as a
distinction between the secular and the sacred, nature and grace, the world and God. To save us
from conflating it with the lay/clergy dichotomy with which it is so often associated it is
important to distinguish between the two. The lay/clergy and its corollaries are distinctly
ecclesiological in nature while this second pair is theological, anthropological, and cosmological.
The connection between these dichotomies is clearly recognizable in Gaillardetz who
sees the secular character of the laity as requiring two wholly independent spheres of activity.
To describe the activity of the laity and clergy in the way that the council does, there must be a
sphere reserved exclusively to lay activity as well as a sphere that is reserved for the activity of
the clergy. The laity, in this schema, are consigned to labor in a secular way in an ambiguous
“secular” while the clergy handle a strictly defined realm of the sacred. The description of the
latter is coupled with the reception of ordination, the exercise of a sacra postestas and the
participation within the ecclesial hierarchy.
The root of this division between secular and sacred is identified as the reliance on a
Dionysian understanding of mediation. Hahnenberg and O’Meara name the Areopagite
specifically, while others decry the notion of mediation in general. In their description of this
hierarchy, the active role of those who have the sacra postestas is the sole means for receiving
the divine. The world, and the laity who act in this world, would be totally cut off from the
divine without the mediated presence facilitated by the clergy. This conversation is easily
transposed into the key of grace and nature, wherein God’s grace is only available through the
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ordained ministers of the Church while the laity toil in a natural world, bereft of the help of God
that is necessary for them to receive salvation.
Among the authors of the development school there is a shared understanding that the
very concept of mediation assumes a deficient world. The conveyance of some reality be it
grace, the sacred, or the action of the Church itself into the world implies that the world does not
already have an equal share in the reality of God. This is tantamount to saying that the world
itself is not good. Lakeland’s recognition of the secular, the world, as sufficient without
reference to the transcendent is the collapsing of this dichotomy in a logical manner. We are left
with a dilemma: either the world is deficient and in need of some further action, which reaffirms
the dichotomy or creation is good and the concepts of mediation and consecration are ill applied
to the secular. I will argue that reflecting upon these issues through a maximian lens will provide
us with a third way. The concept of mediation and creation will serve as our point of departure
for the dialogue between Maximus and these contemporary views. As we will see, the Confessor
conceives of mediation in a manner that is consistent with a creation that has not only been
created good but, in his formulation, already participates in God.
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CHAPTER 2
MAXIMIAN COSMOLOGY

Saint Maximus the Confessor received his title and notoriety from the public defense of
dyotheletism and dyoergism: the teaching that in the person of Jesus Christ there are two wills
and energies or operations, respectively. At the height of the Monothelite controversy, Maximus
was silenced by the Byzantine Empire. In 662, his tongue was cut out of his mouth to keep him
from speaking, his right hand was cut off to keep him from writing. The Byzantine monk was
cast into exile along the eastern side of the Black Sea and would die in that same year. Maximus
is revered as a confessor by Orthodox and Catholics alike, his outspoken opposition to the
emperor was vindicated at the Third Council of Constantinople (680-681). Though Maximus is
most known for his contribution to the Christological controversy, this event chronicles but the
final chapter of a life spent in ascetic reflection and spiritual teaching. The Confessor weaves a
theological tapestry illustrating how the cosmos, humanity, and the Logos of God are intricately
connected. The fruit of maximian thought is a rich theology that affirms both the ontological
distance between God and creation as well as creation’s participation in God. The Confessor’s
thought on the human vocation can be summarized as the eucharistic offering of creation back to
God. For Maximus, holding the ontological distance between God and creation and the
participation of created beings with God in tension acts as a prerequisite for a free communion of
God and humanity with creation as their dialogic medium.
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I. Analysis of Ambiguum 7
An extended analysis of Maximus’ Ambigua 7 will serve as a beachhead for our
exploration of the Confessor’s cosmological vision. This passage, in which Maximus refutes an
Origenist interpretation of Gregory of Nazianzus, is perhaps one of the most written about part of
the Confessor’s work and for good reason. 1
First, it contains a complex yet clear argument that encapsulates the basics of his
cosmology. Second, it acts as a key to maximian terminology. Many of the concepts that
characterize the Confessor’s thought are employed in his overarching argument against
Origenism. We can observe how these concepts interact with one another, demonstrating the
consistency of Maximus’ thought. This includes the process of deification as being, well-being,
eternal well-being, 2 the logos and the logoi, 3 preservation of the person 4 and a nascent defense of
dyotheletism. 5 The crux of the Confessor’s argument reveals his attitude toward creation.
Maximus defends the created order against charges that it is somehow the result of corruption or
not originally intended by God.
This chapter will use the structure of Maximus’ argument in Ambigua 7 as the scaffolding
for a thematic exploration of the Confessor’s thought. We will consider the Origenist position
and its consequences for creation, before exploring Maximus’ response which will be broken up
into three sections. The first section will address the nature of created beings in which the
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Confessor differentiates created reality from God so as to characterize the former as always in
motion until it rests in the latter. The second will provide an account for how Maximus
understands Gregory’s statement that we are a “portion of God” while maintaining the
distinction between created being and God which includes the key maximian concept of the
logoi. The third is a response to the Origenist notion of a preexistent satiety that replaces it with
an endless striving toward God that is the eschatological consummation of creation. 6 While the
general structure will follow Maximus’ argument, we will introduce interconnected ideas
together in order to demonstrate the consistency of the Confessor’s thought.

A. The Countersign of Origenism
The classic portrait of Maximus’ theological position as a monolith of anti-Origenism is
beginning to erode. 7 In place of this, a nuanced understanding of the Confessor’s work is
emerging in which Maximus’ engagement with Origenism is multifaceted. 8 We can think of
Maximus’ analysis of Origen in two modes: As the former image suggests, it is apparent that he
wrote in order to refute the claims of contemporary expressions of Origenism and to preserve
prominent theological works, Gregory of Nyssa, for instance, from radically Origenist
interpretations. This task makes up a majority of the Ambigua. The second aspect of Maximus’
Origenist quest is novel: Maximus was interested in separating the wheat from the chaff - to
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preserve the ascetic and theological wisdom which grew up alongside erroneous theological
ideas. Maximus shows keen discernment by distinguishing between the theological vision of
creation and anthropology present in Origenist works and the ascetic spiritual tradition that he
would have incorporated into monastic life.
An analysis of Maximus’ works on asceticism show that they are heavily influenced by
Evagrius Pontikos, a disciple of Origen’s ascetic vision who became prominent in the monastic
world of the fourth century. Evagrius’ influence on Maximus’ work is unquestionable. Many of
the Confessor’s ascetic works are adaptions and corrections of the Origenist spiritual tradition of
Evagrius. 9 This is true of the Confessor’s largest collection of ascetic teaching, the Liber
Asceticus as well as the Capita de Caritate, which Maximos Constas notes “is a determined
rewriting of nearly one hundred passages from Evagrios Pontikos.” 10 In this vein, we can say
that Maximus is an “Origenist” in the sense that he develops this spiritual teaching in his own
way.
Despite this shift, the cosmology of Origenist school is the most prominent foil for
Maximus’ thought. The Confessor’s desire to protect the writings of the Fathers from being
coopted into supporting views contradictory to Chalcedonian Christianity provides the stage
upon which the drama of maximian cosmology unfolds. Maximus’ writings are largely
concerned with the interpretation of difficult passages and it is within these explanations that his
own thought is exemplified. This mode of clarifying, distinguishing, and solving aporia is
brought to bear on Origenist interpretations of Gregory in the Ambigua ad Iohannem. It is within
this context that the Confessor undoes the cosmology of radical Origenism and at the same time

Demetrios Harper, The Analogy of Love: St Maximus the Confessor and the Foundations of Ethics (Yonkers, New
York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2019), 237.
10
Constas, ed., On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua of Maximos the Confessor, VIII.
9

88

develops his own. While we can be certain that Maximus’ task was a refutation of the
Origenism’s worst characteristics, the development of Maximus’ own thought is so tied to
Origen’s that Pascal Mueller-Jourdan writes “we can recognize the metaphysics of Origenism as
the prime matter of Maximus’ cosmic liturgy.” 11
The bespoke difficulty of Ambigua 7 arises from a misinterpretation of an oration from
Gregory Nazianzus’ On Love of the Poor. At issue are two specific phrases that lend themselves
to an interpretation that devalues creation, namely: “we who are a portion of God that has
flowed down from above” and “this very weakness that has been yoked to us might be an
education concerning our dignity.” 12 Maximus seeks to defend Gregory from a facile
interpretation “derived largely from the doctrine of the Greeks.” 13 It is noteworthy that Maximus
does not name Origen or his contemporaries. 14 Maximus provides a summary of the view early
in the passage: There are some who interpret the “portion of God” to mean that humanity was
once connatural with God. God only created the world as a response to the flowing down of
rational beings: the result of movement which lead to the dispersal of rational beings. Bodies, as
creation, were not originally intended but were given “as a punishment for their former sins.” 15
The dynamic is one in which there was an original unity of rational beings enjoying God. These
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beings became bored with God, despite the definition of God as the “ultimately desirable” and
“the Beautiful” 16 and proceeded from stasis to movement, causing the creation of the world. 17
Maximus accuses these interpreters of assuming a triad of fixity-motion-generation. 18 To
better understand Maximus’ response to this misinterpretation of Gregory, it will benefit us to
explore the Origenist ideas embedded within the narrative. Though there are no direct citations
of Origen in this section, that the view stems from the Origenist school stands uncontested. 19
These ideas are readily observed in Origen’s On First Principles which ties creation to moral
evil. Origen’s account of creation is a cosmic theodicy. 20 Diversity of being and movement are
counted among the results of a primordial sin precipitated by the devil’s rebellion. This sin
results in the creation of the cosmos, ostensibly the spiritual as well as the physical. Individual
differences, including disadvantages in states of life, can all be traced to the extent to which the
person took part in this sin. Even birth defects and disabilities are counted within the scope of
this first punishment. Origen is intent on preserving the unity and goodness of God in the face of
a cosmos rampant with examples of division and sufferings. His solution links choice and moral
evil directly to this downfall and describes them as God’s just punishments but does so in a way
that requires a choice to be made before the beginning of motion or God’s act of creation.
This description of creation makes Maximus’ account seem all the more charitable. It
places creation as a result of sins within the same continuum as those angelic beings that became
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demons. Even the angels are created as a result of complicit rebellion. This does not simply
result in a creation that is not originally intended by God but eclipses the goodness of any act
done by God within creation. Farrell notes that Origen’s view is problematic in that it taints
God’s actions ad extra.21 God’s reaching into creation via revelation or a uniting of the divine
with created reality via the Incarnation would always reflect something other than the original
divine plan.
The Origenist view presents a countersign to Maximus’ view of the cosmos since it has
its beginnings in the freedom of preexistent rational beings and is the result of disobedience. As
the Confessor curtly points out, those who adopt this position would be “indebted to evil.” 22 The
reason for creation, revelation, Incarnation is the disobedience of the many as they, to make use
of the misapplication of Gregory’s words, “flow down” from above. 23 Maximus’ response will
lead to the eschatological affirmation of creation in the sense that creation will endure in the
eschaton, not its identification with punishment. His view can be contrasted directly with
Origen’s. Embodiment is not a reproof or the creation or a training ground to correct
disobedience. Creation is an irreplaceable part of the divine plan. For the Confessor, the
ultimate end of creation facilitates God’s intention who “wills always and in all things to
accomplish the mystery of His embodiment.” 24

B. Creation, Motion, Stasis
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Maximus denies the cosmological order of the Origenist argument. He turns the triadic
cascade of stasis-motion-creation on its head, formulating his own triad: creation-motion-stasis. 25
Maximus does not offer a competing pre-creation narrative; he makes his argument based upon
the nature of created things. In this first section of his response, Maximus deals directly with
creation and motion and defines them in relation to stasis, their end.
Maximus immediately relates creation (genesis) to motion (kinesis): “everything that has
received its being ex nihilo is in motion (since all things are necessarily carried along toward
some cause)...” 26 Motion does not exist in beings prior to their creation. He makes it clear that
creation (genesis) always precedes motion (kinesis). 27 Motion is not listless but has an end in its
goal. The crux of Maximus’ argument is that movement seeks an end, stasis. This includes an
eschatological element: “that which can arrest motion of whatever is moved in relation to it has
not yet appeared. 28 Maximus pits his cosmology directly against the Origenist claim of original
unity in a henad. For the henad, there would have been an original unity, a connaturality with
the natural end or as Maximus terms God “the Beautiful” (to Kalo). In his own schema, created
objects move toward God even though God has not yet “appeared.” Maximus’ rhetoric is
unforgiving. The Origenist position leads to one of two conclusions: a) an infinite cycle of
insatiability: if rational beings rejected satisfaction once, they will do so again 29 or b) the one
around which the henad was gathered must not be the end goal because these beings sought out
an alternative, they were not satisfied by God. 30
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Either possibility links the existence of motion and creation to moral evil. The
connection of evil to motion is just as problematic for Maximus as claiming that disobedience is
the cause for creation. Again, for Maximus, motion is always seeking its reason for being, its
end, the Beautiful. If evil is the cause of motion then it is also the cause of “the most precious of
all possessions, I mean love.” 31 Motion is spurred on by love “through which all things created
by God are naturally gathered up in God, permanently and without change or deviation.” 32 To
claim that evil is the root cause of love is untenable for Maximus. The gathering up of every
created being forms the superstructure for his cosmological thought and we shall see how he
grounds this dynamic, not as a punishment for obedience, but in accord with God’s original
intent for creation.
Inanimate objects are not devoid of this motion, having their own place within the divine
plan. Each created being has motion, created for a proper end that is not included within
themselves. Their motion is a striving toward that end. 33 God alone is self-caused, existing for
his own sake, having no end outside of himself. 34 This being so, God is not subject to the motion
of creation but is the source and end of motion. The impetus behind this movement is
twofold. First, there is a natural power by which beings tend toward God as the final end and
goal. Second, created beings move toward God as a result of their own activity. 35 Maximus does
not limit this activity to intellectual creatures but highlights that creatures express their activity in
the exercise of their volition. It is through free assent that these creatures affirm their movement
toward God. Their choice “intensifies and greatly accelerates [their own] motion.” 36 This is
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realized through a dynamic of recognizing the Beautiful and becoming convinced that it is an
object that should be loved. The experience of ecstatic love drives the intellectual being ever on
until it is possessed wholly by the beloved. 37
The result is an eschatological transformation. Maximus explains that those intellectual
beings who strive toward God as their end will undergo a change in which they seek to be
identified solely in God. The qualities they manifest are not their own but are the qualities of the
one who permeates them. 38 This should not be confused with absorption or
annihilation. Maximus is quick to point out that the intellectual being retains two key
elements. First, handing over of the will does not entail the destruction of selfdetermination. What is surrendered is the ability to make choices that are opposed to God. 39
Secondly, Maximus describes the eschatological enjoyment of God in a way that preserves
personal identity. Though Maximus does refer to the creature’s preference to be known by the
qualities of God the intellectual creature’s identity remains distinct. Maximus borrows an image
from 1 Cor 13:12: even within God we shall “know even as we are known.” 40 Key to
understanding the preservation of identity of intellectual and other created beings is Maximus’
insistence on the infinite difference between the created and uncreated. 41 This allows him to
compare the deified with a star being eclipsed by the greater light of the sun that surround and
penetrates it without annulling the real difference between them. 42
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The affirmation that all creation – visible and invisible – has been created by God ex
nihilo is the opening salvo of the Confessor’s response to Origen. This mode of creation is the
basis upon which he lays his argument for the genesis-kinesis-stasis schema. 43 God freely
intends to create beings that are necessarily in motion. This creation does not take place as a
result of preexistence or downward motion but is brought into existence by God out of nothing.
Creation ex nihilo can serve as a thoroughfare by which we can reach many aspects of the
Confessor’s cosmology. From this doctrine arises three crucial components of Maximus’
theological view: 1) the tension of a creation that is ontologically distinct from God and yet can
become God through participation. 2) Maximus’ apophaticism, the language we can use to
describe the relationship of created to uncreated realities. 3) how the Confessor’s view defines
creation as a free act of creation in love.
Creation ex nihilo is a twofold rejection of the Origenist stance: God does not create from
anything preexistent, rational or otherwise, and God creates freely, not out of a contingency
which arose from disobedience. The assertion that God would have created either from a
preexistent substance or due to the result of a pre-temporal fall would be to consign the creative
act to a matter of necessity. In the Origenist account, creation is a sort of training ground that is
necessary to lead beings back to the henad. It is a response to that situation and no longer an act
done in total freedom. Mitralexis explains that maximian cosmology, in agreement with the
patristic tradition, is not borne out of necessity but due to the act of a personal uncreated
creator. 44 God, due to his transcendence, is always free. For the Confessor, freedom
characterizes God, not as part of God’s nature but as a demonstration of God’s existence beyond
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our conception of Him. 45 Maximus rejects that God is any way bound by necessity. To claim
limits upon divine freedom would be “utter blasphemy.” 46
Having been brought about by a free act, creation receives its characteristic
contingency. God’s choice, in Mitralexis’ words, “transcends predeterminations and
necessities.” 47 This underscores the utter gratuity of the created order. God could have created
something vastly different but chose to create particular beings in this way from among an
infinitude of possibility. Bereft of necessity, God could have chosen not to create anything at
all. Creation in freedom is nothing more than an exercise of God’s creative will. God creates
what he desires, how he desires, when he desires. 48 As we shall see when we explore Maximus’
anthropology in the next chapter, the nature of creation as free has ramifications for the nature of
the freedom found in rational beings. The God who creates without necessity imbues that same
freedom into rational beings who in turn are invited to exercise their own personal
freedom. This is contrary to the Origenist position which makes the creation of the world a
matter of necessity and distorts freedom into unsatiety that can only be cured through a
submission to the theological dynamism that will ultimately return it to God. 49
In his analysis of the fourth section of Maximus’ Centuries on Love, Tollefsen explores
God’s freedom in relation to creation ex nihilo. The analysis begins from a point of continuity:
the doctrine as it was expressed at Nicaea and Constantinople holds influence on Maximus’
writing. Tollefsen demonstrates how Maximus’ view affirms the doctrine but moves beyond the
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conciliar teaching and is conversant with the wider Christian tradition on the topic. The
Confessor raises and answers many questions in the process. 50 Maximus discusses God’s
“inscrutable wisdom” in creating the cosmos when he did and not before or after. 51 This
statement first assumes that creation itself has a beginning, a position that could not be taken for
granted in the ancient world. 52 For Maximus, creation is not eternal with God because no limited
thing can exist infinitely. 53 This logically begs the question Maximus considers in a selection of
his De Caritate: why has God chosen to create when he did as opposed to some other time?
Engaging this question is not simply an exercise in idle theological speculation. It gives
Maximus the opportunity to pass on important distinctions about God’s relationship to creation
and humanity’s ability to know God. Crucial to comprehending the discussion is that this
question has no reference to the time within creation itself. The question addresses “when” God
created in reference to the eternity that exists in God and itself may be an attack on the noneternity of creation. Looking closely at the logic in the question as Maximus presents it. (1)
God’s eternal goodness includes his identity as creator God (2) God is always good then (3) why
did God create “recently” or as Tollefsen writes: why didn’t God create “infinitely sooner?” 54
Maximus finds the question as it stands unanswerable. Asking why God did not create
sooner is nonsensical because there is no time before creation. 55 The question is useful in that it
gives the Confessor an opportunity to reflect on the validity of the question. While it is
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impossible to have a “when” before creation, asking “why” God created when he did can be
meaningful if we understand “why” in the proper sense. Maximus does not answer the question
as it is posed but reaches into the sense of the question to make his distinction. God creates in
accord with the “inscrutable wisdom of the infinite essence” which in and of itself is ungraspable
by the human intellect. 56 Contemplating the divine essence grants an opportunity to wonder at
God’s creative activity but does not answer the proposition. 57
This reflection draws an apophatic boundary around what questions Maximus is willing
to consider. Questions that pertain to God’s inner life, about God in and of himself remain
hidden. The divine essence is impenetrable. For Maximus, asking the reason behind God’s
choice to create when he did falls within this category. These questions are distinct from those
that can be asked about God using data observed from within creation. This second type pertains
to God ad extra, the effects of God’s action within creation. 58 Regarding the current example
from De Caritate 4, humanity can conceive of how God created — the statement that God
creates ex nihilo is an answer to this very question — or to look for the reasons “why” God
created embedded within the created reality. This second way of interpreting the “why” of the
question differs from the first in that it has for its subject God’s action in creation, present in
nature or revelation, not inquiring within the divine essence itself. Maximus’ utilization of
negative theology is of primary importance for understanding his doctrine of creation. Before
exploring the ontological distance between God and creation, which for Maximus is a necessary
condition for his dynamic cosmology, we need to understand the source and structure of his
engagement with apophaticism.
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D. Mysticism / Apophaticism
The limits the Confessor is willing to set to his theological inquiry are not a simple matter
of logical necessity, nor are they unquestioned conformity to what has been handed on to
him. Maximus certainly inherits the categories of apophaticism used by both Pseudo-Dionysius
and Gregory Nazianzus but his conviction that the Divine Essence is utterly beyond the human
capacity to fathom is primarily grounded within his own mystical experience. The cosmology of
Maximus cannot be separated from his lifelong spiritual pursuit of the ascetic life. The
Confessor writes as one with intimate experience with the realities he is communicating, not
dealing in secondhand statements of authority. Maximus has experienced both the presence and
absence of God. 59 He holds up the ascetic life, the life of virtue as the means of encounter with
God who is at once present to the one who lives that life and absent to the one who is not. 60 He
writes about a mystical condition of knowledge that proceeds from this way of life in which the
experience of God is a “simple and direct meaning of the Lord without images.” 61 This is the
door to Maximus’ engagement with the apophatic tradition. It is a denial of the sensible and
intellectual and an acceptance of a vision that exceeds the capacity of human intellect. 62
The mystical experience of an intimate alterity of God underwrites the whole maximian
corpus but finds potent expression in his reflection on the transfiguration. 63 This in itself can be
seen as an adaptive response to Origenism since the Alexandrian utilizes the transfiguration as a
Capita Theologica et Oeconomica – hereafter Th. Oec. 2.57 all translations from George C. Berthold, ed.,
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primary locus for his mystical thought as opposed to Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa
who give pride of place to Moses’ experience at Mount Sinai. 64 Maximus sees in the event of the
transfiguration of Jesus on Mount Tabor a figure of the “two general modes of theology.” 65 The
Confessor outlines these modes using a comparative rhetoric. The apophatic and cataphatic are
presented in a complementary manner. “The first is simple and uncaused, and verily affirms the
Divine solely through a complete denial, properly honoring divine transcendence by absolute
silence. The second is composite, and magnificently describes the Divine by means of positive
affirmations based on its effects.” 66 The threshold of God ad intra and ad extra noted in this
discussion is further elaborated here but without denigrating the cataphatic. Each provide
“symbols appropriate for us.” 67 In respect for the impenetrable mystery of God, Maximus calls
our experience of God’s transcendence a “symbol” just as he does the symbols that address sense
perception. It is through these symbols that we believe in what is “beyond the senses” but stop
short of subjecting these unseen realities to the intellect because doing so would be irreverent. 68
That which is denied through the via negativa is simultaneously affirmed through what is
available to the senses. The “likeness of the knowledge of God” is available through these
positive symbols but only in a rough way, knowing God “from His creations, as their cause.” 69
This concurrent mystical affirmation/negation continues throughout the remainder of
Maximus’ exposition. The Lord, present at the transfiguration manifests this dynamic in
complementary pairs: created in human form/without undergoing any change, being present as a
symbol of Himself to lead all of creation to Himself/though He is hidden and totally beyond all
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manifestation, He provides in a human-loving fashion through visible divine action/what are
signs of visible infinity. 70
Maximus exegetes Christ’s appearance at the transfiguration in this manner. The apostles
experience both modes of theology in the Lord’s presence. In His face, made luminous in the
transfiguration, they experience God who is ineffable and unable to be circumscribed by human
thought. He specifies that beholding the face of the Lord, beholding the Godhead, leaves no
impression around which a concept can be formed. 71
The garments of Lord shine by the same light present in the face and are a symbol of
cataphatic theology. Garments as a created reality, are not the Lord himself but manifest his
magnificence as it is found within visible creation. 72 This corresponds to the effects of God’s
activity through which we can perceive Him in a positive manner, though not clearly due to the
immense light of revelation. These symbols and the theological modes they represent are
complementary. The brightness of the garments is inseparable from the luminosity of the Lord’s
face. Both make up the fulness of revelation, the apophatic shining within the cataphatic, not
cancelling it out. The gathering of these modes into a complementary whole gives Maximus’
mystical theology a distinctly creation-affirming character. Creation is not sloughed off as a
hindrance to the ever-invisible experience of God but is revelatory in its own right in a manner
proper to its participation in God. 73
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It is helpful to compare Maximus’ approach to mysticism with that of
Dionysius. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is a pioneer of Christian mystical theology. There
is in the work of this anonymous author a unity between the hierarchical, sacramental, liturgical
and mystical to the extent that his Ecclesial Hierarchy can be seen as a reflection of the Celestial
Hierarchy. Emphasis on the unity of these complex realities is inherited by Maximus. Blowers
tells us that Maximus’ integration of Dionysius into his own work gives it an ecclesial and
sacramental orientation. 74
There are many witnesses to the direct influence that Dionysius has on Maximus’
thought. Chief among them is Maximus’ aim in his Mystagogia to discuss the Divine Synaxis in
a way that honors the teachings of the “blessed elder” by addressing only the things that he did
not already cover. 75 The high praise offered by Maximus is reflected by the Confessor’s adaption
of many Dionysian phrases for his own use. Many of the concepts central to Maximus’ thought
were coined in works by the Areopagite. Dionysius is the source of “theandric energy,”
Maximus’ favorite term for the new activity formed by the unity of divine and human action. 76
The description of the process of deification as the triad being-well being-eternal well being is an
addition to the dyad of being-well-being, formulated by the Areopagite. 77 Even the term logoi,
key to Maximus’ understanding of the divine/world relationship is adapted from Dionysius.

Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002). and
Jacques Derrida, "In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of ‘Negative Theology’," in God, the Gift and
Postmodernism, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999).
74
Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 39.
75
Mystagogia CCSG 6-7 PG 91:660D. All citations of Myst from Jonathan J. Armstrong, ed., Maximus the
Confessor: On the Ecclesiastical Mystagogy (Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2019). The identity of the
“Blessed Elder” is of some dispute, while the text in question seems to refer directly to what has already been
covered in the Ecclesial Hierarchy the term “blessed elder” is the same that Maximus uses when describing an
anonymous teacher that has had as equal an influence over the Confessor as Pseudo-Dionysius. Historians speculate
that his teacher may be Sophronius of Jerusalem. See Amstrong’s introduction to his translation Mystagogia, 25-26.
76
Amb 5, PG 91:1057C.
77
Ysabel De Andia, "Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor," in The Oxford Handbook of
Maximus the Confessor, ed. Paul Allen and Brownen Neil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 181.

102

Specifically, Maximus adopts Dionysius’ definition of the logoi as “divine wills.” This way of
preserving the unity of the one logos expressed in and to the many manifestations of logoi has
become synonymous with the Confessor’s thought, a concept we will discuss shortly.
The Confessor embraces the Areopagite’s mystical language as a foundation for his
ontology. The ontological distance expressed by apophaticism forbids confusing God with
creation. As Balthasar explains: “Dionysius pointed to the indissoluble autonomy of the finite
world, as a whole and in its individual members in relation to the infinite reality of God. 78
The Confessor appropriates much Dionysian language and method in his mystical
theology yet there are crucial differences. Maximus pulls the categories of apophatic and
cataphatic modes from Dionysius as well as the theological distinction of God ad intra
(sometimes known as the theological) from the ad extra (also called the economic) which
corresponds to Dionysius’ categories of God as cause and God as supernatural cause. 79
Ysabel de Andia juxtaposes Maximus’ development with the Areopagite’s showing how
the Confessor reframed his predecessor’s thought in a distinctly Christological key. 80 Dionysius’
point of departure is an apophatic “ascending of the negations” that approaches the darkness of
God by freeing the mind of sensible realities and ends “beyond affirmation and negation.” 81
Maximus’ approach is characterized by the kenosis of the second person of the Trinity. Instead
of a philosophical ascent, the Confessor’s mystical theology takes its cue from the theological
descent. Affirmations are made possible by witnessing this divine activity as revelation. 82 This
unfolds into emphases of imagery that characterize each approach. Dionysius, in keeping with a
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negation of the created in search for the uncreated, sees the mystical journey as “a mystique of
darkness.” 83 The Areopagite combines the dark cloud of Exodus 20:21 with the unapproachable
light of 1 Tim 6:16 in a depiction of the unknowable God. To this, Maximus adds the imagery of
the transfiguration, the light of the Lord’s face and garments. 84 Unknowing is complemented by
the mysterious knowledge of the Lord in revelation and activity in creation. 85This result is the
difference between Dionysius who pursues an ecstatic state that “leaves ‘everything and itself’”
behind versus the maximian christological synthesis. 86
For Maximus, cataphatic statements do not remove the veil of mystery from
God. Cooper summarizes this paradoxically: “God reveals himself by hiding himself, and in
hiding himself, makes himself known.” 87 Even Holy Scripture cannot be taken as the plain truth
about God, it participates in this dramatic revealing/concealing. Maximus uses the image of
garments, this time showing how they cover the flesh of the Word. He describes the words of
Holy Scripture as “garments” - while the Word is clothed and certainly present in them, they also
cover the Word, concealing the flesh of the Word. 88 The same can be said of God’s revelation in
nature. What is created in nature and according to the Word is an expression of that same Word
but the very visible nature of creation means it conceals what is invisible. 89 Cataphatic attributes
and names of God serve to clothe the naked flesh of the Word so that humanity can communicate
about Him and worship Him. Maximus warns against rejecting the use of these garments to
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clothe the Word since without them we would have no way of describing the invisible. In a
sense, not concealing the Word with human language makes us “murderers of the Word.” 90 Such
are the Greeks for Maximus, who refuse to acknowledge anything beyond what is visible and
become worshippers of the visible nature before them. 91 The purpose of language, symbols, and
images is always to point beyond itself. Just as the garment clothes the flesh, empty garments
are of no use. Making affirmations about God always points beyond those affirmations, always
conceals more than they reveal. These attributes are not simply of human invention. Through
His own self-revelation, culminating in the Incarnation, God has given reason for addressing
Him in a positive way. Maximus writes “the Word ... came to us through a body, and likewise
grew thick in syllables and letters.” 92 The thickening of the Word that is the product of Divine
activity does not change the revelatory dynamic. What is seen and conceived still belongs to
God ad extra. We agree with Cooper’s evaluation of the topic that though these affirmations are
crucial for Maximus, their nature as concealers of the Word means that they do not come
anywhere close to circumscribing the reality of God. Whatever can be said of God “is in fact
more accurately denied him.” 93
We can see how Maximus uses negations to produce theological affirmation in his
Centuries on Theology and Economy. Opening passages of the first “century” find the Confessor
describing what God is not by comparing Him with created realities such as time, movement,
and essence. 94 The unknowable God, ellusive to human knowledge can only be naturally
acknowledged by witnessing “the principles in beings.” 95 The use of these negations to compare
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created reality with God is a mode of affirmation itself but not an affirmation of God as such: it
is the affirmation of an ontological distance between God and creation.

E. Ontological Distance
Maximus’ mystically inspired apophaticism leads us to a God who can only be spoken of
in his manifestations within creation but never fully understood since He Himself is not
contained within creation. The maximian distinction between God and creation is not simply a
linguistic or descriptive one but comes from ontological distance and difference. The difference
we find in Maximus has a certain similarity to what von Balthasar links Maximus’ view with
Dionysius. Dionysius held that there was an “indissoluble autonomy of the finite world, as a
whole and in its individual members, in relation to the infinite reality of God.” 96 The formulation
of ontological distance contains the validation of a characteristically Western belief about “space
and freedom.” 97 From the outset we should take care to temper this notion that allows for space
and freedom with the Orthodox understanding of participation, anticipating discussion of the
logoi. Maximus and Dionysius’ shared apophatic vision affirms an ontological distinction and
difference between God and creation, but they do not do so in a way that bars participation in the
Divine. Loudovikos explains that in the Orthodox context apophaticism, descriptive or
otherwise, does not end with “a sterile gnosiological abstinence.” 98 It denotes a spiritual position
in which the sum of the cosmos is never equal to God but allows for a “dialogical participation in
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divine actuality.” 99 We will return to the description of this dialogic dynamic in the next
chapter. It is the affirmation of this difference, the recognition that God is permanently and
eternally the Other, that simultaneously ensures that the created is never absorbed into the Divine
while facilitating an ever-deepening participation of the created with God.
The ontological distance between God and creation facilitates motion. Blowers describes
the distance as functioning as both space and horizon. 100 As a space it allows movement toward
or away from God. As a horizon it beckons the created toward deification without “ever being
fully traversed.” 101 The difference between God and the creation that God made ex nihilo stands
as an “epistemic fault line,” which for Maximus is “non-negotiable.” 102 We recall that
prerequisite distinction is made by Maximus at the outset of Ambigua 7 which will go on to
describe created beings as participating in God. This distinction and definition of ontological
distance guarantees that God and creation remain unconfused and is of primary importance
because of the intimacy that Maximus demonstrates between God and creation. Recall that
creation ex nihilo is used by Maximus in Ambigua 7 as a justification for his stance on motion
since for the Confessor “everything that has received its being is in motion.” 103 The Confessor
describes God as immovable because the Divine occupies a sort of super-position “since it fills
all things.” 104 Ontological distance simultaneously retains space for movement and affirms
God’s filling of that space. This both qualifies and introduces tension into Maximus’ exposition
on motion. God is both ultimately Other than the creation and yet fills all that exists. The
Confessor’s insistence on this difference holds the tension in place without allowing it to resolve
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into pantheism. The pantheist position has already been rejected by Maximus. The Origenist
interpretation of Gregory’s statement that we are “portions of God flowing down from above”
would not have been problematic for the Confessor had he held a pantheistic view. Tracing
Maximus’ argument about the moment of creation revealed that he was unwilling to consider the
co-eternity of creation with God because it would imply “metaphysical ‘simultaneity.’” 105 God
cannot be univocally identified with his creation. It is only God’s creative will that can bridge
the difference, the primordial abyss, that is between him and the creation which he wishes to
bring into an unconfused union with the divine nature. 106
Further highlighting this tension is Maximus’ appropriation of the Dionysian concept that
creation is both ex nihilo and ex Deo. 107 In Maximus’ words: “We believe that He Himself, by
virtue of His infinite transcendence, is ineffable and incomprehensible, and exists beyond all
creation ... We also believe that this same One is manifested and multiplied in all the things that
have their origin in Him in a manner appropriate to the being of each, as befits His goodness.” 108
These two statements can only be synoptically affirmed with the understanding of God’s
ontological difference. For Maximus, God’s being does not supplant created being. The two are
not in dichotic competition for the “space” we are discussing. If Maximus says that creation is
ex Deo, he does so in a way that should not be mistaken for a diffusion of God’s being into
created beings as though the One is now the many. Instead, as creator and cause of being, God
cannot be thought of as one being among many. God abides outside of Maximus’ ontological
schema altogether. Characteristic of his theologically apophatic style when speaking of God in
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reference to ontology, the Confessor says that it is fitting to call the superbeing of God
“nonbeing.” 109 The affirmation of God necessitates the negation of created being writ large. In a
passage from his Ecclesial Mystagogy, Maximus writes that it is more proper to acknowledge
that God “transcends being” but does so in a way that places God “by nature in the same class as
absolutely nothing of the things that are.” 110 Mitralexis cautions us against thinking that
Maximus is engaging in mere rhetoric here. 111 This radical negation, the breaking of ontology by
attempting to circumscribe God is instead a respectful use of language that cannot hope to be
made to describe the mode of existence of the Divine which is always outside of creation as its
source and end. 112

F. Movement (Kinesis)
The ontological distance that distinguishes creation from the Creator is demonstrative of
the maximian philosophy of movement. By nature, created beings move while God Himself is
immovable. 113 Motion is not the result of corruption or moral evil but is presented by Maximus
as an ontological property of created being. 114 Movement is what inherently distinguishes the
created from God. 115 The Confessor says this univocally of all created beings, including
“inanimate beings and merely objects of sense perception.” 116 Recalling Maximus’ reversal of
the Origenist triad of satiety-motion-generation into generation-motion-satiety, God’s creation ex
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nihilo precedes motion. Beings are then originally intended by virtue of their creation for
motion. 117
That all creation is ever in motion and that it is a God-intended ontological property of
being raises some questions: Does motion ever draw creation away from God? Do created
beings lose the ontological property of motion once they reach their telos in God? In order to
address these issues, Dionysius Skliris distinguishes between three sorts of movement (kinesis)
within the work of the Confessor: metaphysical, diastematic, and perpetual movement. 118 The
metaphysical sense is used as the middle term in Maximus’ response to Origenism. This
movement connotes a being in the process of becoming. It has as a telos its finalization which
brings about metaphysical completion. God is both the preconceived end (telos) and objective
(skopos) of all created things “yet itself exists out of nothing.” 119 According to Skliris, what
differentiates Maximus from the metaphysics of the Greek tradition, particularly Aristotle, is that
there exists a “great chasm between the movement and the end.” 120 This is not to say that natural
maturation does not move beings toward this goal yet it never does so in a way that causes them
to attain their telos. Due to the ontological difference, metaphysical movement can never arrive
at its final consummation. That is, it can never reach total fulfillment without receiving
something from “beyond nature.” Yet this is precisely what has been offered through the
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hypostatic union. The uniting of the created with the uncreated facilitates the movement of
created beings into participation with the Divine. The incorporation of ontological distance that
can only be traversed by an incorporation of the created in the hypostatic union represents for
Skliris the maximian development of a Christian Aristotelianism. 121
The second, diastematic movement, primarily means spatial movement over distance, is a
“passage from one place to another.” 122 This sort of movement also describes temporal changes
that are not part of metaphysical becoming such as a change in attributes or
accident. Diastematic movement always happens within time, it can accompany metaphysical
movement but should not be confused with it. The key difference is that metaphysical
movement is always movement toward a being’s telos. Irrational movement, movement that is
in opposition to the final end of created being is always only diastematic movement. 123
Movement (kinesis) for Maximus can be used to describe both the progress made toward union
with God in time (both metaphysical and diastematic) but collapses into mere spatial movement
(diastematic) if beings move in opposition to this end.
The Confessor’s final use of movement concerns the eschatological drive of humanity for
God. Termed “perpetual” or “eternal” movement, this sort of motion occurs within the human
psyche as an inner drive for God. 124 Since this movement is internal to the human person, it is
not diastematic, there is no spatial quality to it. The perpetual motion causes bodily movement,
following this desire for God, but is itself not concerned with space or the physical. This
eschatological movement is however metaphysical in that it guides humanity toward the final
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end: repose in God. 125 Eschatological movement does not simply lead to and have its fulfillment
in the eschaton. This sort of movement continues even as it is fulfilled. We can contrast this
with diastematic and metaphysical movement which cease when fulfilled. 126 It is this sort of
movement that Maximus has in mind when he uses his aporetic term “ever-moving-repose.” This
term describes God’s movement in which the created is ultimately to participate. 127
It is important to note that the motion which finds its rest only in God is not limited to
rational creatures but includes all that is created. No matter what part of creation, the end, rest in
God is described in the same terms. This is why we can say, properly speaking, that the rest that
has its ultimate goal in God is not only a facet of Maximus’ anthropology, or angelology, but is a
distinct part of his cosmology. The argument of Ambigua 7 does not differentiate between
created beings and rational beings in its foundational descriptions of motions. 128 The logic of the
argument uses the status of rational beings as created beings to conclude that rational beings
must also be in motion toward some goal. 129 It is at this point that the Confessor introduces the
idea of a will within rational beings, who seek “a voluntary end in well-being.” 130 Maximus’
argument about motion is then not solely limited to the discussion of rational beings. The above
distinctions between metaphysical and diastematic movement proves to be important
here. Metaphysical movement has not been limited to rational creatures. We can conclude that
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non-rational, the non-intellectual, beings within creation tend toward God which is their own
telos. The motion of these non-intellectual beings is not meaningless. The goal that God intends
for the whole of creation is rest in Him. The movement toward rest in God is not, however, a
natural progression in the sense of a fait accompli. The movement of all creation does not end in
God out of necessity and may fall short of its potential, into mere diastamatic movement. Due to
the ontological difference between the created and uncreated, participation in the hypostatic
union is the only means by which creation can reach this finalization.
The impetus behind all metaphysical movement for Maximus as he describes it in
Ambigua 7 is desire. As the Beautiful (Kalon), God, is the proper end to this desire. This is a
key point in the Confessor’s argument against Origen since it delineates God as that in which
movement would cease, resulting in satiety. “For whatever is not good and desirable in itself,
and that does not attract all motion to itself, strictly speaking cannot be the Beautiful.” 131 God is
loved for his own sake and is the only one that can grant the end that can satisfy the longing of
which all movement is expressive.
This being so, Maximus does not claim that this desire is ever satiated. In what Blowers
phrases as an “eternal appetitive movement” we see that the perpetual, eschatological movement
is fueled by an unquenchable desire for God that remains even at the point of participation in
God. 132 The existence of such a desire rejects the notion of Origenist satiety altogether. If there
was ever a point at which desire was totally fulfilled there would be a risk that the being would,
like Origen’s henad, become bored with God. In place of this is a desire that can only be
satisfied by God yet never reaches final consummation. In Maximus’ own words, God is “by
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nature infinite and infinitely attractive, and who rather increases the appetites of those who enjoy
Him owing to their participation in that which had no limit.” 133 There is an apparent
contradiction here: even though God is the object that is desired yet never reached, Maximus
adopts a schema of creation-motion-satiety (rest/fixity). If the desire is never satisfied, how can
the Confessor claim that the triad is ever complete?
Blowers argues convincingly that Maximus forms his thought around eschatological
perpetual progress as an adaption of Gregory of Nyssa’s epektasis, that humanity strains toward
the infinity of God. 134 While diastematic movement would cease, in a sense, even the
metaphysical movement is folded into the infinite dynamic of participation. The being at rest in
God would never cease participating in God and due to God’s infinite nature would continue in
the process of becoming for all eternity. Gregory of Nyssa’s formulation of perpetual progress
arises while the Cappadocian is describing those who participate in God through virtue. This
invitation to infinite growth is laid out in syllogistic form: “Since, then, those who know what is
good by nature desire participation in it, and since this good has no limit, the participant’s desire
itself necessarily has no stopping place but stretches out with the limitless.” 135 Blowers finds
evidence of this view not only in Maximus’ cosmology, as represented in Amb 7, but also in his
explanations of the virtues, mystical theology and ultimately his view of deification. 136
Here we can see the cohesion of the Confessor’s thought. Maximus does not use
perpetual progress as a rhetorical device or a piece of mere data to refute a view that he does not
agree with. Perpetual progress is deeply embedded within his thought. It is not only consistent
with but relies as a matter of necessity on the topics discussed above. Ontological distance,
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perpetual progress, apophatic theology, and Maximus’ description of motion and the creation of
the cosmos ex nihilo do not simply interface in a way that they are non-contradictory. The ideas
flow together as though they were viewing the same reality with different emphases. Maximus’
initial response to Origenism rests upon each of these topics presented together as a whole and is
an edifice that does not stand if any one of them is removed. We have explored these topics in
this order based upon the Confessor’s own argument in Amb 7. This order highlights the
important distinction between creator and the created while affirming the goodness of both
creation and the movement of creation. Creation and movement are not the result of corruption
but were in God’s original plan. It is at this point in Amb 7 that Maximus discusses God’s
intention and the means by which God will bring about creation’s participation in the Divine.

II. Logos/Logoi
Maximus introduces the Logos and the logoi (λογοι) within his discussion of Gregory’s
aporetic statement that we are “a portion of God that has flowed down from above.” As a
continuation of his argument against Origenism, the Confessor contextualizes the logoi within
the cosmological structure we outlined in the previous section. The priority of ontological
distance adds nuance and limits to the sort of participation Maximus is willing to consider, a
dynamic in which the logoi play a crucial role. From the outset we should note that the words
logos and logoi hold manifold yet conceptually harmonious meanings. Constas explains the
difficulty of translating logos “which can occur half a dozen times in one sentence with nearly as
many meanings.” 137 Far from leading to confusion, the multivalence of the term shows the
pleremic character of Maximus’ vision and demonstrates why the term itself is so useful.
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The ubiquity of these terms is evident at the outset of this section and connects creation
ex nihilo to this stage of Maximus’ argument. With an allusion to the Book of Wisdom, the
Confessor states that God’s free act of creation is performed with “reason” (logos) and wisdom
(sophia).138 Already his use of the logoi is multifaceted: they are ideas within the mind of God
by which he creates, they allow for a distinction between the one and the many, accounting for
the “differences of created things” and ensure that individuals are not confused with one another
and remain unconfused (asugchutos) with God. 139
God creates in accordance with his logoi which correspond to a macro level (there is a
logos of angels and a logos of humanity) as well as an individual level, addressing each
particular being. 140 Maximus reminds the reader of God’s transcendence, the ontological
distance that reminds us that the Divine is not to be identified with creatures but is also the
paradoxical means by which God can be manifest in all creatures: “this same One is manifested
and multiplied in all the things that have their origin in Him.” 141 God “recapitulates” all that is
and holds it in being and it is by virtue of the origin of their being that “they participate in God in
a manner appropriate and proportionate to each.” 142 It is on account of the preexistent logoi,
universal and particular, that each individual being can be called “a portion of God.” 143
This being so, the logoi do not provide a fatalistic dictation for creaturely action. While
particular beings are created according to their logoi, the creatures’ movements post-creation
must also be “according to its logos” for it to come to be in God. 144 Particular logoi can be
conceived as the origin and trajectory on which God places beings. There is a divine intention
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for the movement of beings that coexists with a freedom that allows the logoi to be impacted by
the response of individual creatures. This freedom makes it possible to oppose the logoi. The
path of opposition does not lead to participation in God. The Confessor describes a dynamic in
which created beings resist their logoi and move “irrationally, swept away toward nonbeing.” 145
Participation is brought about by the logoi as cause, guide, and means by which created being is
brought into unity with God. 146 Though the logoi, in a sense, propel creatures, they are never
moved themselves, remaining fixed within God. 147 They precede the beings that are created by
God “at the appropriate moment in time.” 148 The logoi also define the limits of each created
thing. 149
Maximus defines one limit, consistent with the discussion of the previous section, to the
participation in God facilitated by the logoi. He draws the line of this participation at the limits
of negative theology, God ad intra. 150 In this mode the Logos is utterly distinct from everything
created “since He is beyond all being.”

151

The Confessor is willing to “set aside” this mode in

order to contemplate how created beings participate in God in which “the one Logos is many
logoi and the many are One.” 152 In as far as created beings exist according to their logoi (as their
origin and move in them toward their end in God) they participate in God and it can be said that
the One sustains them and that in them “the One is many.” 153
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Thus far we have encountered Maximus’ formulation of the logoi based upon his use of
the term in Amb 7. The Confessor provides a definition for the logoi adapted from Dionysius:
they are “‘predeterminations’ and ‘divine will.’” 154 The identification of logoi with the will or
“wills” of God that inform all of creation stress God’s unbound freedom and self-investment in
creation. This usage describes God’s own involvement within the dynamic of creation, cosmos,
and return. God embeds divine wills into creation as intended paths and as a means for union and
participation in his own divinity. In keeping with the multivalent meaning of logos/logoi,
Maximus’ definition of the logoi as divine wills presents a firm root for our understanding but in
itself is not exhaustive of his use of the term.
Maximus writes about the logoi so frequently that studying the concept highlights
different aspects of the teaching depending on context and emphasis. 155 Riou calls them the
“personal destiny of every created thing.” Sherwood emphasizes their existence in God from all
eternity and their unitive character. Likewise, Thunberg notes that God’s will is expressed in the
logoi and that following the logoi brings harmony between particular beings. 156 Von Balthasar
sees logoi as a preexistent “sketch” or “outline,” God’s “plan for the world.” Writing from a
Balthasarian inspired theo-dramatic perspective, Blowers describes them as the “the Logos’
‘script’ in the cosmic drama of his self-revelation.” 157 Florovsky emphasizes divine activity, the
logoi are connections expressed as “actions or “energies” which originate in “divine thoughts
and desires.” He also calls them “paradigms.” 158 Cottoi traces Maximus’ use of logoi as “inner
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principles” cosmologically and as “spiritual essences” in the context of the ascetic life. 159 Croce
notes logoi present within the biblical narrative, which give it form and meaning. 160 Loudovikos
writes that the logoi are responsible for “the beginning, middle, and end of things” they guide
“the entire existential course of a particular entity” in every context, eschatological, ecclesial,
eucharistic, or otherwise. 161 Meyendorff emphasizes the ontological aspect of the logoi that
simultaneously mark a creature’s participation in God and existence in being: “Separated from
its logos, a creature is but non-being, me-on.” Participation in God is required for even natural
movement. 162
These descriptions of the logoi hang together in a way that bespeak a kaleidoscopic
view. It is impossible to contain such a complex term by using a single snapshot. 163 The
continuation of our analysis will consider the logoi as they pertain to three key areas of
Maximus’ thought: his ontology, Christology, and theology of deification. To follow Maximus’
thought accurately, we should note that even these frames of reference mark out distinctions but
overlap since they cannot be separated from one another. Following the overarching theme of
this chapter, we begin with the ontological/cosmological point of reference.

A. Logoi vs. (Neo) Platonism
It is due to their role as facilitating participation in God that the logoi grant the very
existence of beings in a particular manner and of the universe in general. 164 This, coupled with
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the Confessor’s use of the logoi as a solution to the philosophical problem of the One and the
many can be mistaken for the Neoplatonic position. Neoplatonism would interpret the logoi as
emanations of the One Logos. This emanation would communicate God’s own being through the
logoi. The logoi are not channels, as it were, of the divine essence into creation. Believing so
would be to mistakenly apply the doctrine of the logoi to what lies beyond being, to God ad
intra. Maximus forbade precisely this view in Amb 7. Instead of sharing in God’s essence,
created beings participate in God through God’s own personal divine activity, which are the
logoi. 165 The logoi exist in God from all eternity as God’s own wills and are inseparable from
God, whereas Platonic ideals are themselves eternal, distinct from God, and have their own
motive force. 166 Platonic ideas are dissimilar to the logoi since they have autonomy and exert
necessity over God, an unthinkable limitation of the divine freedom. 167 Confusing the logoi with
Platonic ideas would be just as detrimental to the freedom of created beings. Mitralexis
describes a crucial difference between understanding the logoi as created wills versus defining
them as divine ideas. 168 If the logoi were a sort of God-originate form or ideal, they would
necessarily constrain creaturely freedom. Expressing the logoi as wills grounds existence in
freedom rather than necessity. 169 Similarly, Bradshaw observes how the logoi are not conceived
of as “exhaustive predeterminations of the entire course of a creature’s existence.” 170 The logoi
of rational beings can be likened to an “invitation” the response to which is left up to that being’s
volition. In the distinction between ideas and wills, we encounter a foretaste of the logoi’s role as
both the guarantor of and means for humanity’s dialogic relationship with God.
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The emphasis on freedom proves to be the deciding factor which differentiates Maximus’
cosmological vision from his neo-Platonic contemporaries and brings the logoi center
stage. Tollefsen expands upon this crucial point and sketches an argument that, while respecting
the transcendence of the divine essence, connects it to creation in a way that demonstrates the
diffusion of goodness within creation as a free act of God. Tollefsen begins with common
ground: he posits that God’s internal activity is both necessary and sufficient for creation and
that creation is contingent, having no effect on the divine essence itself. 171 For both Christian and
Neo-Platonist, God could be conceived as one who wills to be “diffusive of good” without
implying any change in divinity. 172 Creation could be mistaken for a side-effect of the existence
of this diffusion of goodness and it is on this point that the two schools differ. Tollefsen asserts
that the difference lies in God’s attention to creation. God does not simply allow creation to
happen but is the sole attentive participant in bringing about creation, “something other than
Himself.” 173
This argument assumes that we can intimate something about God’s inner life from the
creative result of divine activity. We must recognize a distinction between God’s selfcontemplation as one who diffuses good (one who creates) and the active willing of that creation,
a separate volition of God. This second point would be unacceptable to the Neoplatonist
understanding of emanation. 174 Creation would not be necessary because of God’s selfknowledge but would be known as a possibility of that knowledge. This adds a level of
contingence that Tollefsen derives from Maximus’ description of the logoi in Amb 7. 175 The
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logoi are depicted as God’s knowledge of creatures but not the actualization of those creatures:
the very possibility of those creatures to be created and what they might ultimately become. The
dominant picture of the maximian God as freely acting divinity in place of logical necessity
emerges here. The logoi have a double function of being God’s knowledge of creatures as well
as the free choice of God to bring them into being with multiple possible outcomes intact. This
system allows creatures to exercise freedom in respect to God while God remains unchanged by
the unfolding drama of creation and history. 176

B. The Logoi and Ontology
What then, is the ontological status of the logoi? Their intimate connection with created
beings and rejection of their autonomy from God may lead us to think that they are created like
the beings they inform. Thunberg links this question to immanence and transcendence. 177 The
answer he arrives at, in his words, is “a double one.” 178 We must hold in tension that the logoi
precede the entire cosmos and are uncreated wills of God which can only be realized as they
bring creation into being. From a different perspective, we might understand them as God’s
uncreated intention to bring about creation from all eternity, which only becomes manifest
outside of the divine essence as that creation is brought into being. Yet the logoi are not passive
or static, they represent God’s continued presence and activity in created being. 179 On account of
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this, Thunberg states that the logoi are “both transcendent and immanent.”

180This

double answer

helps us to understand a passage in Amb 33 in which the Confessor relates that it is by his logoi
that the “Word ‘becomes thick.’” 181 The dual status of the logoi as transcendent and immanent
are demonstrated in this passage in which Maximus relates that the Logos is “wholly present in
the whole universe” and simultaneously “wholly present in individual things.” The conceptual
categories of transcendence and immanence help us to make sense of how the Logos could be
present “wholly” to both frames of reference (universally and particularly) while being
“undiminished.” 182 The logoi are the “sole bridge from the inner mystery of divine being” as
expressions of that being’s will made manifest in creation. 183
Following Riou, Loudovikos sees Maximus’ logoi as a uniquely maximian solution to
many of the problems with conventional ontology. The logoi do not represent, in the words of
Riou a “general ontology applicable on the cosmic level.” Maximus’ approach is ontological
inasmuch as it addresses creation as “a sacramental and revealed structure in the created
world.” 184 Loudovikos claims that this differentiates the logoi from other ontologies since it is
“meta philosophical.” 185 Maximus provides a similar schema to created reality but does so on the
basis of participation in the revealed logoi of God. Conventional, and particularly Neoplatonic,
ontology assumes the emanation of the essence of an all-encompassing Being from which lesser
beings are derived. The inner logic might look similar, but the source is completely
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different. Thus, Loudovikos approves the use of “ontology” to describe the Confessor’s thought
but with the reservation that the source is sacramental and revelatory, not “being” as such. 186
Within the framework of ontology, we can pick up the thread of the argument from Amb
7 that “the one Logos is many logoi and the many are One.” 187 For Maximus, this is a matter of
procession from God and return to God. We can understand the many as One and the One as
many due to ontological movement: “According to the creative and sustaining procession of the
One to individual beings ... the One is many. According to the revertive, inductive, providential
return of the many to the One ... the many are One.” 188 The unity of the many in the One is not
established as a gross absorption of the many into a one or the compounding of the many onto
the One. Maximus describes this unity with the image of a circle. The return of the logoi are as
radii which have originated from the center of the circle (which Maximus tells us “pre-contains
the radii” by virtue of its form) but then return to it through the arc of their movement. 189
The circle is a favorite image of the Confessor which he uses to describe the Logos/logoi
dynamic. 190 Maximus uses the circle within these three passages in unique ways that demonstrate
his doctrine of participation. The Sentences on Theology contain the most laconic example of
this illustration. 191 The Confessor likens the “simple and undivided knowledge” of “all the
preexisting principles of things” (logoi) to “straight lines which proceed from the center” of “an
undivided position.” 192 Tollefsen highlights the presence of the term “undivided” which features
prominently in the Christological definition of Chalcedon. 193 He argues that the use of the
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Chalcedonian term is not an accidental allusion but is itself a conscious reminder of the language
which describes the hypostatic union. In turn, we should call to mind the complementary term
“unconfused” which ensures consistency with the Confessor’s orthodox position. Without this
balance, the illustration would be susceptible to an interpretation in which the logoi would cease
to be differentiated when “considered in God.” 194
The balance of the Chalcedonian “undivided” with “unconfused” ensures that we
understand the logoi as a unity in plurality, an imprint of Chalcedonian logic on the thought of
the Confessor. 195 The way these terms are used in the works of the Confessor are fundamentally
the same way in which they were used by Chalcedon to describe the hypostatic union. The union
between the human and divine natures in the one person of Jesus Christ is understood to be
unconfused, without change, undivided, and unseparated. 196 The function of these terms is
contained in the same definition: “at no point was the difference between the natures taken away
through the union, but rather the property of both natures is preserved and comes together into a
single person and a single subsistent being.” 197 What is described here is a particular manner of
union that allows for preservation.
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Tollefsen explains that “undivided” (adiairetos) as used here, and subsequently in the
above passage from Cap Gnost. 2.4 works to preserve the union of two different sorts of
being. 198 Within an ontological schema of created being, this may be used to describe two beings
united in a common genus. In Christ, the uncreated and the created share a union despite not
sharing a common nature. As it pertains to the hypostatic union it is impossible to make a
division between the united human and divine natures. “Unconfused” (asugchutos) clarifies the
sort of union. The mode of union is one in which what makes each nature unique is not
destroyed. An unconfused union allows for the particularity of each nature. The result is not a
mixture but a subsistence of natures within a unity. The intimacy of what is united does not
cancel out the individual traits of each nature.
Describing the unity of the lines at a single point within Cap gnost 2.4 as “undivided” is
evocative of the other adverbs that qualify the union and preservation of natures. The balance
Tollefsen calls for is a warranted demonstration of the Confessor’s application of the
Chalcedonian categories to ontology. The same undifferentiated unity that can be found in the
hypostatic union is reflected in the logoi as they are seen in God - in both their pre-existence and
as they come to their final meeting in God. Maximus expects a continued consistency: in
bringing together the human and divine in Christ, God did so in an unconfused, undivided
way. As created beings participate in God through their logoi, they will likewise do so in an
undivided and unconfused way.
These conclusions can be carried into our discussion another instance of the circle image
already mentioned in Amb 7. 199 This image of radii contains a double movement that
characterizes their beginning and being gathered again. These movements correspond to a) “the
198
199
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creating and sustaining procession of the One to individual beings” and b) “the revertive,
inductive, and providential return of the many to the One.” 200 Tollefsen clarifies the second
movement citing the Neoplatonic origin of the idea: We should not understand this movement in
a way that bespeaks an absorption into the divine essence or a metaphysical return toward a
higher principle. 201 Instead, the movements are processions of the logoi toward actualization in
particular being and a turning back of those individuated beings toward their origin. 202 A
Neoplatonic understanding of this dynamic would end with “communion” of the participating
beings with their cause. 203
In anticipation of Maximus’ anthropology, it must be acknowledged that the movement
of conversion is a free one. The logoi act as a paradigm, a formal cause for particular beings in
this regard. 204 By virtue of their logoi, created beings are naturally attracted toward God. This
nature does not imply necessity. Maximus is careful to retain the possibility that beings,
especially rational, intellectual beings, have freedom to move in accord with their logoi or to
move in opposition to them. It is only if they move in accord with their logoi that they will be
gathered to God. 205 This being said, Maximus does not set up a dichotomy between the natural
movement of creatures, their rational/intellectual actions, and the graced eschatological gathering
by God. Any movement according to the logoi, Maximus would call “natural” since it
corresponds to the pre-existent will for that being that comes from the Creator.
Natural movement according to the logoi is the movement described by conversion. It
would be a mistake to assume that this movement is only necessary because of sin, that creation
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was already moving in opposition to the logoi and thus needs to turn back toward God. In
Maximus’ apology for Gregory’s statement that “we are portions of God flowed down from
above,” the Confessor offers clarification from the double movement we have described
above. 206 The statement “portion of God” refers to the procession in which created reality
participates in God, naturally, not simply as their origin but in a continued way. This is because
God, through the logoi, acts as an efficient and sustaining cause both of the individual and of all
creation. 207
The statement that we have “flowed down from above” correlates to the process of
conversion and denotes the need to return to acting in accordance with the logoi after having
strayed from them. Tollefsen describes this downward movement as the cause of “sinful
separations and enmity in the cosmos.” 208 It is in the drawing of all of creation back to God
through conversion that these divisions are overcome and the effects of sin are conquered. The
unity of the logoi in the one Logos is the result of the breaking down of this enmity. If we limit
conversion to the resolution of this enmity would it not admit that conversion is a result of
sin? Does the movement of conversion assume a previous movement in opposition to the logoi?
As we described above, for Maximus, movement is within the inherent nature of created
being. To be created means to have movement. This is due to God’s own willing of the logoi as
principles of this movement. By juxtaposing the “flowing down from above” with movement
according to the logoi, Maximus is describing this movement in a historical, dramatic
fashion. The return to movement according to the logoi that characterizes conversion is not a
reaction to the flowing down from above but was always God’s original intention for created
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beings. For Tollefsen procession/conversion establish “historical limits of the world.” 209 If we
understand the “flowing down” in a historical and not a logical way we can see it as a movement
that happens in opposition to conversion rather than being the cause for the need of
conversion. Procession/conversion is itself a historical process that is interrupted by the
“flowing down” of sin. Understanding the process in a historical way, as an unfolding in time, is
a Christian adaption of the Neoplatonic dynamic that gives the process a definitive beginning and
consummation. 210 As such, procession/conversion creates a space, a distention that acts as a
stage upon which beings act in accord with or in opposition to their logoi. 211
This historical process is different than a second double movement described by
Maximus: expansion/contraction. Tollefsen differentiates between these movements which
denote ontological distinctions and unity and the movement of creatures according to their
logoi. 212 While the former movement pair included volition in history, expansion/contraction is a
matter of logical distinction in which the two movements happen in simultaneity. 213 Expansion
describes the process of distinction. This happens at every level of individuation: from genus, to
species, all the way down to the delineation of being, derived from Porphyry, to the particular
being as an individual. 214 Here we see the plurality of creatures emerge in a logical manner. The
distinctions are not themselves cause for division or separation but individuation in accord with
the logoi. This is complementary to the first part of the procession/conversion movement in that
God does not simply sustain the cosmos in unity, his knowledge of and intention for created
beings extends to their individual logoi.
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Just as conversion is not an undoing of procession, so contraction does not erase the
distinctions made in expansion. Contraction is the gathering of individuals of a species into
successively larger groups “until it is gathered up into the most generic genus, and there its
contraction comes to an end...” 215 The gathering is not of disparate elements but of like into like
from the smallest category to the largest, general category of all created being. This movement
establishes a communion between all of creation that is built upon progressively larger
expressions of that communion. 216 The double movement of expansion/contraction demonstrates
the divine intention to create a unity in plurality that is irreducible. 217
The consummation of these two double-movements demonstrates the centrality of God
intended unity-in plurality within the Confessor’s thought. Expansion/contraction results in an
expansive communion of communities that overcomes difference, a communion that
incorporates all created being while uniting them all to the uncreated by virtue of their
participation in the logoi. Communion that overcomes difference while sustaining plurality is
also the result of procession/conversion. Moving according to their logoi, beings that undergo
conversion are gathered up according to those same logoi in the manner described in
contraction. Yet this pair of double-movements does not collapse into one. First, there is the
historical versus ontological frame of reference described above but secondly and perhaps more
preeminently, is the eucharistic allusion Maximus makes in his description of conversion. 218 The
verb for gathering in the Confessor’s description of conversion is “anaphora.” 219 As the same
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word used to describe the mode of communion brought about by the Eucharist, conversion as
anaphora evokes the participation of all creation in a liturgical communion with God.
We can correlate this interpretation of conversion with Maximus’ use of the same image
of a circle to describe the unity in diversity that is brought about by the Church as the Body of
Christ. 220 Those incorporated into this body share in a mode of communion in which God
“encloses all things in himself ... [limiting] their extents with a circle.” 221 Beings circumscribed
in this circle, an image of the Church, they retain their identity but are drawn into relationship
with “one, simple, and single cause and power” 222 from which they cannot be distinguished on
account of their relationship with the one who outshines them. 223 Here we encounter the
Chalcedonian “unconfused” (asugchutos) once more. Maximus uses “unconfused” to describe
how natural relationships between beings and the one who unites them are overshadowed
without having their identities destroyed through assimilation. 224
Despite the Chalcedonian qualifiers, the language of maximian ontology sounds similar
to the neoplatonic and stoic descriptions of creation. A singular way in which we can
differentiate Maximus’ Christian cosmology from these philosophical positions is to recall that
the Logos is identified as a person, the Son of the Father. This complements ontological
language with the understanding that it is founded upon personal relationship. It is Christ who
gathers and holds the logoi together “as his own.” 225 Christ as Logos is the same Christ the Lord
sought in the spiritual and moral path of perfection. 226 The logoi have a personal character as the
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will of Christ for individual created beings. As the means by which particular beings are brought
into being, sustained, and brought to inseparable union with God, the logoi are individuated
manifestations of the one Logos to each being. 227 As such, they are manifestations of Christ’s
love and intention for created beings.
Two key ways in which Christ relates to creation are in his providence and judgment. As
expressions of the divine will, we can speak of providence as judgment as two overarching logoi
by which God knows his creation and makes his will known. Maximus defines these logoi in
different ways throughout the Ambigua. In Amb 67, he presents them in a way that appeals to a
moral sense. Providence is understood as God’s assistance in moving according to their logoi to
“be what they are.” 228 Judgment is a punitive correction that reorients created beings toward their
logoi when these principles are “damaged and perverted.” 229 In this moral definition, providence
and judgment effectively guide beings toward their logoi as a channel, offering boundaries to
their action while being boundless in themselves. 230
Alternatively, Maximus offers an ontological understanding of providence and judgment
within an ontological framework. The Confessor distinguishes between this expression of the
logoi and the moral, “convertive” one which is active in “returning whatever has gone astray to
its proper course.” 231 Within his ontological framework, Maximus defines providence as “the
power that holds the universe together, keeping it aligned with the inner principles according
(logos) to which it was originally created.” 232 Judgment likewise is not “punishment on sinners”
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but the “differentiated distribution of beings.” 233 Judgment is properly God’s delineation of
creatures, how they are arranged, and how he brought them into being. 234 Maximus makes clear
that these two conceptions of providence and judgment are not describing two separate
realities. 235 Our free response to the logoi denotes whether we perceive them as punitive. This
experience is a subjective one. A response that rejects the logoi would experience providence
and judgment as a correction since God directs “the course of things that are beyond our control
in a manner contrary to what is within our control” if we have done evil. 236
Both Thunberg and Loudovikos affirm the moral sense while emphasizing the
ontological aspects of providence and judgment. 237 For Thunberg, these logoi are another
guarantor of the diversity of beings able to be united in God, a design that God has for his
creation from the beginning. These logoi forbid violence to the “individualized multiplicity” we
find in creation. 238 In God’s original intention for creation and its eschatological fulfillment,
which is deification, God upholds his will and does not revoke the effects of providence and
judgment. God contemplates individual beings as distinct from one another. Judgment is used
to describe the God intended differentiation between particular being. Providence guides the
relationships of the particular beings and is the “principle of unification,” facilitating union
without confusion. 239
Loudovikos notes that providence and judgment inform God’s free act of creation. If
they were not connected in this way, they would work as though they were uncreated
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principles. 240 Thus, God contemplates and creates in accord with his willed providence and
judgment. The delineation of creatures, their particularity, is not superadded onto an already
unified creation but are the result of God’s own choice. Similarly, Maximus describes the
transformation of created beings according to providence and judgment in a way that expects
their growth and movement. We can conclude, therefore that these logoi do not only
corresponding to “substance” but also to “potency and activity” since God’s preexistent
contemplation of created beings includes potency and activity. 241 Providence and judgment are
related to Maximus’ concepts of movement, freedom, particularity, and communion since
without differentiation and the drive for union the schema has no room for movement and no
consummative goal.
For Loudovikos providence encompasses the capacity of a being to grow toward the
fulfillment of its natural potential. 242 This includes its growth in relation to its own essence, its
potential, as well as activity. Judgment is a protection of this growth. It can be conceived as
punishment for deviations from the logoi. This explains why things do not progress in growth
but rather disintegrate when they move in opposition to their natures. That God’s logoi, God’s
will for creation is circumscribed with the overarching logoi of providence and judgment tells us
that for Maximus God conceives of the worlds not as a static reality of perfection but as a
multiplicity of possibilities moving toward that perfection. The Confessor describes these logoi
as penetrating “both our present and future life, as if they were different generations...” 243 In this,
providence and judgment have about them an eschatological character. God leads created beings
by these logoi in a way that acknowledges that they are not presently perfected but can be in the
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future. Once again, we find that for Maximus, motion, change, and dialogue are God intended
realities manifest in creation.
What are the possibilities inherent in movement according to the logos? Is it a simple
binary of either obedience to the logoi or rejection of them altogether? Yes and no. Movement
in a way that is opposed to the logoi always results in self-destruction. In Maximus’ schema,
movement away from the logoi is a movement toward non-being. 244 Movement in opposition to
the logoi is consummate with an attempt to change the logoi. The free actions of beings in
relation to the logoi does not change the logoi in and of themselves. Attempting to change the
logoi is destructive to the logoi and in turn destructive for that being, the “flowing down” of sin
that Gregory describes. 245 This does harm to the original way in which God intended for created
beings to use their natural powers. 246

C. Tropos
Maximus writes that there was an original, natural mode, tropos (τροπος), which God had
given. The Confessor describes tropos as the place of innovation within created beings. Nature,
which corresponds to the logoi of a being is not changed but a change in mode of that being
leaves the nature intact. 247 Changes made to created beings that are not in opposition to their
logoi are changes in tropos. Mitralexis catalogues varied meanings of the Greek term that are
illuminative: derived from the verb trepo, tropos can mean “to turn, to turn in a certain direction,
to alter, to change ... it presupposes action/activity and an actualized relation.” 248
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Maximus explains that through sin, movement in opposition to the logoi, humanity has
rejected this original God given mode. In its place, God has granted another mode “more
marvelous and befitting of God than the first, and as different from the former as what is above
nature is different from what is according to nature. 249 This new mode is established in the
hypostatic union, the new theandric mode by which humanity can act in accord with the
logoi. For now, it is sufficient to note that the logoi, God’s original plan is unchanging, it
undergoes “no innovation.” 250 The mode, tropos, by which the logos is lived out is able to be
changed.
Maximus uses the term tropos to qualify how logoi are realized in a variety of ways:
theological, logical, ethical, physical, and even hypostatic. 251 The term is often attached to logos
as a “logos/tropos” dyad that communicates the possible ways by which logoi may be
realized. Larchet notes that the preeminent function of this dyad in Maximus’ work is to account
“for the fact that the reality of any natural order can attain to a new, supernatural mode of
existence, while remaining the same in its essence.” 252 As with many aspects of the Confessor’s
thought, the concept of tropos reaches the pinnacle of its purpose when used to describe the
process of deification. On one hand, tropos can be understood as the resulting state of a created
being that has encountered divine grace. 253 On the other it can be used to describe what is
variable in the working out of logoi through the course of history.
The distinction between logos and tropos allows for varied responses among created
beings to their logoi. Moving in accordance to one’s individuated logos does not mean a sort of
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fated, uniform action but a free response. This is consistent with Maximus’ view that God
contemplates created beings as moving. As they move, rational beings would likewise be
contemplated as willing on their own account. The matter of volition that is not opposed to the
logoi are changes in tropos. Free action is then not simply a matter of a conformative response
to one’s particular logos. This dynamic reveals a wide berth for free response according to the
logoi.
A simple demonstration of this point comes from considering the exercise of human
freedom in the creation of art. A person composing a work in an artistic manner is not simply
moving along a predetermined path of their logoi. They are exercising an ability to act in a way
that creates. Maximus acknowledges two sorts of creative activity. The first is the natural
process of making beings “identical in form and substance and absolutely identical to them.” 254
Maximus’ laconic explanation of this activity is difficult to decipher but it seems to indicate
reproduction in species. The second activity is done to something that different than the actor in
identity and nature. This occurs when “a person actively engages something extrinsic and
substantially different, and from it produces something foreign” doing so “from some other
source of already existing matter.” 255 This second sort of activity, Maximus writes, “is a
scientific characteristic of the arts.” 256 Since this creation is by no means a sharing in God’s
creating ex nihilo, an explanation consistent with Maximus’ ontological schema is that the logos
of that item remains intact while the creative action indicates a change in tropos. 257
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To these we may add a third type of possible activity, a negative one that does not move
in accordance with the logoi but against it. This movement is in direct opposition to providence
since it ignores the logos of providence. This is a sort of art of sin which Maximus describes as a
historical reality. Passed on from one generation to the next, humanity has made “progress in
evil.” 258 Thunberg interprets this as a misuse of humanity’s “inventive power.” 259 The competing
cause to that of the logoi are “fleshly passions,” following these only leads to “mortal
despair.” 260 Just as this power to create can work as a means for the freedom to form the tropos
of one’s logoi, the application of that same activity to the logoi themselves further develops the
art of sin, which is destruction of the logoi.
While the binary choice of using humanity’s freedom to move according to the logoi
remains, we see that the choices themselves are not binary in nature. Once the inventive power
of freedom is applied to the right subject, the tropos (mode) rather than the logos (principle or
essence) of a created thing, a multitude of possibilities can be embraced. Thunberg calls the
possibility of movements in accordance with the logoi, moving in “harmony with the logos.” 261
Creation then is a medium on which rational beings may act, changing the tropos and not the
logos in a manner that is not predetermined by the logos itself but for which the logos allows the
possibility of. Again, possibilities that do violence to the logoi are not contained within these
logoi themselves. Choices that oppose the logoi sets the being on the path toward nothingness,
the opposite of the movement of conversion, the path of deification. Movement according to the
logoi is in agreement with the original divine intent that facilitates the final eschatological
communion and consummation that is participation in God.
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D. Eschatological Consummation of Creation
The God who creates offers to all of creation consummate communion with Himself
through the logoi. 262 Maximus’ cosmological vision is inseparable from the eschatological hope
of deification. This hope derives from the maximian affirmation that all creation is good, it is the
result of the free act which is God’s creation of the cosmos for the express purpose of
participation in God.
Maximus boldly proclaims that “the Logos of God (who is God) wills always and in all
things to accomplish the mystery of his embodiment.” 263 This is the divine plan from the
beginning, “God will be all things in everything, encompassing all things and making them
subsist in Himself” and it is because of this plan that created beings can be called “portions of
God.” 264 As we have seen, Maximus describes a plan for the participation and not the
annihilation of created beings in God. This preservation of their created identities is upheld by,
and brought about, in Christ, the center and source of the logoi. It is due to Christ’s mediation
that we can affirm that creation comes to be entirely in God without “ontological
assimilation.” 265
The unification of creation in God is both a future and present reality. It is accomplished
by Christ as origin and goal of the logoi. The proleptic manifestation of the eschaton is made
present in the paschal mystery. As with the discussion of the Logos as the center of the circle, so
here Maximus emphasizes that the Logos is not a bare ontological principle but breaks down
divisions within the course of history in his person. Christ’s Incarnation and subsequent raising,
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the unification with and deification of human nature, brings together all things in Himself. “He
obscured in Himself the property of division that had cut [creation] in two.” 266 Maximus
describes Christ as the one who gathers all of these things up into himself 267 according to the
logoi, translated by Constas as the “most primal and most universal principle” in a way that
preserves them “absolutely indivisibly and beyond all fracture.” 268
The Incarnation serves as Maximus’ eschatological map from which he derives the fate
of all creation. 269 The Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ’s own body is an affirmation of all
human bodies. 270 In Amb 42, Maximus observers that Christ as both architect and “pioneer” of
salvation does not manifest a perfected state beyond the body. Perfection then does not mean the
sloughing off of creation or the “casting aside of the body.” 271 The precedent set by Christ leads
Maximus to expect that the body itself is a recipient of salvation and unification in God. 272
The incorporation of human bodies into the unity that is Christ does not function as a
limit to that communion but signals an expansive vision. The hypostatic union of the Logos with
the human nature is not a self-encapsulated reality but spills over into the rest of creation. Christ
overcomes division and reveals the logoi of humanity as capable of bearing the image of Christ,
“intact and completely unadulterated.” 273 The image of the Body of Christ includes this complete
humanity as well as “the extremes of the whole creation” which he incorporates “as His own
parts.” 274 Though Maximus stops short of calling all of creation, eschatologically realized, the
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Body of Christ, he writes that everything is recapitulated in Christ in “a manner appropriate to
God.” 275 Participation in God does not undo the ontological difference discussed above and it is
necessary for us to continue to affirm this difference. Without this difference, Maximus would
not be writing of participation but absorption. Instead, what has been created out of nothing,
what is different than God has been created for communion with God: “It is for the sake of
[deification] that all things that are have been constituted and are maintained in being, and that
things that are not are produced and come into being.” 276
To better understand what Maximus means by participation, we return to his reversal of
the Origenist triad. The Confessor’s own creation-motion-stasis has as its final term a stage that
must not be confused with satiety. As we have discussed above, Maximus has brought two
seemingly contradictory ideas into contact with one another. First, there is the nature of created
things which is always in motion, even as they come to be in God, propelled by Gregory of
Nyssa’s concept of perpetual progress. Second, there is the use of the term “stasis” that connotes
the cessation of all movement. Both of these are necessary for Maximus’ schema of
participation to be understood correctly. On one hand, the perpetual progress means that
creatures never reach the state of satiety. As opposed to the Origenist henad, they can never be
filled up and grow bored of God. On the other hand, their stasis in God means that they never
deviate from this final state. 277
Maximus again uses God’s activity as the basis for his understanding of creation’s
participation in God, this time drawing on Trinitarian theology rather than Christology. In
describing God as “ever-moving repose” Maximus does not think of God in terms of creaturely
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movement but is instead describing the processions of the Trinity. Just as in his descriptions of
God’s “being” as “beyond being” and non-being, so here the Confessor would call God’s own
motion “beyond motion.” 278 The Trinity includes the fullness of both motion and
fixity. Participation in God means that the created motion is replaced by the dynamic that exists
in God. That is to say that the participation of created things in God leads to a sharing in the
ever-moving repose that exists in the Trinity. 279 Thus, creaturely motion is not annulled but
receives a new, divine impetus. This transposition of creaturely activity into divine activity does
not annul the creature. The logoi, the underlying reason and nature of creatures is never
changed. The mode, tropos is eschatologically changed, now moving in a divine mode. This
ensures that the whole of creation is preserved in deification. From the highest category of
creation as “all that is” to the particular member of any given species, deification does not
assimilate being but leads it into the divine communion. 280
For Maximus, creation does not need any “addition or subtraction” in order to be called
good. 281 Though creation is never complete in and of itself the way that God is, it is not due to
any deficiency or evil inherent to creation. Incompleteness is a sign that creation was made for
communion with God. Mitralexis summarizes this point clearly: “The motion of the created
towards its beginning and end, its source and purpose (a motion that can be clearly discerned by
those who can contemplate the logoi of beings) amplifies the fact that creation is ‘good’ as it
tends to the attainment of completeness.” 282 Natural motion is logically good since this motion is
according to the logoi while the goal is always beyond the reach of nature itself. This
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insufficiency does not negate creation’s goodness but points it beyond itself toward the Other by
and for whom it is made.
Here we can see the totality of Maximus’ response to Origenism as an affirmation of
creation. Each triadic moment of creation-motion-stasis ratifies the others. In creation (genesis),
God freely creates according to his wills (logoi) from nothing beings who by nature (their logoi)
move toward communion with the divine. Motion according to the logoi reveals simultaneously
the origin of created being in the goodness of God’s wills for being as a whole and in particular
as well as the end of deification for which that being was created. This movement is in
accordance with the overarching logoi of providence, which reveals the divine destiny of created
being, and judgment which upholds the divinely conceived differentiation of beings. The
incorporation of created being in stasis, the ever-moving repose of God in the Trinity is the final
state of motion and communion. This state does not collapse into a mode that annuls either of
the previous two parts of the triad. The genesis of creatures is not violated as the otherness of
these beings is preserved. Without this otherness, we would not be speaking of communion but
rather absorption in God. Secondly, the motion toward God, motion according to the logoi
continues despite the description of the state of “stasis.” God, from all eternity has contemplated
creatures as “beings in motion.” This motion does not cease but is elevated into a new mode
(tropos) in God, one that shares in the divine communion. The ever-moving repose is the
consummation of the communion between God and the cosmos. For Maximus, the whole of the
cosmos is pointed toward the final, perpetual communion with God.
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CHAPTER THREE
MAXIMUS ON DEIFICATION
A. Theandric Activity as the Goal of the Incarnation / Resurrection
Maximus’ view of mediation is inextricably entangled with his Christology and
anthropology, both of which are heavily influenced by his ascetic focus. These elements come to
form a theology of deification that is both eschatological in the sense of coming to fruition in the
fulness of time and that it is realized before the eschaton in a proleptic manner. This drama of
deification does not stand apart from the cosmological schema explored in the last chapter but is
the template, linchpin, and keystone for the cosmological redemption within the one Logos, the
person of Christ. Christ fulfills the original vocation of humanity in a way that enables the whole
of humanity to participate in the task of mediation. Maximus’ understanding of the Christic act
of mediation via the logoi affirms the goodness of creation even as it is mediated (converted)
back to God. The invitation for humanity to participate in these mysteries through deification
makes the fulfillment of the original human vocation possible. This is expressed as a eucharistic
reciprocity between God and humanity with the whole cosmos as its medium.
In this chapter we will unpack Maximus’ theology of deification as the foundation of this
communicative reciprocity. The Incarnation and Paschal Mystery of Christ the Logos provide
both the model and goal of this transformation. Maximus’ Neo-Chalcedonianism synthesizes
unique categories for understanding the hypostatic union which results in a new theandric
activity. This activity provides both the impetus and telos for the deification of humanity. We
will explore Maximus’ description of the process of deification and how he understands this
process in relation to humanity’s mediatorial role. This role is made possible through
humanity’s unique status as a microcosm of creation, which informs Maximus’ view of the
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human body as well as his influential thought about the freedom of Christ and deified humanity.
Humanity’s communion with the theandric activity established by Christ allows for the
eucharistic reciprocity between the creator and the created to manifest collectively in the
Church’s liturgy and can be understood in an individual way as an interpersonal communion of
individual persons with the Logos. Understood as a dialogue between persons, Maximus’
schema highlights the importance of human freedom, describing its active role in the return of
the logoi to the Logos.
The point of departure for this discussion is Christ as the central Logos from which all of
creation proceeds and to whom God wills of all creation to return to according to their individual
logoi. The role of Christ as Logos is not that of an impersonal natural principle or force but as
the Second Person of the Trinity by the free act of God, unites all things in himself. The epitome
of Christ’s unifying action is the mystery of the hypostatic union according to which “all the ages
and what is contained in all the ages have taken in Christ the beginning of being and its end.” 1
Though the whole of creation was already guided toward God through participation in the logoi,
the hypostatic union introduces a new “eschatological matrix” in Christ and his body, the
Church. 2 This movement surpasses natural teleology. We should recall that nature is good in
itself and does not in and of itself resist deification. The created world, instilled with the
potentiality to participate in God from its genesis through the logoi, provides the “raw materials
for deification.” 3 Christ’s Incarnation and Resurrection provide the paradigm for deification not
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solely for humanity but for the whole of the cosmos which will be healed of division and come to
rest in Christ. 4
The deification of creation is restorative and transformative. By its participation in the
uncreated, the cosmos is granted a mode (tropos) which exceeds its natural telos. This is only
possible through the mysteries of the Incarnation and Resurrection. 5 The mysteries of
Incarnation and Resurrection are themselves inextricably linked in Maximus’ thought. Their
universal impact provides the starting point for Maximus’ understanding of both God in himself
and God’s economic manifestation in the cosmos. 6 The cosmological reflections of the previous
chapter are reliant upon these mysteries since they are the means by which the cosmos ultimately
participates in the divine.
Keeping Maximus’ mystical theology in view will help us understand the communion of
natures found in the hypostatic union. Nichols calls the Word incarnate a “living synthesis of all
apophasis and cataphasis.” 7 This would imply that in the Incarnation we can name both an
affirmation and a negation. In adopting human nature without destroying it, the Logos unites
himself to what he is not. Inasmuch as the Word is united to human nature without eradicating
it, human nature is affirmed. Since human nature is incorporated into a new, super-eminent,
mode of being, we can understand that it is a negation of human nature since that nature alone is
insufficient. 8 As with mysticism, the resolution is something beyond the original nature. In
Christ, natural beings are made to be above nature consonant with the mystical perspective of
being beyond nature. The categories of mystical theology are important here because the new
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mode should in no way be understood as a simple additive of the divine to the human nor as a
mixture of the two. To avoid misrepresenting the hypostatic union and its fruit requires the
apophatic approach along with precise language. Here we revisit the adverbs of Chalcedon this
time addressing the mystery for which they were formulated: the communion between the human
and divine in Christ is unconfused (ἀσυγχύτως), undivided (ἀδιαρέτως), without change
(ἀτρέπτως) and without separation (ἀχωρίστως). The communion of the human and divine
natures produces a new sort of activity that is connoted by the descriptive term “theandric.” 9
Maximus appropriates the term “theandric energy” (θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν) 10, from
Pseudo-Dionysious who uses the phrase to describe a unity of human and divine action rather
than a singular composite energy. 11 Thunberg writes that the term “theandric” becomes
Maximus’ preferred expression of the union of humanity and divinity in Christ. 12 Understanding
Maximus’ interpretation of this term is central to piecing together the Confessor’s understanding
of deification.
Dionysius coins the term while explaining how Jesus could be “placed in the same order
in being with all men.” 13 In the Incarnation, Christ is no less “overflowing with transcendence”
but assumes this new way of being out of love for humanity. 14 Jesus does not act at times in a
divine manner and at others in a human manner. The Incarnation has produced a new way of
action, a new energy: “by the fact of being God-made-man he accomplished something new in
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our midst-the activity of the God-man.” 15 One underlying issue with Dionysius’ formulation is
that it could be interpreted in a way that agrees with both monophysite and diaphysite views.
Despite this ambiguity, the term was repeatedly adopted by Neo-Chalcedonians. Severus
Asmounein used it to describe a single activity in Christ while John of Scythopolis understood it
in a manner that allowed for both the mixing of the human and divine in a single activity with the
added complication that the natures could also act independently of one another. 16 Maximus’
own formulation views this new energy as taking hold in a new mode, tropos, that respected the
two distinct natures in Christ. A change in tropos, as we have discussed above, leaves the nature
– the logos of a particular being – intact. In the case of Christ, it is a common mode that is the
point of communion of the human and divine natures. This is a union that does not introduce
confusion, division, separation, or change to those natures. The Chalcedonian adverbs protect
against understanding the hypostatic union as a chimeric composite nature. 17
Maximus elaborates upon Pseudo-Dionysius’ thought in Amb 5 which addresses the
Areopagite’s description of Jesus as both “the cause of men” and “truly man.” 18 We should note
that this and the other first five chapters of Ambigua ad Thomam were written while Maximus
was emerging upon the stage of the Christological debates surrounding the energies in Christ. 19
While Maximus still does not make the sort of strict categorical distinctions between theological
subjects, Amb 5 can be clearly recognized as a topical work on Christology. Compared to Amb 7
in which the Confessor presented a wide sweeping description of cosmology, Christology, and
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deification, Amb 5 remains focused upon the hypostatic union with appropriate development and
nuance.
The Confessor fleshes out his own understanding of the hypostatic union before
introducing the Dionysian term. In Christ, human and divine natures enter into a unity that is a
“conjunction,” a “true union,” that is “neither of [the natures] exclusively.” 20 In effecting this
union, the person of Christ no longer acts in a way that is only divine or only human: “in no way
acting through one of the natures in separation from the other.” 21 Instead, the activity is itself
revelatory of this union: the human and divine are seen working together and in a
complementary manner they “[confirm] the presence of the one through the other.” 22 The union
between these natures qualifies the activity of each. Christ “experienced suffering in a divine
way ... worked miracles in a human way...” 23
Maximus stresses the unity of action going as far as to say that “divine and human energy
coincided in a single identity.” 24 This term “identity” can be tricky since out of context it may be
mistakenly interpreted as pointing toward a single identity in action but not in person. Thunberg
and von Balthasar prefer a qualified phrasing, adding that the natures act in a single identity “in
mutual preservation.” 25 This addition is consonant with the Confessor’s thought and is implicit
within the context of Amb 5 which places a heavy emphasis on preserving the principle of the
natures being held in communion. 26
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The Confessor introduces his own clarifications on the interaction of these natures and
allows the Chalcedonian adverbs to do the heavy lifting within his argument. In doing so,
Maximus creates a synthesis between Dionysian and Chalcedonian orthodoxy. The result is a
union that “does not impair distinction” between the natures while at the same time does not
diminish the essential principles that participate in the union. 27 The hypostatic union is not an
adding together of the human and divine in a way that provides a product, the middle of two
extremes. 28 What is “new” is the mystery of the “ineffable mode (ἀπόῤῥητος τροπος) of natural
coherence (συμφυιας).” 29 The shared activity takes place at the level of “mode” (τροπος). As
with the mode of deification, properly understanding the distinction between the underlying
principle that determines nature (λογος) and the mode (τροπος) of activity is pivotal. The mode
of activity helps us understand that it is not the natures that are changed but the manner by which
they now operate. The divine acts humanly and the human acts divinely. Collectively they share
in theandric activity. In defining theandric activity as a τροπος, Maximus seeks to clarify the
Dionysian term with the Chalcedonian affirmation that the human and divine remain unconfused
(ἀσυγχύτως) and undivided (ἀδιαρέτως) in Christ. This is the mode of activity that is proper for
“‘God made man,’ to Him who became perfectly incarnate.” 30
Following Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus avoids using the term “one” for this new energy.
This would necessarily introduce by itself a new nature. What is singular for Maximus is the
mystery of the activity, which is a communal activity. This is not a common unity of two
extremes but the working together of two natures in communal activity. Both retain their natural
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energies but these energies no longer work without being in concert with the other energy:
“therefore it is not permitted to say that there is simply ‘one,’ or a ‘natural,’ energy common both
to Christ’s divinity and His flesh.” 31
A second reason Maximus is unwilling to call the name theandric energy “one” is that he
wants to use “theandric” in a way that connotes dynamism. It is not a thing in and of itself but is
a “mode of exchange” between the human and divine natures present in Christ. 32 This is because
the union preserves the human and divine natures in a way that is without change (μεταβολῆς) or
confusion (συμφύρσεως). 33 Though Maximus uses a different word for change than the
ἀτρέπτως of Chalcedon, the meaning is the same. There is a perichoretic quality to this
communion, the divine and human natures are “interchangeable” with one another yet are
inseparable from the person of Christ.
The Confessor utilizes a vivid image to demonstrate this communion. He asks us to
ponder a sword, heated in fire. 34 The two natures are preserved while taking up the properties of
the other. First, the sword becomes hot as the fire is hot. Swords heated to the point that they
change in color can set other objects on fire as though the sword were itself aflame. Likewise, it
is difficult to distinguish between the burning of the flame and the cutting of the sword. In a
sense, the flame has taken on the sword’s property of sharpness.
A few clarifications will help us further understand the sort of union Maximus is seeking
to describe. Though a modern scientific framework may tell us that there is indeed a change
going on within the composition of the sword, we can see that this is not what Maximus is
31
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attempting to communicate. If it were a change in the sword that Maximus was after, he could
have contextualized the heating as part of the shaping of the sword in a kiln by a blacksmith. In
Maximus’ example, there is no change. Secondly, what may seem to be a limitation of the image
actually reveals the true character of the union. If a sword is tempered at a high temperature
such that it changes color it would begin to cool once it is removed from the heat. At this point,
the metal, once cooled may have been changed by its encounter with the fire but would have also
lost the characteristics of the fire.
Maximus describes an ongoing, dynamic union between flame and blade. He is not after
a result that emerges as the fruit of the combination of two elements with different natures. The
point at which the flame is sharp and the sword can burn is the moment of union. Just as the
image of a sword heated by fire communicates an active union, so the theandric energy is not a
“result” of something but an active communion of natures. The human and divine retain their
own nature while taking up the properties of the other. Though unlike the sword which takes on
the properties of heat, there is no possibility of separation between the two - the hypostatic union
is an eternally active communion. The image of the flame evokes this dynamism. The
hypostatic union is an indissoluble union, ongoing and ever dynamic. 35 The new theandric
energy is not a composition of two natures because the natures are ever participating in shared
communion. If one of the natures were to be subsumed by the other (the sword melted by the
fire, to draw out the example) there would be no union because one of the natures had been
destroyed. The communion of the human and divine is one that is active, communicative of
properties, ongoing, and indissoluble.
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In this energy Maximus characterizes the divine as active and the human as passive. It is
tempting to juxtapose the Confessor’s description of passive, suffering humanity with an
impassible, unmoved concept of the divine. Maximus does not approach human passivity in this
manner. By characterizing humanity as passive in this regard, his emphasis is not on refuting
related issues such as patripassionism nor does it represent a conceptualizing of the divine nature
in a fundamentally unmoved state. Reading concerns for the immovability of God would project
a western approach to theological reflection far more characteristic of thomism. In the present
text, the Confessor is not comparing human nature to God’s in any way. When he discusses
human passibility, Maximus addresses humanity insofar as it is bodily, suffering, and contains
within its contingency the possibility of death. 36
The union of the Logos to a human nature grants God the realm of human suffering. In
this very suffering that Christ brings humanity together in Himself: “By means of the suffering,
He makes us His own” and enables humanity to be deified “for we have become that which He
revealed.” 37 The theandric energy of the hypostatic union acts upon the passive humanity,
affecting the whole of human nature. Maximus’ formulation of theandric energy does not stop
with Christological definition but encompasses the deification of all humanity. We read in Amb
4: “In doing lordly things in the manner of a slave, that is, the things of God by means of the
flesh, He intimates His ineffable self-emptying, which through passible flesh divinized all
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humanity...” 38 The theandric reality in Christ is salutary and revelatory. The Incarnation and
Passion are the means by which all of humanity can become deified.
The path for deification has the hypostatic union as its template. Humanity only receives
divinization through the communion of divine and human natures - human nature is unable to
reach this on its own. 39 Humanity’s participation is one that does not leave its own nature behind
but likewise enters into an active communion, one that is reciprocal and preserves human and
divine identity. 40 Thunberg frames this dynamic within the terminology of movement, as we
discussed last chapter. In becoming human, the Logos moves “tropologically toward man.” 41
Thunberg describes humanity as passive, this time not only by nature but due to sinfulness,
moving in a “false direction.” The mystery of Christ is what enables humanity to turn, to be
“activated by the divine movement” and due to the hypostatic union in Christ, respond by
“divinizing [our]self.” 42 This does not mean that after the mystery of Christ’s hypostasis is
established humanity is in no further need of communion with God. Thunberg clarifies that
Maximus’ vision of deification enables humanity to move “beyond” what is natural and “beyond
the existential.” 43 The means of this movement is the communal, existential relationship, the
theandric unity in which humanity can now participate. 44
This union affects the totality of the human person but does not deprive the human person
of freedom. We will return to this point later but for now we should note that reciprocal
communion leaves an “empty space” between the “uncreated and the created order.” 45 Within
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this space divinized humanity is able to move. This movement is not fated obedience or natural
necessity but is movement characterized by Thunberg as “intentional.” 46
We should remember that the union is no mere “abstract synthesis” but occurs at the
hypostatic level from which the divine is brought into relationship with human hypostasis. 47 The
goal is participation in the mode of exchange of divinity and humanity. Redemption, deification,
moving according to the logoi in a divine mode is primarily a relational reality and secondarily a
metaphysical one. This new mode enters into creation first through the person of Christ and then
through human persons united to Him through their own deification. Humanity occupies a
specific place in the dynamic of our own deification and the deification of the cosmos. As
created persons, humanity has the capacity for union with the person of Christ as well as the
capacity to mediate that union to other facets of creation. Christ remains the foundation upon
which the redemption of creation rests but inasmuch as humanity participates in the exchange of
modes that is theandric action, we become participants in the redemption of creation. Humanity
in Christ, collectively as Church, and as particular individuals in communion with Christ
constitute “the hope for salvation of the whole creation, [they are] priest and mediator of
creation.” 48
Participation in the mediatorial task of Christ is the promulgation of the new tropos. The
remainder of this chapter will chronicle how humanity’s own mode is changed, what that means
for freedom, the physical creation as manifest in the human body, and ultimately how humanity
mediates the divinization of the cosmos in reciprocal communion with the divine.
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B. The Process of Deification as a Change in Tropos
Change in tropos, the mode of a being’s activity, is Maximus’ way of preserving both
human and divine natures in Christ first and second his way of preserving the totality of the
human person in communion with God. Nichols describes Maximus’ approach to the topic of
deification following Garrigues: “divinization and Christology form one single mystery.” 49
Maximus’ experience as an ascetic and his reception of the monastic tradition allowed him to
form a synthetic vision that carried his Christological and anthropological insights into spiritual
theology. As such, Maximus’ concept of deification is not only couched in dogmatic
terminology but includes a spiritual theology that unfolds, a process of deification.
Nichols interprets Maximus’ description of deification as a perpetuation of God’s will to
be embodied: The Word, born of the flesh in the Incarnation also seeks to be “born ceaselessly
according to the Spirit, in those who desire him.” 50 This pneumatic birth of deification happens
as human nature grows according to the virtues. Far from a simple confirmation of humanity’s
natural dynamism, living according to the virtues necessitates deification, “transposing [nature]
into a new key.” 51 This transposition is not one that is reserved exclusively to the afterlife.
Deification mysteriously takes hold of “the whole ‘natural’ life of human creatures.” 52 The
process is one that embraces the history of human movement as it is transformed and restored by
grace. 53 It is the reception of grace as the participation in the life of God that allows human
nature to take part in deifying movement not as a defying of its own nature but in accord with
this new key, moving beyond its own nature. 54
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The first step of this transformation can be equated with the colloquial meaning of
“conversion.” Though we have already explored Maximus’ nuanced understanding of this term
as a movement according to the logoi, here it can be presented as the beginning of deification.
Anyone who turns away from sin and sets their life on the path to virtue yields to convertive
movement. Maximus writes that such a one can be said “to enter with Christ, our God and highpriest, into virtue, which is figuratively perceived to be the Church.” 55 Growth in virtue grants a
share in divine charity that Thunberg describes as a participation in God similar to the dynamic
communicatia idiomatum in Christ. 56 Just as both human and divine attributes subsist in the one
person of Christ so the person undergoing deification is the recipient of “reciprocal attribution,
that the attributes of those whom it unites pass from one to the other ... and that it makes man act
and appear as God, through the one and unchangeable decision and motion of will on both
sides...” 57
The details of this process, Maximus describes within the framework of his logos-tropos
distinction. As these terms were used to describe what was new in Christ so it is used to describe
how the human logos can act divinely. 58 Maximus formulates this interaction and growth toward
deification in a triad that forms the mode (tropos) in which human nature is expressed in a divine
manner corresponding to being/well-being /eternal being.
The progression is straightforward, moving from being to well-being to eternal being.
Some confusion may arise since in places Maximus since uses both of his key categories, logoi
and tropoi, interchangeably to describe these movements. The centrality of these categories and
this process requires us to clarify this before examining the Confessor’s texts. Tollefsen argues
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that Maximus is right to use both terms since being, well-being, and eternal being all depict a
phase of participation in God. Just as we saw earlier with providence and judgment, God guides
creation by certain principles (logoi). Here there is a need to speak of how beings are regulated
or modified so that they may participate in God at the levels of being, well-being, and eternal
being. 59 If beings were not guided by these principles, external to themselves, we would wonder
why they would “not participate in the fullness of activity all at once.” 60 That there is a process
of deification then necessitates that the participation in the divine be guided by these principles.
As these principles are participated in, we can speak of the participation in the logos of being, of
well-being, and of eternal being as modifications made not to the logoi of individuals but to their
tropos. Such as they connote principles by which beings participate in God and are deified, these
phases are logoi. When naming how creatures participate in God, they are tropoi.
Movement toward God is taught by these principles which bestow participatory
properties on creatures depending on which mode they lie within. 61 Maximus lays out these
phases in a consistent manner throughout his opus. As with the logoi in general, being, wellbeing, and eternal being are discernible to those who have sharpened their spiritual vision. 62
Within the first section of the Chapters on Theology, Maximus presents an illuminative
illustration of these logoi. He describes them as activities that correspond to different days
within creation.
Being corresponds to the sixth day of creation. It is associated with natural genesis. It
was on the sixth day that we see the “full accomplishment of natural activities.” 63 For Maximus
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this is not only an image of natural creation in the beginning but for the fulfillment of created
natures. Growth in natural virtue belongs to the sixth day, which “reveals the principle of being
of things.” 64 This natural movement, though it moves creatures according to the way they were
made, including rational creatures and is “a symbol of practical activity” 65 are actually the
accomplishment of God since it was God who wrote this movement into the logoi. 66 Movement
according to being corresponds with movement according to the essence of a created being but is
characterized by potential, not actualization of this essence. 67 Loudovikos understands this as an
affirmation of the goodness of creation itself as well as God’s goodness. The creation is
complete in and of itself but has the potential for spiritual growth. 68
Well-being is likened to the seventh day which is “the fulfillment and rest of the natural
activities of those who contemplate the ineffable knowledge.” 69 This day begins the cessation of
natural movement and the beginnings of created beings moving according to a divinized tropos.
Though this day is not used to denote the final rest of deification in God, the Confessor’s use of
“rest” calls to mind the seemingly contradictory “ever-moving repose” we discussed previously.
The day of rest is also the pivotal day of human activity. It corresponds to the movement of
conversion. This is an active day because it includes the choice to enter into the rest of the
Sabbath. 70 It is at this stage which rational beings freely make use of “the potential of nature,
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either according to nature or against nature.” 71 The activity of conversion, choosing well-being,
movement according to nature that leads beyond itself, is the moment of freedom. 72 It is also the
opportunity for the misuse of this freedom, which would bar the creature from entering into wellbeing “the misuse of natural powers” which “necessarily leads to their destruction.” 73 This
intermediate mode is characterized by free action while the two opposite it (being and eternalbeing) are characterized by God’s own action. 74 Loudovikos draws a direct correlation between
this mode and the spiritual state of the baptized who have freely chosen to proleptically place
themselves in a life beyond natural life, a simultaneous reception of grace and a putting of that
grace into action. 75 The free choice to enter into well-being can be understood as the moment
when the divine tropos begins to grow within the creature and sets it on the path to eternal-being.
The culmination of deification, eternal-being, is a sharing in the eternal eighth day. This
is the “ineffable mystery of the eternal well-being of things.” 76 The one who has been found
worthy of this eternal day “becomes himself God by deification.” 77 Maximus presents this day in
all of its eschatological splendor. It is the “perpetual day, ... the unalloyed, all-shining presence
of God, which comes about after things in motion have come to rest.” 78 This state of eternal
well-being is confirmed by Maximus to be a participation in God, who gives those within it “a
share in Himself.” 79 This sharing, again, is not according to the nature of the created being but is
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solely the action of God according to grace. 80 Loudovikos attributes all that Maximus says about
deification to this final mode of being: herein is the Resurrection and ever-moving repose that is
facilitated by participative theandric unity. 81
The communion between the created and uncreated is brought about due to the change in
tropoi according to the logoi of being, well-being, and eternal well-being. The Confessor
ascribes the being and eternal-being to God (which he calls the “extremes”) while allowing the
drama of freedom to unfold in the middle term of “well-being.” 82 In citing God as the active
agent of the first and last stages, does the Confessor seek to bracket the second mode affected by
freedom or as the sole place where created freedom can be exercised? Tollefsen cautions against
taking an absolute stance here. To affirm that the effects of freedom are limited to well-being
would be problematic since eternal-being would no longer be connected to the free choice of the
creature. Instead, the result of free decision carries into the mode of eternal being. Eternal
being, be it well-being or ill-being is the result of the decision for or against conversion. “The
quality of this eternal existence is open to [humanity’s] own influence.” 83 This dynamic is
consistent with Maximus’ dedication to freedom. Rather than uncoupling eternal being from the
results of free choice, deification includes the permanentizing of free decisions. The final stage
is the deification of the created being that has already chosen well-being. To better communicate
this, Tollefsen encourages a combination of the final two modes, already found in Maximus’
reflection, calling the mode of deification “eternal well-being.” 84
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Bradshaw reflects on how this process as a whole showcases freedom’s involvement in
the shaping of the tropos of logoi that lasts eternally. The logoi have an initial mode by which
they move naturally. The freedom of the creature gives specificity to the mode by which the
logoi are actualized. The creature shapes the mode of the logoi as one responding in the course
of a dialogue. 85 While the logoi themselves remain intact, the trajectory upon which the created
being travels is forever shaped by this freedom. Beyond a simple affirmation or denial of wellbeing, creaturely response changes the mode in a way that is particular to that response. The
mode and path by which the logoi have had their tropos modified by the response of created
beings determines whether and how those logoi are regathered into eternity. 86

C. Deification and Human Freedom
Maximus is best known for his formulation and defense of dyotheletism, the proposition
that there were two wills (thelema) in Christ which correspond to Christ’s two natures. The
controversy gripped Christendom, threatening the already fragile unity between East and West.
It was this issue that led the Byzantine monk to ally himself with the Pope in the hope of winning
over his countrymen. Ultimately, dyotheletism would be accepted by the Church, both East and
West at the Third Council of Constantinople (681) but not before Maximus was banished from
the debate through exile and the grotesque punishment of having his right hand and tongue cut
off so that he was incapable of writing and speaking against monothelism. The conviction that
this formulation of Christological wills was true earned Maximus the title of Confessor.
The development of neo-Chalcedonian dyotheletism is one of the Confessor’s central
contributions to theology. Maximus’ definitive formulations of this view were cast in the
85
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crucible of the ongoing debate and grew in nuance and clarity over the course of the events that
led to his persecution. It would be a mistake, however, to bracket the Confessor’s understanding
of dyotheletism from the rest of his thought. As we have seen, Maximus’ theological worldview
is intricately woven so that each part is consistent with the others. His thought on the wills of
Christ is no different. We can repeat as we have already said in relation to Maximus’ description
of deification here: what the Confessor writes about the hypostatic union is manifest in the
ecclesial reality of His Body. Our reflections on the wills of Christ are relevant to Maximus’
anthropological outlook. We saw this in the previous section, regarding how the process of
deification has the exercise of human freedom at its center and gives rise to the possibility of
human free choice setting the eternal tropos of the creation that participates in God. Prior to the
point of conversion that is the entrance into “well-being”, Maximus demonstrates that freedom is
the central characteristic of the human person. We will explore the place of human freedom in
Maximus’ anthropology before delving into the far more complex issue of how that freedom is
manifest in Christ and how theandric activity reflects back upon human freedom.
A common exercise in the writings of the Church Fathers was to inquire into the meaning
of Genesis 1:26 in which God creates humanity in his “own image and likeness.” Speculation on
the image and likeness include the human capacity for reason, the possibility of good action, or
the ability to love. For Maximus, the image of God is made manifest in the expression of
freedom. God gives humanity the ability to be like God who has the freedom to self-actualize
and self-determine. 87 For Maximus, the image and the likeness of Genesis 1:26 can be separated
into two distinct realities. The image tells us how humanity has been created. Humanity has the
power to decide their own fate through the exercise of freedom. Whether humanity conforms to
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the “likeness” of God or not is contingent upon the human choice to follow the logoi. Though the
exercise of human freedom according to the logoi constitutes the culmination of action
consonant with human nature, we cannot understand even this free movement as independent of
God. As we noted in our discussion of deification in the natural phase of “being”, God is
responsible for the genesis of human nature and the possibility of virtuous action which is
nothing more or less than the human person’s adherence to that same created nature. The
realization of God’s likeness is then both the result of free human action and humanity’s
participation in the immanent God, written in their nature according to the logoi. 88
Freedom is pointed toward the same goal of deification. The nascent potential of
humanity to participate in God must be affirmed by self-determining activity. That free choice
and divine action are needed does not make the process of growing in God’s likeness less
“natural” for Maximus. Harper provides an acute summary of this dynamic:

Although the human essence or nature already iconizes God’s essential attributes, it does
so in potentia and must be activated through self-determination in order to properly exist
like God, voluntarily receiving from divinity at each stage of the natural maturation
process what it needs to continue eschatological movement. 89

Nichols points out that this should not be understood as a rote obedience to God but as true acts
of human self-determination. 90 Maximus describes how God values the “shining thoughts of the
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mind” which can be no less than the free contemplation of divine things as precious “pearls.” 91
The free exercise of the human intellect is for Maximus a holy act. 92 Recall that God’s own
contemplation of creation, including humanity, is according to the logoi of providence and
judgment. These logoi allow beings to move, even according to their logoi, in a manner that
respects their God given freedom. In Maximus’ cosmology, God conceives of and contemplates
individual beings as moving within contingent possibility. This is related to freedom. Though
the realization of the eschatological state is a unified one, the logoi represent the relationship of
God to each individual creature. The exercise of freedom in the response to the logoi introduces
a tropic variance that is as particular to the creature as the logoi they were created by. The
eschatological potential set by God is exercised such that each creature reaches the fulfillment of
that potential in its own way. 93 This uniqueness does not declare the free creature self-sufficient.
Even in freedom there is an interplay between the creature and God. Charity, for instance, can
only be practiced in union with God. The free human response of charity is then incapable of
expression without divine action and we see in it the dynamism of human-divine action once
again. Garrigues calls this synergy a “co-acting” that both divinizes humanity through
participation, growing in likeness of God, while “not suppressing distinctively human activity. 94
To complete the maximian interpretation of Genesis 1:26 would be to affirm that the
potentiality for free action, the image, is the same in all rational creatures. The response, the
formation of the likeness in each creature is in a way so particular that each response is its own
unique expression of God’s likeness.
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Maximus’ understanding of human freedom carries over into his Christological
reflections on freedom. The capacity for freedom and self-determination is therein reaffirmed as
the way humanity carries the image character of God. 95 The discussion of freedom thus far has
not necessitated the tracing of Maximus’ definition of creaturely freedom as such. The use of
these terms in a Christological context requires that we delve into the nuances of his definitions.
For instance, to this point we have spoken of freedom in the overarching sense of autexousia or
“power over oneself,” self-determination. 96 According to McFarland, Maximus’ use of the term
is meant to communicate “individual ownership of responsibility for action.” 97 Despite how
Maximus’ depiction of deification intertwines human freedom into dialogue with divine
principles, this overarching concept is consonant of the sort of self-determination necessary for
moral praise and blame. Beyond this equivocal sense, Maximus’ usage differentiates between
specific types of freedom.
The key distinction is between natural will (thelema physikon) and gnomic will (thelema
gnomikon). Natural will, as the name suggests, corresponds to what is proper to rational beings
by nature. Human natural will is intrinsic to human nature. For Maximus, the natural human
will is what defines us as human agents. 98 This is the autexousia that plays a crucial role in the
process of deification and it is according to this determination that the tropic response to the
logoi is made.
The gnomic will is often contrasted with the natural will though sometimes in ways that it
is consonant with the natural will and others where it is juxtaposed as a corruption of the natural
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will. In either case, gnomic will is understood as corresponding to a mode of the human will. It
is properly speaking a tropos not a logos.
The moral character of gnomic will is debatable. In the most ambivalent sense of the
gnomic will, it can be understood as an “a particular instance of willing, oriented to some real or
imagined good. 99 The natural will then is the inherent ability to choose. The gnomic will would
be individual modes of that will as distinct choices are made.
Andreopoulos interprets Maximus’ reflection on the gnomic will as a reality that did not
exist prior to the fall. Sin has broken the natural will, now in need of restoration, the mode of
human willing is trapped in the gnomic will. 100 The gnomic will consists of humanity acting in
an indefinite manner via subjective opinions and requires continuous deliberation. Yet even in
this negative valuation of the gnomic will, the mode of the will becomes the epicenter of
deification. It is in this exercise of will that the decision for or against the logoi – for or against
conversion – takes place. 101
In both interpretations, gnomic will is the formulation of particular decisions based upon
human opinion, which is the literal meaning of gnome. 102 The formation of this opinion would
not be enough for an act of gnomic will. It is accompanied by deliberation and is consummated
in judgment, the moment of decision. 103 The gnomic will has the capacity to either follow the
divine will or become divergent from it. 104 Though Andreopoulos and others emphasize the

(D Pyrr, PG 91.308C cited in McFarland, "The Theology of Will," 520.
Andreopoulos, "Eschatology in Maximus the Confessor," 329.
101
Andreopoulos, "Eschatology in Maximus the Confessor," 329. Andreopoulos notes that the restoration of the
human will to its proper mode is a task that is taken up principally by the Logos in Christ on the level of ontology
rather than a moral level.
102
McFarland, "The Theology of Will," 522. Maximus sees gnome as a multifaceted word, citing twenty-eight
meanings of the word in Scriptures and the Fathers. See Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 171. citing D Pyrr
PG 91:312AC.
103
Opusc. 1, PG 91:16; cf 21D-24A, trans McFarland, 522.
104
Opusc. 3 PG 91:56B.
99

100

167

fallen state of the will, this does not necessarily mean that the fruit of gnomic deliberation always
produces incorrect decisions.
We are finally approaching the level of nuance present in the Christological discussions
on Christ’s human and divine will. As a preamble and final word about the human will in an
anthropological sense, we ask an eschatological question: what happens to the natural human
will as a result of the process of deification? Maximus consistently teaches that the hypostatic
union includes all that is proper to the human nature. The natural will is an intrinsic part of that
human nature, united to the second person of the Trinity. As the human nature is united to the
divine in the hypostatic union so “we too... will come to be in the world above ... undergoing no
change whatsoever in nature.” 105 Clearly this includes also human natural will, the autexousia, of
self-determination. The Confessor confirms as much in Amb 7 when describing deification and
the subjection of all things to God’s will: “Let not these words disturb you, for I am not implying
the destruction of our power of self-determination...” but that humanity’s will in mode of
deification would be moved by desire for God. 106 Maximus’ eschatological vision includes free
human action, self-determination, in the eschaton. This freedom united to the divine freedom
and resulting in theandric activity would include human nature but move in a manner that is
beyond its natural power. The permanence of this free movement in God, the ever-movingrepose discussed in the previous chapter, would be an elevated form of freedom, not a limitation
of freedom. This freedom would be delineated by God’s will for creation encapsulated in the
logoi of providence and judgment. 107
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Deified freedom is exemplified first in Christ. Only on account of the hypostatic union is
human nature, inclusive of freedom, compatible with deification. What then of the gnomic will?
Maximus’ stance on this issue evolved as his combat with Monotheletism intensified. Before the
monothelite controversy Maximus included the gnomic will in Christ. The inclusion had a
soteriological purpose, Christ was the only one capable of restoring human deliberation. 108 As a
result of a prevailingly negative evaluation of gnome within the debates, the Confessor made
what Blowers calls a “great reversal,” which denied that Christ’s will was expressed in a gnomic
mode. 109 He settled on a definition that gnomic will is fallen and ambivalent which was
incompatible with the hypostatic union.
Speculation that this mode of the will was due to the Fall was not the only reason
Maximus changed his view on gnome. Couching the problem in his distinctive terminology,
Maximus understands that the composite hypostasis of the human/divine union would have been
incapable of the gnomic mode. This mode of willing, he argues, is not only proper to human
natural will but to the human hypostasis as a whole. The whole human person corresponds to the
human logoi. Since Christ’s humanity participates in the hypostatic union and cannot be
summed up as a human hypostasis, the gnomic mode of willing does not apply. 110 The
Confessor’s rejection of gnome in Christ also has a soteriological logic. The gnomic will,
vacillating about which decision to make, would not have been capable of bringing about the
stabilization of the human natural will - it would have lacked the resolve to do so. 111 Instead,
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Maximus holds that Christ has a natural human will that is at once deified and always obedient to
the Divine will.
The Confessor’s stance on this issue has sparked some soteriological concerns among
maximian scholars. That Maximus’ mature writings reflect a rejection of gnome in Christ is
almost universally agreed upon. The concerns center around Gregory of Nyssa’s adage “what is
not assumed is not redeemed.” 112 Despite the Confessor’s argument that the gnomic will is a
tropos of the will rather than the nature of the human will, the worry is if Christ did not
deliberate within himself then the process of human deliberation has not been redeemed. The
description of the gnomic tropos as the making of particular decisions compounds the issue since
that is the only mode in which humanity experiences freedom prior to deification and obedience.
Ian McFarland’s interpretation of Maximus’ teaching changes the register in such a way
that avoids these difficulties. Instead of focusing on the gnomic will as the making of particular
choices, McFarland highlights the Confessor’s emphasis on investigation and deliberation as
actions characteristic of gnome.113 This places the issue firmly in the bounds of knowledge. If
gnome is an attempt to form an opinion about the good through investigation and deliberation
then it would not be fitting for Christ to have it since the hypostatic union would mean that
Christ always had knowledge of the good and would always act in an obedient manner in
accordance with the good. McFarland explains that this would have made Christ’s human
willing “qualitatively different” than what any other human being would have experienced yet
without any change in Christ’s human nature. 114 The difference here is that all of Christ’s
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particular decisions are formed in accordance with the good because Christ could see the good
clearly and had no need to investigate and deliberate.
The Agony in the Garden (Lk 22:43-44) is the key biblical text for the Confessor. The
way gnome is defined plays a crucial role as to whether Maximus’ use of this passage clarifies
the redemption of the human will or leads to the bespoke problematic. Understanding gnome as
vacillation and deliberation leads Blowers to question whether we could understand Christ’s
agony in the Garden as redemptive of the human will. 115 For Blowers, the appearance of this
vacillation in Christ makes the event at Gethsemane unique and he questions whether denying
gnome honors the drama present in the biblical witness. 116 McFarland’s analysis allows for there
to be a real drama, a true struggle of obedience in Christ without the presence of gnome. 117 The
Agony in the Garden demonstrates for McFarland an exercise of the human will in Christ that
corresponds to the acceptance of his vocation. 118 There is in Christ a drama that is based upon his
true human nature, the fear of death, and not reliant on the darkness of the human intellect
caused by sin. This human nature is reconciled to the divine nature in the exercise of the human
will to become obedient to the divine will. There must be drama, a certain tension. As a risposte
to the monothelite, human will must be conformed to the divine will. Maximus’ theological
opponents held that the human will would not have struggled since it had already been overcome
by the divine will in a way that would have made obedience compulsive. 119 The crux of the issue
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for Maximus is that it is against human nature to will death and therefore could only be chosen as
a response to the call made by the divine will. 120
Once more, we see Maximus’ Christology as a means for working out the problems of
deification. If we understand gnomic will as the result of imperfect knowledge which would
require deliberation then we can understand that as the human person is enlightened by God’s
knowledge and will manifest in the logoi, they are able to more easily choose the good, a
lessening of this gnomic mode. Ultimately, deification means that the human will no longer
relies on fallible judgments but is capable of the same agency that is inherent to its nature.
Gethsemane as an example for the interplay between divine and human wills writ large brings
some conclusions to the fore that we can make based upon Christ’s redemptive suffering. The
process of deification is not bereft of drama. The struggle is not one in which the human is
easily conformed to the divine but includes the divine call and transformation through suffering.
The present example shows that Christ’s obedient response was not without suffering. This
obedience does not deprive Christ’s humanity of autexousia yet the exercise of this freedom to
act beyond his human nature produced agony. Freedom is both preserved and surpassed by
deification.

D. Deification and the Body
Lars Thunberg succinctly expresses Maximus’ approach to the human body, the
Confessor does not condone “a departure from the lower elements in man, but a restoration and
reintegration of man as a whole.” 121 The mission of restoration is an affirmation of the goodness
of creation, particularly in this case the goodness of the whole human nature and all of which it
120
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consists. Within the context of Ancient Greek thought, this view of the body offers a distinctly
Christian approach. Whereas other thinkers in the Hellenic tradition may see the body as dead
matter, brought to life by the soul, for Maximus the body itself has a participation in the Logos
and is capable of being deified. 122
As a general point of his anthropology, Maximus includes the body within his schema of
deification because it is an inalienable element of the human nature. Returning to Amb 7,
Maximus describes deified life as God acting to the whole of the human nature as the soul acts to
the body. 123 This does not cancel out the existing relationship between soul and body, both are
retained. Here, Maximus is describing the sort of life, the mode of life, that will be lived by the
deified. This relationship is one in which God permeates the human nature in a mysterious way
so that we can no longer speak of the deified as living life in a natural manner. 124 This life is not
less than a natural one but is beyond it. The Confessor emphatically includes both the soul and
the body as participants in this dynamic, the soul receiving “immutability” and the body
receiving “immortality.” 125
Christologically, the body plays an important role in fulfilling God’s desire to be
embodied in all of creation. Once again, the process of deification and Maximus’ Christological
teaching are reflexive: Christ in assuming human nature has in his hypostasis a wholly deified
human body. This is not accidental but serves a crucial purpose. The deified body of Christ is
not an obstacle for apprehending the Logos but is the divinely chosen means by which the Logos
is definitively revealed. This character carries over to human corporeality as a whole which
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becomes “the organ for [the divine glory’s] manifestation and active presence throughout the
whole cosmos.” 126 Deification transforms the whole person, including the body, through
participation in God and is expressed in the living out of the virtues, primarily charity. For
Cooper, Maximus’ description of the presence of God in the body as the incarnation of love
gives the human body a sacramental character. 127 The body becomes a communicative means for
charity and as deified persons interact with others, they enable the latter to share in deification. 128
Christ’s body and therefore all human bodies acquire a theophanic character through
deification. This truth underscores the difference between Maximus and those who downplay or
reject the body. Cooper notes that this is all the more extraordinary given the Confessor’s ascetic
context. The strict discipline of the body leads to the understanding that the body itself was the
“most contingent and mutable object of creation.” 129 The monastic experience of tempering
bodily desire and the struggle with bodily sins led to the temptation to characterize the body as a
source of difficulty. Following the logic of Maximus’ thought on the Incarnation and deification,
Cooper writes “the human body-when ennobled by deification, has been selected by God in his
own good counsel as the primary means of his self-demonstration in the cosmos, and thus the
high point of creation’s access to him.” 130 The deified body becomes the crossroads between the
impermanence of contingent creation and the one who holds all of creation together. 131
How does Maximus portray the body during the process of deification and what is its
final fate once that process has been consummated? We should be clear that in his work on
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deification, the majority of the Confessor’s writings about the body are a proleptic expectation,
the description of the body’s participation in God within the context of a realized eschatology.
For Maximus, there is no tension between the reality of life in God lived in the present and the
age that follows. The present, proleptic, state of deification always acts as a signpost to that final
consummation. It is a fitting share in that final state proper to the present. When Maximus
considers the body, he does so in a way that describes deification in a pre-resurrection existence.
In his comprehensive study of the subject, Cooper explores Maximus’ portrayal of the
deified body. Of particular interest is how Maximus emphasizes the passivity of human
bodies. 132 Recall that in his description of the hypostatic union, human nature allows the Logos a
share in passivity, particularly the ability to suffer. 133 In the same passage the passivity of human
flesh (δια σαρκὸς φύσει παθητῆς) is emphasized. 134 There is here an instrumental use of bodily
passivity by Christ to affect salvation which makes the flesh passive in the process of deification.
The body then, participates in deification by becoming passive to the theandric activity affected
by the graced incorporation of the whole human person in God. 135 Based upon this, we echo
Cooper’s conclusion that the human body is deified and expresses deification by suffering. 136
Granting to the body the role of suffering does not negate the goodness of the human body or
creation as such. In suffering, the body has within itself an intrinsic martyrdom, a witness that
points through its own contingency beyond being. Deified suffering is not a masochistic practice
or a resignation to punishment but an active drawing close to the same mystery manifest through
the crucifixion. Maximus does not speculate on the aftermath of bodily death, the apex of bodily
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suffering, except to say that the body continues to have a share in God, no longer subject to
natural processes and is wholly deified in its action. 137

E. Humanity as Microcosm
The eschatological trajectory expressed by the body through suffering cannot be
separated from human nature as a whole. As a compositional unity of body and soul, humanity
occupies a distinctive place within the cosmos. Thus far we have taken these elements of
humanity, so to speak, in turn focusing on specific aspects of humanity including the change in
tropos in deification, how that dynamic transforms freedom, and the body’s role in deification.
Now we turn to the unique reality of human nature as understood by the Confessor: the gathering
of disparate elements of creation into union. For Maximus humanity is a microcosm. This is the
central locus around which Lars Thunberg bases his reflection on maximian thought.
Understood as a microcosm, humanity occupies a unique place in God’s plan for creation:

The very fact that the things of the world are reflected in man present him with a vocation
to gather them together for his and their final goal. He should relate opposite phenomena:
mortal creatures with immortal creatures, rational beings with non-rational beings, etc. In
this way man should function as a world in miniature, and for this reason he was created
as a reflecting image of the whole cosmos. 138

137
138

Amb 7 PG 91:1088C.
Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, 73.

176

Christ is the first and paradigmatic realization of this vocation. Humanity can only strive
to fulfill this unifying call because of Christ’s recapitulative redemption, granting humanity the
ability to heal the “natural fissures” in creation. 139 The Incarnation inaugurates this unitive action
by first perfecting humanity in himself through the hypostatic union. Christ chose to affect this
unity first because it is the building block upon which the rest of the gathering relies.
Maximus elaborates on the image of humanity as microcosm in Mystagogia 7. For the
Confessor, the redemption of a single human being is the redemption of the whole of creation in
miniature. He analogizes between the whole of creation which includes visible and invisible
elements with humanity which is also visible and invisible because their nature is the unity of
soul and body. 140 Maximus’ view is that humanity represents the whole universe and perhaps
more provocatively, describes the universe as a human being. 141
The cosmos itself is like the unity of the visible and invisible in humanity because the
whole cannot be teased out of the parts. The invisible belongs to the universe as much as the
visible. 142 This anthropomorphic analogy should not be taken to mean that creation itself forms
some sort of hypostasis but that the visible and invisible, the sensible and insensible elements,
belong to the same reality of the cosmos in the same way that we cannot speak of a human nature
without considering the soul and body. This is tied to the cosmos’ eschatological fulfillment:
“The universe, as a man, will then have perished in that which can be seen, and it will be raised
again—new from that which has grown old—at the resurrection that we presently await.” 143 The
commonality of composition becomes a commonality in resurrection. Just as humanity in

Amb 41 PG 91:1308D.
Myst 7 CCSG 33.
141
Myst 7 CCSG 33.
142
Myst 7 CCSG 34.
143
Myst 7 CCSG 34.
139
140

177

deification is permeated by God’s action and presence so the whole universe, likened to the same
reality, will be raised in a manner wherein God’s presence permeates the whole. This is
Maximus’ way of expressing the eschatological fulfillment of 1 Cor 15:28, that in the
Resurrection, God will be all in all. It is crucial to keep the Confessor’s Neo-Chalcedonianism in
mind. In this final consummation he holds that the human along with the whole cosmological
creation will be penetrated by the Logos without being ontologically assimilated. 144 The Logos
does not seek to deconstruct creation or remove the individuality of the human person instead its
tropos is changed to a divine one without in any way altering its being. 145

F. Consecration of Creation as the Vocation of Humanity
Just as the whole of creation can be conceived of as a human being that will be raised and
share in eschatological fulfillment, the human person can be said to contain all of the elements of
creation. Humanity contains the potential to relate with each of the five “divided elements” by
virtue of the human nature. 146 The unity of disparate elements in humanity points toward God’s
original plan for the human species. God’s intention was for humanity to serve as a mediator, a
point of unity, for the communion between God and the cosmos. Maximus tells us that humanity
is listed as the final part of God’s creation with this express purpose in mind. 147 Humanity is to
be the natural link (συνδεσμός τις φυσικὸς), the point of unity for all of creation with God. 148
This original difference was not due to sin but, as we reflected upon in the previous chapter, due
to the natural differentiation of God’s judgment. Maximus describes this original human
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vocation as a gathering up of all of creation into one. This proceeds through a series of natural
divisions (male and female, paradise and the world, heaven and earth, the sensible and the
insensible) to the point where the whole of creation is brought together in a unity, “one single
creation.” 149 Having overcome these divisions, Christ unites creation to Himself through
uncreated love, overcoming the fifth and final division of created-uncreated.
Maximus tells us that this final division is overcome through Christ’s ascension. Having
mediated all of the divisions in nature through uniting them to himself in the hypostatic union,
Christ ascends to heaven and with him all the extremes of creation. 150 Maximus calls our
attention to Christ’s human body “which is of the same nature and consubstantial with ours” in
which Christ had already united the natures of the cosmos. 151 In doing so Christ reveals and
restores humanity’s original vocation as mediator of creation to the uncreated. Christ gathers all
of creation together, “fulfilling as man … all that He Himself as God had preordained should
take place, having completed the whole plan of God the Father for us…” which allows all with a
human nature to participate in that vocation once more. 152
The vocation of mediator is understood to be imprinted on the process of deification. By
growing in union with God, humanity first mediates God to the human body. 153 From this point,
the intent was for humanity to bring God to reside in all things in accord with nature. 154 The
lasting result was to be a creation “drawn together into a unity as they converge around the one
human nature.” 155 The hope for deification is not, then, a hope that is limited by the scope of

Amb 41 PG 91:1308AB.
Amb 41 PG 91:1305B.
151
Amb 41 PG 91 1309B.
152
Amb 41 PG 91:1309D.
153
Amb 7, PG 91:1092B.
154
Amb 7 PG 91:1092C.
155
Amb 7 PG 91:1092B.
149

150

179

human individuality. It is not a relationship that finds its boundaries in an exclusive relationship
between God and the self but by the very vocation of humanity breaks down the border between
self and creation. The deification of the human person “constitutes the hope for the salvation of
the whole creation.” 156
In every description of humanity’s vocation as mediator, Maximus notes the historical
reality of sin. This reality does not annul God’s original intention but impedes it greatly.
Through the misuse of freedom, humanity has become estranged from God’s original goal and
intention. 157 Sin is movement that is discordant with the original intention of God, a
contradiction of the logoi. It is a violation of human nature and vocation. 158 Instead of uniting
creation, sinful humanity introduces new and deeper divisions. Instead of uniting what was
divided, humanity “divided what was divided.” 159
Due to this discordant movement, we see why it is only through the Logos’ own
Incarnation as a human being that humanity’s role can be once again restored. This does not
mean that the Incarnation was not an original part of God’s plan. In a sense we see that God’s
desire to be embodied in all of creation already points toward the intention of Incarnation. The
matter at hand is that the original vocation of humanity can only be realized as a consequence of
the Incarnation and redemption. The incorporation into the one Logos from which humanity
exercises the power to offer God’s presence to the rest of creation, to consecrate that same
creation to God, is only possible now by means of the redemption. For Maximus this redemption
is intrinsically linked to membership in the Church.
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G. Mediator Role Expressed Liturgically
The Church is a reflection of divine activity, bringing about the “oneness” desired by
God. 160 The entry of the human person into the Church is an entering into union with God.
Thomas Cattoi describes the Confessor’s mystagogical outlook as a “reverse-kenosis.” 161 The
self-emptying of Christ has as its mirror image the leaving of passions and attachments that is
necessary to become one of Christ’s faithful to enter into the restored relationship with God
facilitated by the church.
Within a liturgical framework, the Church stands as the Body of Christ and is
representative of the same cosmic unity that is the goal of deification. The church does God’s
unifying work through its collective actions as that body. 162 The community in microcosm
encapsulates the macrocosmic action of the church. The liturgical assembly unifies its individual
members without confusion, surpassing all of their natural relationships and by the incorporation
of those individuals acts in a corporate manner for the unification of all creation. 163 This does not
only address the internal elements of humanity. The church extends its reach to non-human
elements of creation. The cosmos is “another Church that is made without hands.” 164 The
Confessor draws a direct correlation between the church “made with hands” to the cosmic church
that has for itself a sanctuary and nave. 165 Maximus explains that the unity of the church as a
building derives from the liturgical action which takes place within it: “The nave is identical to
the sanctuary according to power because it is consecrated by the anaphora at the consummation
of the mystagogy and, conversely the sanctuary is identical to the nave according to activity
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because it is the place where the never-ending mystagogy begins.” 166 The church derives its
unitive character from its use as place for the consecratory action and remembrance of the
mysteries. As the church, the members are incorporated into a unity that outshines their
differences. By gathering up members regardless of their natural differences into an indivisible
union, the church does the same work that God does and with the same activity. Maximus tells
us that God is the only one capable of bringing about such a union and when the church performs
this action it acts as “an image relates to its archetype. 167
Undoubtedly this same action takes place in the church of the cosmos in which the
Confessor to identify it as a nave and sanctuary. In his translation of the text, Armstrong notes
that this liturgical context grants the word anaphora (ἀναφορᾷ) a meaning beyond the mundane
“reference” by which it is otherwise translated. Here the term can mean “offering” and in this
setting refers to the Eucharistic offering of the liturgy. 168 We can conclude that the cosmos
stands in unity with the church as an edifice in which the offering is made, an offering that brings
each of these realities into unconfused unity. Thunberg calls this the Confessor’s “ecclesial
vision of the world.” 169 The cosmos, as a macrocosmic church is the place of sacrifice and
consecration. The church cannot be separated from the creation it inhabits as though it were
some exterior reality. The church as described here is a “double reality” that interpenetrates and
draws the cosmos into itself. 170 Maximus does not envision a separation between the world and
the church. The church acts as a consecratory power from within not the “imposition of an
omnipotent causality.” 171
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Incorporating our earlier reflection on the logoi allows us to see that the cosmos as
church is not simply a backdrop for this mystery but a participant in the liturgy. The liturgy is
the working out in time of the right movement of the logoi embedded within creation. The
double-movement of procession and conversion, which we reflected upon in an ontological
context, are similarly present in the liturgical dynamic of consecration. These movements make
up, as it were, two points of departure by which the Logos affects transformation. The cosmos,
inseparable from the multitudinous logoi, point humanity toward the one Logos. The church, by
virtue of the unity present in humanity and participation in the mediation of Christ, draws
creation into one in the anaphora. The Logos meets and unites the cosmos and humanity in the
one deifying liturgical act of consecration allowing for the divine tropos to not only be manifest
in humanity but to become embodied in the whole of the cosmos. The church, in both senses of
the image, takes on the task of its archetype, bringing the whole of creation into the unity made
possible by Christ’s hypostatic union. 172 The result of this convertive and unitive movement is a
dissolution of difference without confusion. The whole of creation manifests this liturgical unity
and sings out in the one voice of the Logos which demonstrates their unity not by dissolving it
but by gloriously outshining their visible distinctions. 173 Von Balthasar credits Maximus with the
novel insight, absent from both Evagrius and Pseudo-Dionysius, that the whole of creation
participates in the church’s liturgy. 174 The liturgical incorporation in Christ is not done despite
creation, it consists of creation expressed as “incarnational, ascetic, sacramental” creation. 175 The
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material diversity of creation is the instrument of consecration. 176 In this action the whole of
creation is brought into union with Christ, it is deified. As Thunberg explains:

When, in the Church, the created multiplicity assembles around Christ, who is the only
logos of the totality-assembles without confusion, but also without separation between
the divine and the human, as the Chalcedonian formula states-then the Church expresses
in a ‘typical’ mode (i.e. as type) one of the same principle and one of the same power of
unity on the level of creation. 177

The influence of Chalcedon on Maximus forms a critical point for his liturgical
understanding. Cattoi observes that the declaration of unity “One is Holy, one is Lord, Jesus
Christ,” that concludes the holy mysteries and is recorded by Maximus in Mystagogy 21, can
sound “remarkably isochristic ... a complete erasure of difference between deified individuals”
and the divinity to which they have been joined. 178 We have already noted multiple times that
participation in the divine, the fruit of the process of deification and the goal of liturgical
transformation, does not annul the nature or individuality of the creature. The preservation of
identity within deification indicates two truths. First, it is God’s affirmation of the goodness of
the cosmos as created. The intimacy brought about by Eucharistic participation and the
transformation of the natural mode to the divine mode does not constitute the erasure of the
fundamental structure of reality. 179 Secondly, it highlights the uniqueness of every created being.
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Cattoi points out that even the uniqueness of created beings is a shared trait that draws them to
communion. 180 This particularity is not a static one. The preservation of unique created beings
reveals God’s design, the unrepeatable logoi by which each creature in its particularity has an
unrepeatable role to play within the divine plan. 181

H. Eucharistic Reciprocity
Approaching individual participation in the cosmic action of offering the logoi back to
God introduces tension between the one and the many. Maximus’ whole project is
unquestioningly pointed toward an eschaton in which all are united, crossing the boundaries set
by the five levels of division with a shared origin in and consummation with the uncreated
divinity of God. Teasing out how distinct individual beings participate within this dynamic may
seem counter to the whole project. As we have seen time and again, the preservation of the
individual in a fashion compatible with Chalcedonian language undergirds the Confessor’s
theological opus. Mitralexis affirms that when we speak of the human person’s task as mediator
that we are speaking on the level of the individual: “... each and every separate otherness that is
to be restored as a perfect otherness in perfect communion, and note merely to the aggregateotherness.” 182 If this is the case, we must pay close attention to how Maximus views each and
every individual person’s developing relationship with the divine and the restorative process that
happens as the result of that relationship. The ultimate unifying task is not one that wipes out
this relationship but affirms it. We should also acknowledge that while Maximus’ use of
microcosm and speaking of the whole of creation and the church as a human would allow us to
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increase the scope of this dynamic beyond that of the individual, doing so tempts us to ignore the
pivotal role that the relationship of individual created beings and God plays within this schema.
Allowing the one to be absorbed into the many does violence to the whole project. The tension
between the one and the many must remain intact.

Logoi and the Person
Loudovikos’ work places the relationship between persons, human and divine, at the
center of his interpretation of Maximus’ theology. 183 The reframing of the Confessor’s work is
comprehensive, touching each aspect of maximian thought. At its core is the understanding that
the nature communicated by God through the logoi is not a static reality but is presented to the
person as their own “ecstatic personal vocation, rather than an immutable ‘given.’ 184” If the logoi
had been proposed by Maximus as immutable ideals that have their being apart from God, they
would have exerted power over God’s freedom as we discussed in chapter two. Here we will see
that this would have stripped humanity of freedom as well. Instead, understood as divine wills,
which rely on the response of creation for their ultimate fulfillment, the logoi are the person’s
“eschatological ontology.” 185 Far from a permanent ontological character, the logoi form the
basis of a vocational dialogue between creator and created, an eschatological dialogue. 186
Loudovikos underscores Maximus’ eschatological emphasis. What makes the Confessor’s
thought stand out is not so much how he describes the origin of the logoi but the process of their
eschatological fulfillment. 187
See Loudovikos’ A Eucharistic Ontology. Within this work, Loudovikos contextualizes the whole of Maximus’
thought within this interpersonal relationship, a critical step for adapting the Confessor’s work for the conversation
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The logos/tropos dynamic demonstrates that God creates with the intention of having a
dialogue with his creation. Creation is not intended to be a monologic procession/return to God
of an already perfect creation simply offered in return the same way it was received. The counter
example of the return of an already perfect creation evokes the biblical image of the fearful
steward of Mt 25:14-30 who does nothing creative with the gifts entrusted to him by his master.
Dialogue is a risky notion that places the fate of the logoi in the hands of created beings. It also
creates a possibility alien to teleological fatalism: the dialogic view holds that creation interacts
with the logoi in such a manner that there is reciprocity between creation and its creator.
Mitralexis calls this dialogue “a primary characteristic of existence, an ontological category.” 188
This dialogue is radically personal, happening between the individual and God but it is in
no way conceptually independent. Maximus’ liturgical outlook understands this dialogue as the
individual’s participation in the collective liturgical movement. The dialogue is characterized
first and foremost as Eucharistic. The center of the eucharistic mystery is a personal dialogue
characterized by the “exchange of gifts.” 189 This exchange is the raison d’etre for Maximus’
insistence on the dissoluble character of personal individuality.
In Ad Thalassius, Maximus describes the logos/tropos dynamic as a eucharistic
reciprocation of gifts given. 190 Not only the logoi embedded within human nature but the whole
of the created logoi discoverable in creation through the exercise of wisdom are received by the
human person as a gift from God. 191 The eucharistic movement is immediately recognizable: the
inner principles (logoi) of all created things, once they are known become gifts offered back to

Mitralexis, Ever-Moving Repose, 87.
Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology, 37.
190
Ad Thal PG 90:481C trans in Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology, 38.
191
Ad Thal PG 90:481C.
188
189

187

God and have a transformative effect allowing the human person to reveal “in himself through
his life all the majesty of the divine wisdom which is invisibly present in existent things.” 192 It is
important here to underscore that Maximus does not create a boundary to this dynamic that ends
at the person. What is offered is not only the elements of creation that are manifest and
participate in the person’s own body, the individual microcosm of humanity. The individual
eucharistic mediation is an offering of all created reality in which that person discerns the logoi.
Treating creation as a gift that could be offered to God exposes Maximus’ logic to a
critique that threatens to reduce dialogue to monologue. The concept of offering creation as a
gift to God seems to forget that the creation itself has God as its origin. Would it not be the case
that ultimately what is happening here is only a nominal “offering,” a return to God of that which
already belongs to God in a way that only appears to include authentic personal involvement?
Maximus tells us that God is the only one capable of creating according to the logoi. Attempting
to change the logoi leads to the destruction of that entity. God is ultimately the source and
destination of all creation that has its origin in and moves according to the logoi. It would seem
then, that the only offering creation could make to God would be a sinful innovation of the logoi.
How then can we speak of creation being offered to God in any sense of the word?
The key lies in Maximus’ understanding that God offers creation to us as a free and
authentic gift. Created things are not only gifts in appearance. Maximus’ God gives freely with
no ontological requirement that the gifts be reciprocated. The nature of creation and its
ontological distance from God allows God to bestow creation as a gift to itself. A gift truly
distinct from God, authentically other. As the gift is received, God recognizes the creature’s
legitimate possession of that gift as its own. God’s free offering is a relinquishing of these gifts
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to creatures. The Confessor tells us that this is a demonstration of God’s goodness and provides
us with an ability to offer an authentic gift back to God, not out of obligation but out of freedom:
“[God] accepts His own gifts as offerings from us, reckoning the whole contribution as ours.” 193
The giving of gifts does not happen on the level of appearance. God gives authentically and
becomes a participant in the relationship that can now openly receive gifts. The giver becomes
the receiver of gifts, recognizing an “indebtedness” for the gifts coming from creation. 194 By
treating what has been given as exclusively belonging to humanity, God can then participate in
this Eucharistic relationship in a truly dialogical manner. 195 Without this element, the
communion would be one sided, a participation of creation in the creator and not a communal
exchange. This dynamic becomes the guarantor of creation’s freedom. Communion with God,
received by God as gift, is in no way obligatory or compulsory.
The Confessor grounds God’s ability to give and to receive in His complete
independence from creation. Since God is totally other, beyond the created world and essentially
self-sufficient, God has no need of what creation can offer. 196 The return offering of the logoi,
the tropoi changed by their actualization within created beings, are received as gifts. They do not
return to God out of a matter of necessity because God by nature has “no need of any of these
things.” 197 Understood as a gift to be received and given, maximian cosmology reveals creation
itself to be profoundly dialogical. 198 Its whole purpose is to facilitate the Eucharistic giving and
receiving of gifts.
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This Eucharistic exchange is inconceivable without the person. The person as God’s
dialogical partner is the hinge upon which Maximus’ ontological system is built. 199 Loudovikos
develops a specific definition of the person based on maximian thought. “The person is the
spiritual event in which the inner principles of entities are made into man’s ‘gift’s offered’ to
God and God’s ‘gifts bestowed’ on man, circulating between created persons, thus fulfilling their
natural function.” 200 Understood under the hermeneutic of gift, all of creation partakes in this
interpersonal exchange.

I. Becoming, Micro-Eschatology, and Micro-Dialogue
The broad categories of “person” and “gift” once again tempt a macrocosmic
understanding of maximian thought. Contemplating these ideas in such a categorical manner
may evoke imagery of the whole creation, represented as a composite other, exchanging gifts
with the divine. Loudovikos, following Maximus’ writings closely, emphasizes that for this
system to avoid breaking down into a matter of necessity, it must be built around the individual
responses of distinct persons. 201 The logoi are offered by God as gift and proposition to creation
writ large, yes, but more importantly as proposals that elicit responses from individual rational
beings. Freedom to respond, to self-determine and have an influence over the eternal trajectory
of the logoi is the key moment of receiving the gift and reciprocity. Without this, the individual
exercise of the freedom of persons, we could not understand the logoi as God’s wills. They
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would become aligned with the ideals of Greek philosophy, not awaiting a response from
creatures but by effecting what they represent by their compulsive power. 202
Responses in freedom are precisely the pivotal moment of deification, as we outlined in
the journey of being, well-being, eternal well-being above. Maximus’ ontological vision is not
one of static being but of a constant progress toward becoming. Though the person only moves
toward deification by responding affirmatively to the proposals of the logoi, they do so by the
mode of free response and not out of necessity. A fated natural teleology would affirm every
critique of onto-theology and ultimately lead to the pantheistic assimilation of persons Maximus
guards against. 203 Basing the process of deification upon becoming rescues it from a fated
following of nature.
The distinction between being and becoming is a distinction between teleology and
eschatology. Maximus’ view is a thoroughly eschatological one wherein creation itself is not a
finalized perfection. It does not contain its telos in itself but by virtue of the logoi is placed on
an eschatological trajectory beyond its nature. This eschatology becomes manifest to each and
every individual creature through the logoi. The proposals of the logoi to individual beings make
up for that being their own, unique, “micro-eschatology.” 204 God’s offer for fulfillment and
participation with the divine nature is proposed to specific individuals awaiting their free
response. These principles set up an eschatological relationship: “each logos is able to represent
the Logos Himself to the actual being in question.” 205 The discernment of the logoi, growth in
virtue, and the response to the call to deification are all encapsulated in an eschatology for that
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particular being. By offering a personal, unique eschatology, Loudovikos writes that God
presents Himself as a “God for them” whose offering is a free gift of love. 206
The call and response take the form of a micro-dialogue between God and each unique
person. 207 Dialogic reciprocity entails a reception of gifts and an offering of gifts through the
logoi by the transposition of their tropoi. Deification is eternal participation in this dialogue, the
encounter between the uncreated God and created persons which in turn effects the tropos of
those created beings that surround that person. The transposition of the logoi found in creation
to the new divine mode of life is not an accident of these individual micro-dialogues. It is
constitutive of those same micro-dialogues. The logoi discerned in nature are the currency of
gift through which the human participation in the divine is made possible. Without the logoi of
created things, both within humanity itself and those logoi that have been discerned, there would
be no recognition of being coming from God. There would be no free turning of the person
toward God in well-being and thus no eternal affirmation of that choice in eternal-well-being.
Creation distinct from the human person is a required element for this micro-dialogic
relationship. Without creation there is no gift to be received or given.
These micro-dialogues demonstrate how each human person engages the vocational call
as mediator. This mediation does not happen in spite of the natural state of the cosmos but in
fulfillment of those natural logoi that exist within the cosmos. The cosmos as created is already
good yet unable to reach eschatological completeness without this task of mediation, one that
changes the mode from a natural existence to a divine one. This dynamic would be impossible
without the freedom of self-determination that constitutes the response to the logoi. The
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individual gathering up of the logoi and the offering to God of logoi as a gift from humanity
shows how the goodness of creation and the task of mediation complement one another.
Understood as the same dynamic that is the process of deification, dialogic reciprocity is
the act of participation in the divine. Deification is also God’s ultimate ratification of each
individual person. 208 Even at the pinnacle of deification, the human person retains the
Chalcedonian quality of being distinct from God without separation on the level of nature.
Eucharistic dialogical reciprocity can continue eternally because the natural logoi of created
beings are not assimilated into God.
The result of each individual dialogue is not a state of isolation of the person with God
but of communion. The gifts given through dialogic reciprocity are not given to God as an
overarching principle but to God in the person of the Logos, Jesus Christ. The unique exchange
of gifts, though remaining distinct, are gathered in Christ to the one hypostatic union that allows
for the created to participate in the uncreated. Each unique micro-dialogue then leads the
individuated unity of body and soul that constitutes a particular humanity to union with Christ,
union with church, union with the cosmos. The ineffable unity of all things in Christ, the
eschatological fulfillment of deification, preserves the particularity of the person and their
freedom yet unites it to every other micro-dialogue, along with the whole of creation in a way
that is without a change in nature, undivided, inseparable, and unconfused.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MAXIMUS & THE THEOLOGY OF THE LAITY

During the summer of 2016, Pope Francis held a celebration honoring the 65th
anniversary of Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI to the priesthood. At the conclusion of the
celebration, Benedict XVI gave a short address, which was only the second time he had spoken
in public since he resigned from the Papacy in 2013.
Speaking to Pope Francis, an array of cardinals, and others present he called to mind a
fellow ordinandi who had the word eucharistomen inscribed on a holy card commemorating the
ordination. Benedict emphasized the fulness of this Greek term of thanksgiving:

Eucharistomen harks back to the reality of thanksgiving, to the new dimension that Christ
imparts to it. The cross, suffering, all that is wrong with the world: he transformed all this
into “thanks” and therefore into a “blessing”. Hence he fundamentally transubstantiated
life and the world, and he has given us and gives us each day the bread of true life, which
transcends this world thanks to the strength of His love. 1

In a rhetorical move that resonates equally with Maximus’ thought and Vatican II’s description
of the laity, Benedict called for the participation of all Christians in Christ’s one act of
thanksgiving:

"Commemoration of the 65th Anniversary of the Priestly Ordination of Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI," updated
June 28, 2016, 2016, accessed February 3, 2021,
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2016/june/documents/papa-francesco_20160628_65ordinazione-sacerdotale-benedetto-xvi.html.
1
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We wish to insert ourselves into the “thanks” of the Lord, and thus truly receive the
newness of life and contribute to the “transubstantiation” of the world so that it might not
be a place of death, but of life: a world in which love has conquered death.

Benedict’s desire for himself and for all to participate in this transubstantiation of the world is an
apt summation of many of the themes that are present in Maximus and later re-expressed by
Vatican II in its own ecclesiastic milieu. His use of priestly language to describe a universal
human task propels the application of his words beyond the prestigious gathering of clerics to the
life of all Christians. The linking of liturgy, participatory action and especially the Eucharist,
and transubstantiation are touchstones that we will return to at the conclusion of this chapter.
Our analysis of Maximus’ thought over the previous two chapters has culminated in a
strikingly similar image of the eucharistic exchange of gifts. Eucharistic dialogical reciprocity
draws together the multitudinous radii of the Confessor’s opus to form a dynamic that is
comprehensive and can be introduced into the ongoing conversation on the laity. This
reciprocity aptly describes the call and response dynamic of the irreducibly unique person in the
myriad of vocational roles manifest in the laity. Far from a description of an isolated
relationship between “God and me” this reciprocity is inseparable from the Christic action of
unifying the whole cosmos in the one Logos. It is a thoroughly Chalcedonian way of
understanding each person’s role in the whole Christ.
As a recapitulation of maximian theology, dialogic reciprocity relies upon key insights
form the Confessor’s thought. First, that God created the cosmos, visible and invisible, as a free
act of love. Forming the whole through a free act of will, every part comes to be on account of
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its participation in God via the logoi. These logoi serve a twofold function that correspond to
God’s will to create a diverse creation (the logoi of judgment) and to gather the whole of this
creation back into Himself (the logoi of providence). These stamps of the creator are present in
each creature, from the inanimate natural elements to rational beings. They are expressions of
the one Logos, the person of Christ, and act as the means of participating in the Logos by way of
origin and eschatological return. This participation moves toward God’s goal of becoming
embodied in all things everywhere. 2
As free rational beings united to both the visible and invisible creation, humanity was to
serve as the natural link between the Creator and creation. For Maximus, the vocation of
humanity as mediator is not a result of sin or the depreciation of creation as such but the very
means by which God holds a dialogue with creation. The currency of this dialogue is the gift of
the logoi embedded within creation. The logoi do not exist apart from creation, making creation
the necessary dialogic medium between God and rational beings. God, having freely given,
allows humanity to freely receive and offer back that same creation to God as humanity’s own
gift to Him. In the offering, the divisions of being are broken down and gathered into a whole
without doing violence to their individuality.
Tragically, sin stifled humanity’s ability to make this offering in a natural manner. The
unifying of human nature with the divine in the hypostatic union introduces a new theandric
mode of action. In Christ, humanity is able to act in a divine manner and can once more fulfill
this original vocation. Christ as the Logos Himself, the original end, is revealed as the means of
this unification. 3 Without doing violence to their identity as persons, humanity is able to act in

Amb 7 PG 91:1084D.
Following Maximus, we can speculate that the Incarnation and hypostatic union of Christ was intended from all
eternity and not a response calculated due to sin. As the culmination of God’s desire for embodiment in the cosmos,
Christ is the proleptic corner stone on which the human task of mediation now rests.
2
3
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this new divine mode, now capable of fulfilling this original vocation in Christ. Entry into that
same theandric activity manifest in Christ’s hypostasis grants ineffable communion between
human and divine realities. Deification is the recognition, ratification, and permanency of
dialogical reciprocity.
Recapitulated as Eucharistic dialogic reciprocity, the Confessor’s crucial insights about
the cosmos, anthropology, and deification can be brought into a fruitful conversation with the
reflections on laity discussed in the first chapter. We will take the latest literature on the laity as
our point of departure and work in a reverse-chronological manner toward the Second Vatican
Council. In doing so, we will be able to draw upon the insights and concerns within the postconciliar literature when forming our synthesis of Maximus with the council. The focus of this
discussion will be the understanding of mediation and creation. As we approach the conciliar
text itself, we will analyze the key terms of the conciliar description of the laity, namely “secular
and “consecrate.” In doing so we will be equipped to understand the points at which Maximus
and the council find agreement and where further reflection may be necessary. In the final
section we will attempt to outline a possible theology of the laity based upon a synthesis of
Maximus and Vatican II.

I. Maximus and the Developmental School of Post-Vatican II Lay Theology
We found in chapter one that the post-conciliar literature on the laity could be separated
into two schools of thought: the magisterial school, in which Lumen Gentium’s description of
the laity as “secular” is defended and a second, the developmental school, which sees the Second
Vatican Council as a point of departure for further discussion on the laity. Since the magisterial
school is chiefly composed of statements that re-present the conciliar documents we will engage
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this school when discussing the conciliar texts proper. Broadly speaking we will introduce
Maximus’ thought into the conversation between these two schools in a reverse chronological
order.
The nature of the developmental school’s critique requires that it be addressed before any
meaningful dialogue between Vatican II and Maximus can be attempted. Development authors
call into question key concepts used by both Vatican II and Maximus to describe the Christian
life. The developmental school names a threefold set of problematic dichotomies: the
laity/clergy, the secular/sacred, God and the world. Their reflections causally link the lay/clergy
distinction to the understanding of a passive laity who must be always receptive to an active
clergy. This mirrors the relationship between secular and sacred spheres and ultimately bears
upon our perception of how God relates to the world. The underlying concern is one of
inequality. These dichotomies, as expressed by the developmental school, bar the laity from
access to God outside of receiving the sacred from the clergy. On account of these problematic
dichotomies, the development school seeks alternative models of ecclesiology that no longer
make use of the concepts of mediation, the secular, or the sacred.
Rooted within the liturgical and monastic traditions of his time, we can candidly ask
whether or not Maximus would recognize the ecclesial distinction that is at the foundation of the
developmental critique of lay theology. If so, would he affirm or deny that it was necessary to
use the terms “lay” and “clergy” to describe the Church? A reading of Maximus within the
framework of post-conciliar lay thought might see his proximity to Dionysius the Areopagite,
who is attributed with enshrining the hierarchy with its privileged place in ecclesiology and
assume that the Confessor would hold an ecclesiological view consonant with one of his major
influences. We would be hard pressed to blame anyone for making such an assumption,
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especially given Maximus’ own description of his prominent work on the liturgical life of the
Church, the Mystagogia, as an expansion on Dionysius’ Ecclesial Hierarchy. Our own reflection
on Maximus’ theology shows that he leans upon liturgical concepts such as the Eucharist and
anaphora in which he frames the cosmic and personal drama of eucharistic dialogical reciprocity.
Maximus rarely writes directly about the ordained and their activity. An interpretation of
the priest and the actions during the anaphora is a notable omission from the Confessor’s
Mystagogia. This is underscored by the structure of the work which depicts the liturgy as the
process of deification. Maximus’ description of the clergy is not to be found within the liturgical
reflection of the Mystagogia but in his correspondence. In a letter to the Bishop of Kydonia, the
Confessor describes the priest as taking God’s role as mediator among his people, even to the
extent that God is “physically seen” through the activity of the priesthood. 4 In another place,
Maximus describes the priesthood’s role as mediator in detail. The work of the priesthood
consists of drawing every soul to God, granting it a share in “its own knowledge, peace and
love,” and to “present to God those it has initiated into the holy mysteries” 5 The Confessor
writes that “the goal of the true priesthood it to be deified and to deify” through true knowledge
and love. 6
Does this description of the ordained priesthood as mediators and initiators into the
divine mysteries mean that Maximus is susceptible to the same criticism leveled at Vatican II by
Doohan, O’Meara, et al? This criticism has many strata to it and we should deal with them
individually. For instance, it is clear that Maximus conceives of a priesthood that acts in a
ministerial role, at the very least mediating the rites of initiation and presiding over the anaphora.

Letter to the Bishop of Kydonia PG 91:604D trans in Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology, 41.
Letter to Bishop John PG 91:624D-625A.
6
Letter to Bishop John PG 91:624D-625A
4
5
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Does this mean that the Confessor conceives of the Church as an “unequal society,” a two-caste
structure of lay and ordained? To consider this question thoroughly we should look closely at the
tradition of mediation in the Dionysian literature and how Maximus’ reception of that tradition
informs his ecclesiological framework.

A. Dionysian Mediation
Returning to Dionysius’ influence on Maximus is crucial because it is the place where the
post-conciliar literature consistently names the birth of the lay/clergy distinction. 7 Hahnenberg
decries the use of a Dionysian hierarchical mediation, the exercise of sacra potestas.8 According
to O’Meara, the acceptance of Pseudo-Dionysius’ writings at the Parisian school in the Middle
Ages was an enshrining of Neoplatonic hierarchical structure within ecclesiology and the
foundation for the passive-lay, active-clergy dynamic. 9 He describes the Dionysian influence on
ecclesiology as the erection of “a fixed, descending, pyramidal structure of a single authority
possessing all being.” 10 O’Meara adds that treating this Neoplatonic structure as a divinely
willed model for the church is “untenable.” 11
Aside from a broad understanding that the Dionysian model introduces Neoplatonic
ideals into Christianity which requires the exercise of a sacra potestas restricted to those who
receive it through priestly ordination, O’Meara offers scant detail about how Dionysius’ system
works. We find in his discussion of Aquinas’ description of the relationship between the

Though some such as Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity, 11., trace the genealogy of the term “laity” to the first
century letter of Clement, this early distinction does not carry the problematic undertones of the schema attributed to
Dionysius. See 1 Clem 44.
8
Hahnenberg, Ministries, 46.
9
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 178.
10
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 279 fn46.
11
O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 279 fn46.
7
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episcopate and priesthood that O’Meara considers Thomas’ ecclesiological outlook to be
influenced by Dionysius “for whom diversity flows from unity.” 12 From this description we can
gather that O’Meara and those who criticize Dionysian ecclesial structure, of which mediation
represents a key component, see this structure as one of Neoplatonic emanation. The power
flows out from the one, mediated by succeeding ranks of hierarchy, to the many. 13 This model
describes the lay/clergy dichotomy and is also present in the criticism of ecclesiologies that focus
too heavily upon a Christological approach, meaning the sacra potestas is held by the few apart
from the many. The point of contact with God in this schema is only through the hierarchy and
without it there is no access to the divine.
This is an accurate depiction of Dionysian ecclesiology, to a point. The hierarchy
functions as mediators for the faithful inasmuch as they initiate them into the mysteries. The
recipients of this mediation do so in a triad of stages that correspond to the sacramental life.
They are first illuminated in baptism, purified in chrismation, and perfected in their participation
in the Eucharist. 14
The Areopagite’s schema differs from a purely Neoplatonic both in what is being
mediated and how it is mediated. He is not describing an ontological mediation of something the
hierarch has that the faithful do not. It would be a misrepresentation of Dionysius to claim that
his model is one in which the hierarch, the ordained have as their own the sacra postestas power

O’Meara, Theology of Ministry 99, 292 fn14.
A short note about terminology: (1) The concept of hierarchy should not be saddled with the cultural baggage that
the term represents within our early 21st Century usage, something akin to a social rank or pecking order. Instead, it
should be understood as combination of Greek hieros “sacred” and arche “source or origin.” (2) I continue to use the
term “sacra potestas” because it is used within the literature on the laity. The phrase itself does not appear in
Dionysius though the concept could be analogous to what he describes as the “power of consecration” the activity
by which the hierarchy initiates the faithful into the mysteries. Ecclesial Hierarchy, 505D. A key part of my
argument is that the objectified version of sacra postestas does not exist in Dionysius and is thus not inherited by
Maximus.
14
EH 3.1.424D, see Nikolaos Loudovikos, Church in the Making (Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2016),
39.
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of mediation that is theirs to exercise. This would be an objectification of that power. While the
Areopagite describes the hierarchy itself in an ontological manner, the sacred never becomes the
possession of the clergy. The divine energy always belongs to God alone. Instead of the passing
along of an ontological power that can be possessed, Dionysius describes a mediation based
upon participation. Though the hierarchy itself is an ontological ordering, the act of mediation
does not pass on something of its own ontology, as would be the case in Neoplatonic emanation.
The Neoplatonic concept of emanation, as it is found in Procleus and others, includes the
transmission of being from superior to subordinate beings. The Proclean model based the
passing of the sacred upon the ontological order from higher levels to inferior entities. 15 What is
communicated is from the ontologically greater to the ontologically lesser which can have only a
lesser share due to their nature. Those receiving from the hierarchy are dependent on those
above and have no share in the ultimate source of being as such. They only receive what is
passed on to them from the higher, those above them in the hierarchy, making them necessarily
passive and of lesser value. The proper foil for the arguments and concerns of O’Meara et al is
the Proclean understanding of hierarchy.
Dionysius’ model differs in both what is mediated and how it is mediated. First, what is
mediated is not a share in “being” filtered down through hierarchical descent but an
undifferentiated share in the purifying divine activity (energeia). 16 This act of mediation is not
one that involves an ontological stepping down and a flowing from more to less. It is not an
ontologically reduced facsimile. It is the participation in the whole of irreducible divinity. The

See Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon, eds., Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1987), 445-577. 1089.17-1239.21 See also Elias Tempelis and Christos Terezis, "The
Presence of Proclus in George Pachymeres’ Paraphrase of Ps.-Dionysius’ De Divinis Nominibus," in Proclus and
his Legacy, ed. David D. Butorac and Danielle A. Layne (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2017), 272 fn3.
16
Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 35.
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divine activity participated in is not the possession of the hierarchy or the faithful which is why
we cannot speak in any sense of a passive reception but an active participation. Initiation into
these mysteries can in no way be a passive process because it is an initialization of that same
dynamic divine activity in the individual. This activity, or in Dionysian terms energeia, never
ceases to be the activity of God alone who operates through the hierarchy that serves as an icon,
ever pointing through itself to the ultimate source. This is a distinctly Christian view of
hierarchy that differs from earlier Neoplatonic views which would consider not only the source
but each stage in the hierarchy as divine. 17
A proper understanding of the Dionysian process of consecration/deification then is one
in which the hierarchy remains distinct from those being initiated as to their functional role as
consecrators. This function does not grant them a higher share in the sacred than the recipient.
As utter mystery and simplicity, God cannot be divided. Participation in God is likewise not to
be divided. The sacred is never portrayed as the possession of the hierarchy. The result is not a
dependency upon the hierarchy for access to God but an equal share in relationship to the divine.
The notion of participation clearly differentiates the Dionysian hierarchy from the
Proclean. There is a tension between the divine activity and the Areopagite’s emphasis on
ecclesial structure and function. The latter can tempt us to lose sight of the unity of divine
activity. Loudovikos notes that Dionysius’ apophatic approach to divine activity, expressed in
the charisms which interpenetrate one another, is overshadowed by the clear and distinct

Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 36. See also Cooper who notes: “In Dionysius the word (draw ‘elkuso’ via Jn
12:32) comprehends the totality of the function of the Church’s sacerdotal office in which the hierarch - the bishopserves as a mediating ray for the assimilation to God of all the orderly ranks under him. This of course indicates that
Dionysius, and Maximus following him, understood the notion of hierarchy differently form the way it is popularly
understood today.” Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus, 174. and Harper following Louth: “whereas the modern
understanding of hierarchy stresses separation and exclusion, for Denys it connotes inclusion and union.” Harper,
The Analogy of Love, 116.
17
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functional designations of the hierarchy. 18 Decoupled from the apophatic, this structure stands as
an objectified edifice, ripe for misinterpretation as an ontologically ordered descending
hierarchy.
Does Maximus’ own understanding of mediation and hierarchy draw similar emphases?
The structural elements and descriptions are suspiciously absent in the Confessor’s own
ecclesiological reflections. Constas notes that Maximus does not use the term “hierarchy” once
within his writings. Given the ubiquity of the term in the Dionysian corpus and the multiplicity
of other terms Maximus adopts from the Areopagite, Constas sees this omission as a “tacit
rejection” of the very structural notion of hierarchy. 19 This of course would require a nefarious
reading of the praise offered by the Confessor of Dionysius’ Ecclesial Hierarchy at the outset of
his own Mystagogy.20
Without interpreting the omission of hierarchy as a rejection of the concept in toto, we
can at least say that what Dionysius emphasized, Maximus deemphasized. Loudovikos writes
that Maximus does not reject Dionysian hierarchy as much as he goes beyond it. 21 The central
point of the Confessor’s position is familiar to us, drawing from the first chapters of the
Mystagogy: the Church acts as God acts, in a participative manner and does nothing apart from
this divine activity. 22 Where Dionysius is concerned with drawing out the particularity of
distinction, Maximus draws together consubstantial unity in action. This does not mean the
dissolution of difference and the creation of a confused amalgam. We do well to remember that
the Confessor’s thought has a Chalcedonian grounding. The differences of the individuals are

Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 42.
Maximos Constas, "Maximus the Confessor, Dionysius the Areopagite, and the Transformation of Christian
Neoplatonism," Analogia 2, no. 1 (2017): 4.
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united in a characteristically Chalcedonian manner into the one body that is the Church.
Loudovikos proposes an understanding of this that holds in tension the preservation of individual
members in light of the whole: “The Church, I would therefore say, is the eschatological mode of
the human person’s unity, whereas the human person is the consubstantial mode of the unity of
the Church.” 23 This concept of consubstantiality is key to Loudovikos’ interpretation of the
Confessor. This is necessary since Maximus recognizes priests as mediators of deification, does
not explicitly reject an ecclesial ordering that could be understood in a hierarchical manner,
while at the same time affirming the participation of each individual in the one divine activity
that is consonant with deification. Maximus’ description of the unity of the Church as a human
being lends itself to being described in a consubstantial way. While we might point toward a
hierarchy of functions within a body, the body acts as a single unity. That is to say, the actions
of the body are carried out with the same energy, expressions of the same person in a
consubstantial manner. These activities, though they can be individually recognized, are actions
united in substance: “And each of the Church’s energies or charisms is spiritually validated only
as a manifestation of a complete likeness to the specific divine energy to which it corresponds,
since it expresses the whole of this energy and it alone.” 24 The interpenetrating consubstantiality
of the actions of the whole Church allows for the expression of unity that Maximus affirms in his
ecclesiological writings.

Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 46.
Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 47. We should also note that when speaking of the unity of the charisms we
are not envisioning a body that is the sum of its parts. The interpenetrative nature of charism is apophatic in itself
since it is necessary to recognize certain functions but impossible to separate them from one another. As
Loudovikos writes: “every charism is the whole of ecclesial being.” In this analysis, the structures of the Church are
not conceived of as “being” but “becoming” as such the hierarchical functionality is not a reflection of the eternal
but the means by which all are to enter into that same unity. Here the hierarchy exists not to be enshrined over all
but to constantly fulfill its task of drawing in all to become members of the apophatic unity and participants in the
divine activity. See Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 49-50.
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At the heart of this consubstantiality is Maximus’ concern for both divine unity and the
unity of the Church. Cooper notes that a central feature of Maximus’ thought is the “baptismal
unity” described by Paul in Galatians 3:28: “there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male
and female, for you are all one in Christ.” Due to the consubstantiality of the charisms, this unity
is not impeded by differing ecclesial rank but facilitated by it. 25
We have come full circle to the concerns for ecclesial unity found within the postconciliar literature. Would Maximus recognize the ecclesial dichotomy of lay/clergy in a manner
that can be comprehended by the conversation surrounding Vatican II? Our response must be
both yes and no. The answer is yes in the affirmation of general categories of hierarchy/clergy
and lay/faithful. It must be no if we have in mind an ontological ordering that values the
charisms bestowed on the hierarchy in a way that would put it over and above the charisms
received by the faithful. The unity of the charisms forbids this. Yet the Confessor can still see
the hierarchy as a means for consecration and initiation. The recognition of each of the charisms
containing all charisms within them in an apophatic unity guards against an idealistic dichotomy
in favor of a consubstantial unity.

B. Ecclesial Distinction and Structure
We must be cautious here to delineate between definitions of ecclesial structure and lay
activity. There is scant reflection upon lay activity in the development school. When it is
mentioned, the whole maximian idea of humanity acting as a mediator is rejected for reasons we
have discussed at length. Concerning ecclesiological structure, Maximus and the developmental
school (specifically Hahnenberg and Gaillardetz) hold much in common.
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Maximus’ thought is generally compatible with Hahnenberg. The two thinkers share the
view that the activity of the clergy and the laity are of profound value. A major difficulty in
reconciling Maximus with Hahnenberg is that the Confessor would still draw a solid line of
demarcation between the types of activity undertaken by the hierarchy and those of the laity.
The difference is that Maximus would not see this as a lessening of the dignity of lay activity but
as a proper expression of the one charism manifest in the particularity of their activity. Maximus
may agree with Hahnenberg that the clergy are only so in light of their relationship to the
community but would argue that this relationship is characterized by a distinct activity, an
expression of the one charism. The “dividing line model” looks different from the Confessor’s
theological framework. In Hahnenberg this distinction is seen as the root for separation, in
Maximus it is an expression of unity in diversity.
Maximus’ pneumatological emphasis is similarly inseparable from his Christological
theology of the Logos. The charismatic activity of the Church is the result of the response to the
logoi. The pneumatological frame of reference is interchangeable with the Christological mode.
The dynamic of charism and logoi are one in the same due to the perichoretic nature of
Trinitarian activity. This theological reflection demonstrates the point on the unity of the
charisms. Just as the logoi participate in the one Logos, so the charisms as they are lived share in
the one anointing of the Spirit open to all the baptized. In Maximus’ thought one can in no way
deemphasize the Christological in favor of the pneumatological.
The post-conciliar trajectory discerned by Gaillardetz seems compatible with Maximus’
thought. By Gaillardetz’s evaluation, the council’s thought was moving “strongly in the direction
of simply identifying laicus as the normal situation of the practicing Christian who seeks in their
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daily life to bring all of history to its fulfillment in Christ.” 26 We would find particular agreement
in the description of the micro-eschatological eucharistic exchange as portrayed by Maximus and
the common activity of daily life expressed in Gaillardetz. The clergy/hierarchy would share in
this role but would also carry out those extra responsibilities that are particular to their state.
What is at issue in Gaillardetz is not the special mission of the clergy, which he affirms to an
extent but the existence of a special mission of the laity.

C. The Secular and the Sacred
In a radical departure from preceding expressions of ecclesiological structure, Doohan
declares the term laity “theologically dead.” 27 Doohan precedes Gaillardetz and shares the basic
concept of the lay now occupying the position of common membership within the Church. As
Doohan puts it “the laity are Church.” 28 We could expect that Maximus may agree with this
thought which is directed by a general thrust of equality among ecclesial members due to the
dignity of baptism. Doohan’s rejection of “laity” as a category is also based upon the
observation that it leaves the vast majority as passive recipients of clerical ministry. Maximus’
view does not approximate the caricature of hierarchy that sets up the clergy as an ontologically
superior class to the laity. The Confessor would equally take issue with the description of any
participant in the Christian life as “passive.” As we have seen, every member the Church in
Maximus’ outlook is in communion with and participates in the same deifying life of God. As
we have outlined in our last chapter, every Christian, clergy and laity alike, are active
participants in the Eucharistic reciprocity that is the individual’s dialogue with God as well as the
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core of ecclesial identity. The participative communion that forms the basis of this reciprocity,
culminated in liturgical action, is always an active participation. Maximus describes the
eschaton as a continuation of this activity. The liturgical offering of creation to God does not
come to a final resolution but is transposed into the eternal communion with God: ever-movingrepose.
Doohan had considered a view similar to Maximus’ in the overview of lay theology at the
outset of The Lay Centered Church. While he lauded attempts to reframe the life of the laity as
an engagement with the world founded on the value of creation, he thought that the position
would be incomprehensible to the vast majority of the faithful:
A basic problem in this theology of laity is that it demands a radical conversion in the
way one understands the essential contribution of earthly life to salvation. Many people
find it difficult even to admit the need for such conversion, for “that the earthly and
heavenly city penetrate each other is a fact accessible to faith alone.” 29
Though Doohan does not reject this mode of thinking outright, he leaves it undeveloped in favor
of the ecclesiocentric “laity as Church” model he pursues throughout the rest of the work.
The difficulty noted by Doohan contains within it a kernel of argument that finds its
realization in the secular/sacred dichotomy. 30 Recall that the line of argument expands the
lay/clergy distinction to their relevant spheres of secular/sacred which imply that there must be a
similar line of demarcation between the world and God. The parallels between these
dichotomies are clear but we must ask whether affirming one necessarily brings about the others.
This is important because over the course of the fifty years that followed the council the
literature on the laity attempted to undo these contrastive pairs. The argument tends to flow both
ways: recognizing God’s presence in the world does away with the conceptual notion of separate

Doohan, The Lay-Centered Church, 15.
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sacred and secular realities which makes the distinction between laity and clergy moot. This
would include exercise of sacra potestas which is always referred to in a divisive manner. The
development of the argument in ecclesiological spheres often follows an inverse order: all of the
baptized are equal meaning that there should be no distinction between laity and clergy, there can
be then no demarcation between sacred and secular activity which means that one cannot
distinguish between God’s presence and the world. The result is always a doing away of
distinction in order to avoid separation.
For Doohan this means moving beyond the notion of laity as a distinct set of the faithful
since the laity act as Church. Gaillardetz’s point of departure is not the work of the clergy but
the so-called secular character of the laity, writing that the identification of lay action with action
in the world creates disparity with the clergy who are concerned with the sacred. 31 Claiming the
laity work in the world implies that they do not work in the sacred which demeans their
baptismal dignity. The same dynamic leads O’Meara to rid his ecclesiological view of sacral,
priestly language and replace it with the non-dichotic vocabulary of mission, service, and
relationship. This lens is placed in juxtaposition with mediation: “Ministry approaches the reign
of God not as high priest or banker but as servant.” 32 The dichotomy of world/God is directly
related to this. The efficacy of individual sacraments, the work of the clergy/hierarchy, are
overshadowed now by the sacramental nature of the world qua Rahner’s circles of grace. 33 The
clergy are not proprietors of graced reality because reality — the Church as sacrament in
particular and the world as creation — is already graced.
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Lakeland plays these arguments out to their logical conclusion. In The Liberation of the
Laity, Lakeland assumes this post-conciliar theological shift, that nature is already graced, as his
point of departure. 34 This radically reconfigures the mission of the Church and his conception of
ecclesiology: the means and goal are already embedded within creation and God’s mission for
humanity consists in “the humanization of the world.” 35 Lakeland’s view is simultaneously a
playing out of and a reaction to the authors that came before him. If the post-Vatican II literature
solves the dichotomy of the secular/sacred by overemphasizing intra-ecclesial activity, making
everything ecclesial-sacred activity, Lakeland solves it by highlighting the secular, making every
action a secular one.
This begets a self-contained vision of creation which would be violated by mediatory
activity. Indeed, Lakeland’s view of priesthood and mediation is one in which the priest (in all
senses of the term) “ferries back and forth between God and the world.” 36 A world that is selfcontained, “self-sufficient,” is in no need of mediation since there is nothing to be added. “The
secularity of the world is the divine plan.” 37 To admit such a mediation would be to denigrate the
status of the self-sufficient secular into one of dependency. Lakeland admits that the world is
dependent on God as its cause and architect but reminds us that God abides in the world in a
graced way. The graced status of the world is constitutive of its self-sufficiency and allows it,
for Lakeland, to be self-referential. To fulfill human nature is then not a seeking of something
that is outside of the world, for in this there would be a regression to the sacred/secular,
world/God dichotomy. Instead, the mission is one of free action and human promotion. This
action is good in and of itself as part of the secular, graced world. Lakeland asserts that these
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actions should be self-referential only. Any reasoning or reduction of these actions to an exterior
referent would do violence to them, it would “compromise its graced character in the name of
something supposedly more fundamental.” 38
In seeking a solution to the secular/sacred dichotomy, Lakeland has traced a cosmology
that shares many characteristics with the maximian view. First, both affirm God’s presence is
within all of creation in a way that allows it to fulfill its very nature. God’s presence is
embedded within creation, for Maximus as the logoi and for Lakeland as the grounding of
graced-created reality. Both champion freedom of human action. Freedom is an extraordinary
good intended by God in the order of creation, it should be valued and fostered. Lakeland’s
liberation of the secular world is an affirmation of this freedom while Maximus sees in this
freedom the very image of God. The world, creation (in Lakeland’s terms, the “secular”) is good
in its own right. In Maximus, it is a gift from God that should become the subject of freedom.
This point of convergence is where their cosmologies part ways. Lakeland’s view holds
that there is no reason “behind” the secular, that secular reality is the reason. For Maximus the
Logos is always present within creation as the logoi. God is not simply “behind” creation, for
the Confessor God stands before creation as its eschatological goal.
Lakeland’s description of the secular would be virtually the same as Maximus’ if we strip
the Confessor’s view of dialogic reciprocity. God creates the cosmos as good and humanity with
the good nature, logoi, embedded in them to be acted upon freely. In this portrait there is no
continued relationship. God simply abides. This is not a cold deism, but a lukewarm affirmation
of humanity’s affairs deprived of further aspiration.
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Eschatological vision is driven from Lakeland’s cosmology because it makes the world
about something other than the world. This is done to protect the world from being cut up into
two distinct spheres: the secular and the sacred. To say that the world has a further goal is to
admit this separation from God which is, for Lakeland, the root of hatred for the world. 39
maximian thought provides us with an alternative to this view. The Confessor dealt with
the world/God dichotomy by transcending it. As we have seen, the doctrine of the logoi allows
Maximus to affirm the goodness of creation in a radical way while setting it firmly on the path of
eschatological fulfillment. The Confessor’s cosmology was forged as a response to Origenism.
It is a protection against a negative view of the world seen as a punishment or a corruption of
God’s plan while at the same time maintaining a clear distinction between God and the world. In
Maximus’ view, the world participates in God by its very creation in the logoi. This logic trends
toward a unity-in-distinction that requires us to constantly hold in tension the distinction between
God and the world while affirming God’s presence to each individual being and the whole of
created being through the logoi. This distinction is the apophatic foundation of Maximus’
thought: the distinction between God and the world becomes the guarantee that all of creation
can participate in a dialogue between God and the world.
Mediation takes on a different meaning in this context. It is not needed to uphold the
goodness of creation. The ontological divide between God and the world is not a chasm of
goodness but of finite versus infinite being. The contingent nature of the world, which is an
affirmation of God’s creation of the world in freedom, does not devalue creation but allows God
to perpetually uphold its goodness through participation in the divine. The task of mediation is
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not a bestowal of goodness onto creation but a crossing of this ontological divide via relationship
in a manner that does not cancel out the autonomy of the world or any of its inhabitants.
Dialogic reciprocity encapsulates the maximian alternative. The eucharistic exchange of
gifts in charity does no violence to nature or claim that the world need be hated or done away
with. On the contrary, the dynamic of exchange and mediation in Maximus takes the form of a
constant relationship that uplifts creation toward its eschatological fulfillment which is eternal
well-being with God. Conversion in the maximian schema does not leave the world behind in
favor of God nor does it insinuate that the world is lacking something that is proper to it.
maximian deification does not make mediation as a means to an end but recognizes this active
exchange as constitutive of communion with God. Mediation does not bring something into
creation that is not already there. It allows creation to be creation in all of its goodness. What is
changed in Maximus’ schema is the mode, the way of being creation. The introduction of the
divine tropos into creation allows creatures to act freely not in isolation or as passive recipients
but in participative eucharistic communion that is the very act of deification.

II. Vatican II’s Description of the Lay Vocation and Maximus
Up to this point we have reflected on the post-conciliar developments of the role of the
laity, specifically the possibility that Lumen Gentium’s description of the laity leads to a series of
harmful dichotomies. Maximus’ theological vision provides a way to transcend these
dichotomies with his characteristic Chalcedonian logic. This logic emphasizes unity based upon
distinction based in relationship. At its center is the vision of Eucharistic reciprocity.
We turn now to the conciliar texts and the subsequent interpretations of them by the
magisterium. Our aim will be a dialogue between the maximian system and these sources.
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Maximus’ nuanced system of theology helps to clarify the vision of the council and stands as a
solid foundation from which it can be interpreted.
In the first chapter of this work, I outlined the council’s teaching on the Church as a
unified structure of three distinct groups of members: the clergy, religious, and the laity. All
together these make up the collective faithful of the Church or in the phrase most used by the
document to describe the Church “the People of God.” 40 The document is intentionally
structured in a way that emphasizes this unity. There is not a diversity of missions but all
participate in the one mission of the Church. The mission is one of unity through the Spirit that
works in every member of the People of God. 41 This view is groundbreaking in its recognition of
the laity as sharers in this mission and not mere instruments of the hierarchy.
Lumen Gentium, later affirmed by both Apostolicum Actualisitatem and Gaudium et Spes,
describes the laity by their activity within the world as the norm of their identity and mission.
The special task of the laity is “to order and to throw light upon these affairs in such a way that
they may come into being and then continually increase according to Christ to the praise of the
Creator and the Redeemer.” 42 Constitutive of this task are the daily lives of the laity and their
participation in temporal affairs. Though the document describes this work as being done in a
spirit of witness, it has a value in and of itself as an ordering of the world to God. 43 This work is
an expression of the laity’s share in the office of priesthood. The secular activity of the laity is
united to the one offering of the Church which culminates in the celebration of the Eucharist. 44
In this very act the laity are said to “consecrate the world itself to God.” 45
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Two of the most often critiqued aspects on the council’s description of the laity are
present here. First, though the conciliar fathers made an explicit effort to avoid a stratification of
roles within the Church, as we described in chapter one, this is exactly how some received the
description of the three states. Similarly, the description of lay activity as secular with the
purpose of consecrating the world to God led to the prevailing critique that the council was
making an attempt at delineating clear and separate spheres of activity for the clergy and laity.
This interpretation took hold despite the conciliar text explicitly rejecting the separation of these
spheres. 46 The post-conciliar literature is proof enough that the documents leave themselves open
to such an interpretation even if the source of this interpretation is the lived experience of Church
members during the post-conciliar period and not the documents themselves.
We explored the response of the magisterial school to these developments in John Paul
II’s Christifideles Laici. This post-synodal exhortation did not grant the theological grounding
asked for by the fathers of the synod but was a reiteration of the teachings of LG along with
correctives and further clarifications about the proper roles belonging to the laity within the
Church. There is a distinct focus on complementarity within the document, underscoring the
unity of action described in LG. John Paul II cautions against confusing these roles since doing
so would break down this complementarity. 47 Following this line of thought, the Pope draws a
sharper distinction between the work of lay persons in the Church and the ordained, noting that
their priesthood differs “not simply in degree but in essence.” 48 Though John Paul II explains
that this is ultimately for the sake of unity and complementarity among the Body, it is not
difficult to see how it could be received as a further distinction between secular and sacred
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spheres of activity. Though complementarity is the theme, the focus is a reiteration of the proper
ordering of offices and roles within the Church.
It could be argued that the refrain of complementarity agrees with the maximian portrayal
of the apophatic expression of the one charism in the many activities of the Church even though
the topic of the Church’s one charism is not clearly treated within the text. To further facilitate
the application of Maximus’ thought we can draw a parallel between CL and Dionysius’
Ecclesial Hierarchy: both are primarily concerned with the right organization of the Church.
Due to the centrality of this issue, each work lends itself to the interpretation that their goal is to
uphold separations. In turn, they could both be accused of drawing sharp dichotomies where
there should be only be distinction. In the case of CL, the desire for a definitive theological
definition is neglected by a pressing concern for order in response to specific situations. Any
deeper grounding based upon complementarity and a vision of the Church acting as a whole is
eclipsed by the attention paid to basic questions about ecclesiological roles and functions.
This parallel lends itself to an application of Maximus’ wider ecclesiological vision
similar to how the Confessor deemphasized the structural imagery found in Dionysius. Because
Maximus does not share this structural concern, I propose that viewing the conciliar descriptions
of the laity through the maximian lens developed in chapters two and three provides the deep
theological grounding desired by the bishops who attended the synod on the laity. Here we are
less concerned with a detailed mapping of ecclesial roles and more interested in providing a
theological context for lay activity.
We should be clear here that there are no direct references to Maximus in the Vatican II
documents nor that we would be able to derive the conciliar description of the laity from the
works of the sixth century monk and mystic. It goes without saying, then, that this is not an
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argument for the proper interpretation of the council as though the thought of Maximus were
linked to it as a source or stands as the ultimate authority behind its validity. Neither should this
be taken as a reproof of the conciliar texts. The scope of these documents, even on such specific
topics as the laity or the mission of the Church are far too wide to contain all of the detail
necessary to provide a thorough account of the underlying theologies. We should expect that the
documents are themselves embedded within the larger tradition of the Church.
With this in mind, the task we mean to accomplish is a contextualizing of this description
of the laity in a way that grounds it in the Confessor’s profound vision of the cosmos. As we
have seen, the maximian vision resists the temptation to dichotomize distinctions into
differences. The post-conciliar literature was prudent in pointing out the possibilities and
eventualities involved in a dichotomous interpretation. Reinterpreting the conciliar text within
the framework of cosmos and mediation outlined in the previous chapters helps us to navigate
beyond the dichotomies that threaten the underlying message of ecclesial unity found in the
conciliar documents. The maximian lens will bring into sharper relief the task of the laity and
expand upon it so that it is not susceptible to accusations that it is too vague an enterprise to
carry out. 49
In the first chapter, we noted that the documents outlining lay activity in the world often
viewed the world in a variety of ways. These spanned a gamut of definitions from one of
alienation wherein the world was seen as opposed to the Church’s mission to the neutral setting
in which the affairs of human life transpire in the secular as the subject of God’s plan. Each of
these plays a part within the maximian framework of God’s presence in the world through the
logoi. Though we can say with surety that the creation of the world in and through the Logos
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and the abiding presence of the logoi make the whole of creation enduringly good we can see
room for where the negative description of the world could be used in a maximian context. The
world as opposed to God’s plan only exists where it has cast off its underlying identity and
trajectory. The world as created is always good but if, through the free choice of seeking to
subvert the abiding logoi in resisting its nature, even this good creation can reject God’s plan.
The rejection of the embedded logos of a particular being threatens it with non-being.
Attempting to replace the logos destroys that being. 50 This means that the ecclesial mission to the
world is not one that is against creation but is ever for creation. If ever Maximus were to speak
of creation opposed to the plan of God it is only in the context of inviting creation to return to
natural action according to the logoi.
The same participation in the logoi plays out as a rejection of the world as a so-called
neutral sphere of activity. Yes, choices can be made in which the logoi are lived out or resisted
but ultimately the nature of the world points toward its source in the one Logos. Maximus’
theological vision is the concrete affirmation of the third view of the world listed here: it stands
as the ultimate subject of God’s plan. This view is consummately expressed in the now familiar
description of the divine desire: “the Logos of God (who is God) wills always and in all things to
accomplish the mystery of his embodiment.” 51 The mission of the Church is soteriological but
also eschatological, transcending the very notion of bringing about healing to a prior state of
goodness. The work of redemption is inseparable from the work of deification. The affirmation
of the good world is not negated in the activity of the Church or its members but is ultimately the
proper end of the indwelling logoi. Thus, we can only admit an understanding of the “secular”
within Maximus that is inscribed with this ultimate eschatological end. This is not limited to
50
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actions, situations, or spheres that have an express ecclesiological or sacral meaning. It would be
fitting to stress the presence of the logoi in the particularized obscurity of mundane situations
and activities. Here we find tremendous overlap of Maximus’ thought and what is described as
secular: the “ordinary married and family life, their daily occupations, their physical and mental
relaxation ... and even the hardships of life...” 52 Every facet of creation and activity is an
encounter and potential moment in this process of deification.
A crucial point for correctly representing the maximian dynamic is to hold in tension the
ontological difference between God and the world without setting up a God/world dichotomy.
We discussed above how this ontological distance is rooted in the Confessor’s mystical theology.
This in no way sets up a competition between God and the world such that where God is the
world is not or vice-versa. On the contrary, the ontological distance allows for God to both
transcend of all creation and be intimately present to all of creation in the logoi. Ontological
distance in Maximus’ schema facilitates the communion between God and the world. Creatures
always remain ontologically creature but through communion with God act in a new mode. The
distinction between logos and tropos enables Maximus to describe how created realities are
transformed in their mode of activity while retaining their own logoi/nature. The preservation of
their nature allows created beings to enjoy participative communion with God. A theology that
admitted the breakdown of the distinction between God and the world would be one in which the
communion would last for a finite interval. Alternative models of divinization would see the
absorption or annihilation of creation as part of this process. Not so for Maximus. The
definition of communion and divinization for the Confessor is a thoroughly Chalcedonian one
that it is without confusion, without separation, without change, and without division. Modeled
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after the hypostatic union, the eternal exchange between persons does not allow the dialogue of
God and creation to break down into a divine monologue.
Ontological distance as facilitator of communion means that tasks and beings in the
world are distinct but not separate from God. The logic of the tasks and actions remain the same
when transformed into divine activity through their change in tropos. The world and the actions
that take place within it never cease being secular in the sense that their subject and practical
activity appear the same as actions that are non-deified. The baker, the businessperson, the truck
driver, the artist, and parent all perform the same activity but in a new mode. Maximus’
theological vision of the logoi acknowledges God’s presence already in these tasks in a noncompetitive manner. Yet the eschatological invitation to deification allows this activity to
become divine activity. The important point for us at this juncture is that the world and the tasks
within it, though transformed in tropos, still function and retain the identity as created. The
ontological distinction and distance do not create a stumbling block for this communion.
Distinction is the guarantor of communion.
The maximian theology of the cosmos offers us an important interpretive lens for our
engagement with the Vatican II text. It singles out a definitive description of the world as the
subject of God’s plan which in its deepest identity can in no way play the part of an antagonist in
a drama that pits God against the world. Neither is the world a mere blank slate, a neutral
ground for action. Even so, the world is ever distinct from God. Encompassing all of creation, it
remains distinct and avoids dialectic absorption or annihilation by the divine in favor of
remaining a dialogic partner with God. We have seen Maximus express this on a macro-level.
He uses the image of a single human person in worship to describe the whole world. He uses the
cosmos in a way that it is interchangeable with the Church in its role in eucharistic dialogic
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reciprocity. This does not mean that the individual is forgotten. In characteristic maximian
fashion, the Confessor retains the individuality of every distinct person, forbidding us to lose
sight of them in light of the vastness of creation. As we have seen the macro-dynamic of
dialogue is based upon the micro-dialogues between God and individuals.
Grounding the interpretation of Vatican II in maximian thought also assists us in a
descriptive manner. The understanding that it is the tropos of activity that changes and not the
type of activity affirms the wide scope of human action present within the laity. Maximus
describes this diversity in his ecclesiological reflection:

For numerous and almost infinite number are the men, women and children who are
distinct from one another and vastly different by birth appearance, by nationality and
language, by customs and age, by opinions and skills, by manners and habits by pursuits
and studies and still again by reputation, fortune, characteristics and connections. All are
born into the Church and through her are reborn and recreated in the Spirit. To all in
equal measure she gives and bestows one divine form and designation, to be Christ’s and
to carry his name. 53

The many members who bear the divine name share in the same divinized tropos but through
their own logoi. The diversity in action does not negate a share in the one divine activity.
Maximus is not scandalized that these differences perdure in the midst of the deifying Church
but rather relishes the variety of expressions in the Spirit.
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Within this diversity, the council recognizes distinction. How does the lay/clergy
distinction appear through our maximian lens? The relationship between laity and clergy is
spelled out in LG 32. This passage identifies the clergy in a way that is consonant with
maximian thought: they are “dispensers of mysteries on behalf of others.” 54 A performative
example of this can be found in the Mystagogy. Beginning with the reading of the Gospel,
Maximus identifies the priest with “the spiritual Word of contemplation.” 55 The procession of
the priest toward the people with the Gospel is an image of the Incarnation the Word “coming
from heaven to dwell with his people.” The Confessor so closely identifies the priest with the
Word that the text no longer makes mention of the priest as an individual but recounts all of the
ritual actions undertaken by the priest as actions of the Word. This continues throughout the
most profound moments of the Divine Liturgy, the revelation of the mysteries, the chanting of
the Trisagion, through the conclusion of the Liturgy in the singing of “One is Holy.” In all these
things, the priest acts as the Word, undifferentiated by Maximus as the agent who leads the
faithful to deification through participation. As with the discussion of Dionysian mediation
above, understanding the role of the clergy as primarily initiators into the mystery of Christ does
not place them in a persistent power dynamic. Even in their mediatory role, the clergy’s share in
Christ is a participative share that can be relinquished, as we shall explore below.
In this same passage of LG, the clergy are given the task of “teaching ... sanctifying ...
ruling.” This final task has no maximian parallel, making it difficult to understand the concept of
“ruling with the authority of Christ” within the maximian framework. In the context of LG,
ruling is always connected to the visible structure of the Church which requires some form of
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practical governance. 56 Governance is understood as the facilitating of growth in Christ in a way
that is consistent with the role of clergy, especially bishops, named by Hahnenberg. They are the
sign of unity for Christian community and foster the growth and exercise of the charisms. LG
likens the role of governance to that of a father and shepherd who is always prepared to lay down
his life for those under his care. 57
In their role as the visible rulers of the Church, the clergy are not the source or ultimate
authority. As with Maximus’ understanding of mediation being a participative union in Christ so
LG describes the mode of governance exercised by the clergy. Though they are “ruled by human
shepherds; are nevertheless continuously led and nourished by Christ Himself.” 58 Drawing a
parallel between the maximian understanding of mediation allows us to frame governance as
something other than a claim to power or the establishment of ruling clerics who oppress the
majority of the faithful. Governance that is understood as a theandric task that is only properly
exercised legitimately if it has a share in the participative union with Christ would deprive the
clergy of an objective claim to authority. Maximus’ relationship with eastern and western
ecclesial authority is a narrative example of this dynamic in action.
During his final years, the height of the monothelite controversy, Maximus proffered his
obedience to Pope Martin I and his predecessor Theodore I over the eastern patriarchate not as a
statement about papal primacy but based upon Christological orthodoxy. The account of the
Confessor’s trial demonstrates that ecclesial communion and authority was one of his
prosecutors’ primary concerns. They asked Maximus to accept their Christological definitions
not out of a concern for right-belief but due to concerns over ecclesial communion, berating the
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Confessor as a stumbling block to that unity. 59 The prosecutors’ plea with Maximus continues
until it reaches a crescendo: “Why do you love the Romans and hate the Greeks?” They ask, to
which Maximus responds: “We have a precept which says not to hate anyone. I love the Romans
as those who share the same faith, and the Greeks as sharing the same language.” 60 With this
final rejection of communion with the east, Maximus sealed his ecclesiological allegiance as well
as his fate as a confessor.
Maximus did not tacitly accept the doctrinal authority of the eastern clergy, he recognized
their error. Christological orthodoxy was the rule by which he judged ecclesial communion. In
turn we could conclude that this communion affects his view of ecclesial authority. The eastern
patriarchs and clergy did not possess this authority ex officio but due to their communion with
the reality from which that authority flowed.
Just as the laity have so long been deemed “sharers” in the mission and work of the
apostolic Church which had been previously seen as the proper role of the hierarchy, here the
hierarchy itself becomes a “sharer” in the governance of Christ insofar as they themselves have
been drawn into divine life. We could illuminate this concept further by offering the negation of
LG 6: If Christ is no longer the one who is continuously nourishing and leading the laity in the
actions of the clergy, the human shepherds have no claim to authority. 61
The document concludes the description of the lay/clergy relationship by quoting St.
Augustine of Hippo: “What I am for you terrifies me; what I am with you consoles me. For you I
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am a bishop; with you I am a Christian. 62 This indicates not only what is the cause of
Augustine’s trepidation - the role of the Bishop - but what he and all clergy share in common
with the laity, their role as Christians. As the following section 33 unfolds we are ready to affirm
something that is implicit within Maximus’ schema. In their participation in Christian life, the
laity do not so much share a task that is exclusive to their state as much as they carry out the task
of the one Church in a distinctive place and manner. This constitutes the laity’s proper role in
the apostolate. Their own work is a participation in Christ since they “expend all their energy for
the growth of the Church and its continuous sanctification, since this very energy is a gift of the
Creator and a blessing of the Redeemer. 63 This mission is specifically to “make the Church
present and operative in those places and circumstances where only through them can it become
the salt the earth.” 64 Once again, the task itself is not a separate one, it is rather the individuated
expression and the location in this time, in this place that make up the laity’s irreplaceable
contribution. A multiplication of the clergy would not be fit to execute the task of the laity. The
laity do not simply make up for what is lacking in clerical number, effort, or ability. Following
the doctrine of the logoi, each member of the faithful has at the center of their life an exclusive
micro-dialogue that they alone can carry out in the unique milieu they occupy.
Maximus’ theology can serve as an interpretive key for understanding the laity’s place in
LG 34’s consummate image of the lay priesthood: consecrating the world itself to God.
For all their works, prayers and apostolic endeavors, their ordinary married and family
life, their daily occupations, their physical and mental relaxation, if carried out in the
Spirit, and even the hardships of life, if patiently borne—all these become ‘spiritual
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sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus Christ’. Together with the offering of the
Lord's body, they are most fittingly offered in the celebration of the Eucharist. Thus, as
those everywhere who adore in holy activity, the laity consecrate the world itself to
God. 65

The following points represent a maximian re-imaging of Vatican II’s theology of the laity.

A. The World Constitutes a Eucharistic Gift
First, our discussion of world consecration must happen with the understanding that the
act implies in no way that mediation somehow devalues the world. Consecration in maximian
terms does not mean introducing a commodity into the world that it was somehow previously
lacking. We find in both the Vatican II documents and Maximus’ cosmology an emphasis on
gathering creation as an offering to be united to the action of the Church.
This text evokes the dynamic of eucharistic reciprocity. We can link the text thematically
to Maximus’ thought in the shared concept of gathering up all of human activity throughout
creation, uniting it to the cosmic liturgy as a eucharistic consecration. The eucharistic nature of
this consecration further distinguishes it from a view of mediation that acts as a sort of
commerce, a trade, or a ferrying of some commodity of grace or ontological being between God
and created beings. Eucharistic action as a rule stems from the free act of thanksgiving and selfoffering to the other. The unitive aspect of Maximus’ approach undergirds this: the one
consecrating in a eucharistic manner gathers up all the various aspects of life as constitutive of
themselves as an offering. For the Confessor, the human vocation of mediation is not a task that
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happens exterior to the person and the deifying communion with God as though it were clear and
distinct offerings of separated realities. Far from a task that casts aside the material for the
spiritual, the action of eucharistic offering takes place in a thoroughly incarnated, embodied
reality. The personal gift offered by humanity cannot be decontextualized from the particularity
of an individual person. Apart from the variety of mundane phenomena that sample human
experience in LG 34 there would be nothing for humanity to offer.
To further clarify this in a maximian framework, the gifts that are gathered, united to the
human person, and offered to God do not happen with the world as a so-called neutral backdrop.
The gifts gathered and eucharistically offered are the embedded logoi which are inseparable from
the particular beings that they abide within. Dialogue as a eucharistic exchange of gifts is
constituted by the offering of logoi presented from the creature to God now with a tropos of gift.
Therefore, the dialogic reciprocity can be in no way extracted from creation in an ideal,
uncreated manner. To be within this reciprocal dynamic means conversing in the key of logoi
which necessarily includes the consecration of created realities to God. To sum up this point,
dialogic reciprocity of the laity does not happen in the midst of the world as some backdrop, it
happens in the world because it is the world itself as constitutive of experiences, relationship and
reality that is offered back to God. It is with this world that humanity acts eucharistically and by
means of the world as created reality that thanksgiving is offered.

B. “Secular Character” As Descriptive of Micro-Dialogue
In this context we are describing in dialogic reciprocity is the underlying action of all
Christians. Maximus tends toward describing Christian action as a unity. Acknowledging a
“secular character” for the laity that uniquely differentiates this activity from that of the clergy
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may not be consistent with his thought. As we have seen, the hierarchical priesthood occupies a
specific place in Maximus’ thought but even the basis of their activity is described within this
eucharistic framework. In fact, it provides the model for the rest of human activity. We can
return to a point made in the analysis of LG’s claims about lay activity: The emphasis of the
document does not set up different spheres but grants individuals with a specific orientation of
mission. The activity of eucharistic offering is held in common by the whole of the Church.
Maximus’ vision for the Christian life as an individuated participation in the cosmic liturgy
reflects this dynamic.
In Maximus we find no affirmation of a task that belongs to the laity alone. There is,
however, the remains of a definition of the laity in a “negative” manner of those who are not
ordained. Yet this is not the return to a dynamic in which the lay life is somehow lessened or
devalued by the lack of an exclusive task. The action of the hierarchy serves the Christian
mission, the lay mission to embody God through the logoi. While the hierarchy participates in
the totality of the shared mission, their activity as mystagogues or the exercise of sacra potestas
is not done for its own sake but as an integrated part of the greater work of God’s embodiment.
This is an important change in ecclesiological perspective since it is not an inclusion in some
alien mission being offered by the hierarchy.
The “secular character” would not connote a specifically lay set of actions but is used to
describe the expansive, extra-ecclesial location of that activity in lay life. Secular character still
communicates something special about the lay faithful: theirs is to execute the mission of God’s
embodiment in themselves and the particular facet of the cosmos that they alone can address.
The deemphasis of secular action in favor of a concentration on interior ecclesial works can lead
to a state in which the reality which the secular character describes is left unaccomplished and
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the vast majority of human activity seen as irrelevant to the mission of the Church. As a
maximian adaption, we can see mundane human activity as individual instances of microdialogue. Though the range of human activity is diverse they participate in a common end often
obscured in particularity. Taking time to map out a role or theology for the graphic artist, the
accountant, the philologist, or the botanist would both grant us too wide a set of experiences and
one that is too narrow. The dialogue happens embedded within the world and as between the
human and the divine on both an individual and collective level. We cannot here discount the
cognitive dissonance noted by Doohan. Tasks in the world tend to be dissociated with ecclesial
activity. A description of the laity should not seek to deepen this perceived rift but show how
this is an unnecessary exclusion. The secular character, then, can be interpreted as a shorthand
for individual micro-dialogues as a reminder that these are constitutive of an individual vocation,
a mission to the world.

C. Humanity’s Gift Expressed in Freedom
An invaluable facet of Maximus’ thought is the championing and description of freedom.
We have seen that for Maximus, the world is created from nothing and given by God out of
freedom. Human response, a mirroring of divine freedom, can reach its divine potential by
offering those same freely created realities back to God in conversion. A maximian
understanding of the consecration of the world to God removes any temptation to view this
return as a fated reditus caused and guaranteed by forces of necessity. The notion of a necessary
return to God is a violation of freedom and threatens to depersonalize humanity into cogs in a
divinely arranged machina. A formulation based on necessity would destroy dialogue and break
down the communion between persons.
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Such a remission of freedom is impossible for Maximus who sees free will as a primary
way in which humanity images God. The Confessor guards this freedom in his eschatological
formulation of the dynamic. God does not impose forces of necessity upon creation but invites it
to free response. The converse of this would be a graced-forcing of creation to unfold in a
certain manner bereft of freedom.
Applied to the life of the laity, the preservation of human freedom is invaluable to a
description of the diversity of lay action. If God’s plan is a free dialogue and not one of
monolithic necessity, the variety of human responses can be understood positively. As we
discussed in chapter two, the logoi as expressions of God’s wills create a space for a multitude of
free human responses. This has two direct consequences: first, it reframes our understanding of
vocation and second it underscores our inability to evaluate how those around us respond to their
own micro-dialogue with God.
Within the maximian model, contemplating one’s vocation contains something of the
“interior dimension” of pre-Vatican II vocational theologies described by Hahnenberg. 66
Maximus affirms a fundamental nature and ordering of the life of the individual as a plan by God
by acknowledging the logoi. The revelatory elements do not take the character of an ossified
“will of God” in one’s life but form that basis of the dialogic relationship. Recall that for
Maximus the logoi that could be interpreted as God’s plan for the individual and the cosmos is
contemplated by God as containing each possibility of one’s response to that logoi. Within this
milieu of change, the stream of dialogue, the manifestation of individual logoi may contain
differing possibilities over the course of one’s life, these logoi penetrate “both our present and
future life, as if they were different generations…” 67 While holding in tension the human
66
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person’s constant ability to live in a manner that rejects the logoi, we affirm that living one’s
vocation is not within this model a simple discovering of what one ought to do and sticking with
it. Living out one’s vocation is a continued dynamic of relationship, the living of that
relationship within the same participative communion of deification.
Even in cases where we have developed discernment in our own manifestation of
dialogic reciprocity, we would expect that the result of the micro-dialogue between God and our
neighbor would be different. These differences would not immediately ascribe moral value to
one response over the other since they are responses to different individuations of the logoi.
Here we are reminded of the apophatic nature of dialogic reciprocity: inasmuch as the
dialogue is between God and the individual, it is an exclusive dialogue. As such, it requires that
the response come from the individual involved in that specific dialogue. Acknowledging this
necessitates a space of freedom for that dialogue to take place. There can be no sense in which
responses could be constructed by someone outside of that dialogue or foisted upon the dialogic
participant by an outside authority.
This emphasis on freedom proffers an ecclesiological model that is radically different
from the pre-Vatican II caricature of a laity whose task is but to "pray, pay, and obey." The
clergy should never seek to short-circuit this dialogue but to ever form, invite and exhort
Christians to participative communion in God. The shared state of all Christians as participants
in their own logoic dialogue with God should create a foundational empathy. In no way can the
role of the laity, or any Christian, be subsumed into mere obedience or passivity. The action of
every Christian must attain to the maturity Gerard Philips uses to describe well-equipped laity:
they must have "accurate judgment, inventive spirit and creative imagination." 68
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This bespeaks an individual genius of particularity. Without being able to draw
conclusions as to the correct response in all possible instantiations of the logoi we must affirm
that the one who is capable of giving that correct response is always the dialogic participant and
none other. As such their freedom must be respected. In no way does the allowance for this
freedom connote an inability to name immoral action or responses that are contrary to the logoi
writ large. What we are concerned with here is the myriad of creative responses made possible
within the relationship of whom the only proper executor is the individual participant in
dialogue.
The value of freedom also yields an eternal meaning to individual human action. This is
similarly rooted in the nature of creation as freely created by God. God hands over creation in a
way that relinquishes claims on ownership. The dynamic Maximus describes for the return of
creation to God is incumbent upon free action that changes not the nature, the logoi, of creation
but the mode of creation in free human response. God then receives the gift back in the manner
it has been offered by the created agent.
During the dialogic exchange the logoi constitutive of the gift remain intact but the
trajectory changes due to the novel tropos applied to it by the creative response of the creature.
The particularity of the response is characterized by two radical elements of individuation: the
particularity of the logoi and the particularity of the response to those unique logoi. That this
dynamic has at its core the return of the logoi embedded within every facet of the cosmos has
inestimable consequences for lay or “secular” activity. The ubiquitous nature of the logoi
forbids us from dismissing any authentically human act of freedom as irrelevant to the church’s
life and mission. The decision for or against converting the logoi in a manner that returns them
to God is a decision with eternal ramifications in every circumstance. As they return to God, the
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logoi carry with them the inventive effects of human freedom. In a sense, God allows humanity
to have a share in the ultimate direction and meaning of creation. While never losing sight of the
communal unity in eschatological fulfillment we acknowledge that the most minute or interior
movements of human freedom carry an eternal relevance. God’s reception of tropologically
deified creation is an eternal acknowledgement of human action.

D. World Consecration as Participative Communion
Contextualizing the consecration of the world within the maximian eucharistic
framework rejects the exercise of dialectic for the sake of an outcome in favor of dialogue. A
dialectic approach may follow a logic of God being combined with what is not God resulting in
some new synthesis. Reviewing Maximus’ comments on theandric activity we can see that this
is not his aim. Maximus is interested in a new activity that does not mix natures but preserves
them in participative communion. We recall here the image of the fire and the sword the
Confessor used in Amb 5. Each takes on the characteristics of the other without a change in
nature. So too with the hypostatic union and by Maximus’ extension of that same logic,
communion between the human and divine.
Participative communion describes an action that does not end. There is no cessation of
this dynamic once a desired outcome is met. The consecration of the world cannot, therefore, be
seen as some appropriation of the world by the Church or God. The result is not a completed
action but an establishing of the communal dynamic. To admit an end to world consecration
would be akin to seeing an end to the eucharistic exchange of gifts.
While Maximus describes deification in a three-step process of being, well-being, and
eternal well-being, we should note that what is established at the end of the process is not a new
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being but a permanence of the relationship of the original being with God. The transformation
that results has to do with the mode of being, affirmed by the free choice in conversion of that
being’s original logoi to return to God in an eschatological manner. At no point does a new
being emerge from this process. So too, the offering back to God of all creation does not result
in a different creation but a deified one. Even the use of the word “result” is misleading here
since we are speaking about an establishing of a relationship in eschatological permanency.
Even as God is embodied in the deified world, ontological distance is never done away with. In
each person and in each created reality, consecration establishes participative communion that
has yet to be eschatologically ratified.
That this dialogue perdures as a permanent dynamic within the eschaton is supported by
Maximus’ temporal theology of ever-moving-repose. This concept allows us to see deified
creation as coming into the repose that connotes the impossibility of regressing from the final
union with God while acknowledging the continual dynamism of this “ever-moving”
relationship. The deified receive this quality of ever-moving-repose as a reflection of God’s
activity. We are reminded here, of the Confessor’s use of the Gregorian idea of perpetual
progress. The never-ending communion bespeaks a further deepening of the relationship.
Though this relationship is eschatologically permanentized it is one that is not susceptible to
Origenistic satiety.
The above intermingles with a fine point of eschatology due to the nature of this dynamic
as a participative and not a productive one. In offering creation to God through consecration
humanity never acts in a way bereft of divine activity. Eschatological consecration is always
then a result of divine activity and never human action alone. Though humanity is invited into
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the role of consecrator, eschatological realization can never be said to be contingent upon
anything but divine action.

Conclusion: Consecrators of the World to God
At the outset of this chapter, we mentioned Benedict XVI’s hope that we might all be
gathered in Christ’s activity of transubstantiating the world. The Pope Emeritus was not
referencing a fully developed theological concept but making a striking parallel between the
liturgical action of consecration and the offering of the world to God. Transubstantiation of the
world is similar enough to conversion of the logoi that it can be used here because it addresses
the same eucharistic realities that make up maximian dialogic reciprocity.
Maximus would not have been familiar with the concept of transubstantiation since it was
not coined until the 12th century. 69 The concept is characteristically western, drawing upon the
Aristotelean framework of substance and accidents. Without belaboring an explanation of the
philosophical categories at work we can understand the concept of transubstantiation as an
acknowledgement that while the outward appearance of a thing remains the same, God is capable
of changing the reality behind it.
An aspect of transubstantiation that is particularly well suited for our purpose is that from
a position removed from the reality, especially without the perspective offered by faith, one does
not notice any change in the reality which is being addressed. To draw a direct comparison: in
the same way as one who observes the eucharistic species from an outside perspective sees only
bread and wine, the lives of Christians who have turned the tropoi of their lives to God would
consist of the same matter of joy, suffering, love, and death that makes up every human life. The
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daily bread offered and consecrated to God is of the same good creation which every human
person experiences from their own unique perspective.
Here I propose a change in tropos is accompanied by a subjective element, a change in
meaning. This is in keeping with our application of transubstantiation. In sacramental theology
it could be said that the eucharistic action is accompanied by but not limited to a transignification that indicates to the believer that this bread and wine now mean something different
without exhausting the mystery of the sacrament. 70 In the same, I submit that the change in
tropos is signaled by a change in subjective meaning for the one making the offering. Once
again, this is not meant to equate a change in tropos with a change of meaning but names a
change in meaning as one of the traits of a reality which has been handed over as an offering, a
logoi recognized, affirmed by human freedom that is on a trajectory back to God.
This proposition touches directly the practical daily living of the faithful and begs
specific application. First, we should note that each of these examples are participative instances
of the divine-human activity that Maximus names theandric, the language I am using to express
these examples may tempt us to see them as taking place as an exclusively human action but, if
we are to be at all faithful to the maximian perspective, we must always remember that God
remains ever involved in this activity. Second, there is a need to make a chalcedonian distinction
that does not imply separation between actions that are explicitly undertaken as an offering to
God and those that acquire their status as an offering because they are the natural actions of
human persons on the path to deification. The first I call explicit offerings since even if they are
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not undertaken for the sole purpose of being an offering to God the recognition of the activity as
offering grants it an explicit change in meaning intended by the offeror. The second I call
participative offerings since they take on the character of offering not as a direct result of being
recognized as such but because they make up the daily matter of life of one in participative
communion with God.
Explicit offerings include any of those actions in which the meaning is understood to be
directly connected to God. As the most explicit offering, times of prayer and liturgical action are
the means by which other realities in our lives are offered and consecrated. This includes the
handing over of one’s life, struggles, joys, and hopes in the course of the Church’s liturgical
action as well as personal prayer. Actions taken in the name of charity and justice also fall under
this category: the reordering of society taken up as a vocational call of the laity represents an
explicit offering to God of practical circumstances. Similar to this are actions taken for the sake
of creation in the name of preserving the ecological gift that God has given. These actions,
inasmuch as they share an intentionality that is done for the sake of or on behalf of God’s plan,
are explicit offerings of creation to God.
Participative offerings, due to their indirect nature, may be recognized by the offeror as
acts of consecration during moments of reflective introspection but do not owe their status of
offering to this recognition. They are performative in nature and consist of those daily life
decisions that unceasingly demand the attention of the faithful. These offerings are the living out
of the married life, daily occupations, physical and mental relaxation, and hardships cited in LG
34. Many of these realities are difficult to extract from the complicated circumstances that make
up daily life and in naming these actions and situations I in no way intend to present them as a
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comprehensive list nor do they represent clear and distinct sacrifices that could be isolated from
one another but in concert make up the life and creation offered.
One common scene from family life can serve as an intersection for many of the complex
realities characteristic of a participative offering: a mother’s loving care for her child. It would be
difficult to find an act of love that is more natural or ordinary, yet it is the nature of this love that
we see the logoi of selfless care and dedication manifest. Images of this are iconically written
into the human psyche. From the point in which the child relies on the mother for existence en
utero, to first years of feeding, teething, soothing, playing, crying … Regardless of life
circumstances mothers give something of their very lives to their children. Such self-gift
demonstrates participative offering to the point that it would be bold not to recognize the
presence of the logoi even in the actions of non-believers.
The biological roots of maternal charity are not a stumbling block for us here, as though
the act of self-giving in motherhood would be better if it were a matter of sheer will. That
maternal love arises partly out of a mother’s natural desire and disposition toward loving is itself
a proof that the logoi tend toward dialogic character of self-gift. Maximus’ creation affirming
thought prepares us to recognize that the logoi are not opposed to corporeal reality but written
into it. The realization that such love draws the mother out of herself, toward charity, and is best
realized in other-centered-self-gift may be a natural path through which many recognize and
pursue conversion of the logoi.
Similarly ubiquitous to human living is the tragedy of suffering. In LG 34 this reality is
coupled with a qualification: it must be “borne patiently.” This is due to the ambivalent character
of suffering, which may engender spiritual growth or death equally based upon free response.
There are, of course, voluntary sufferings which fall under the above heading of explicit
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offerings: fasting, mortification, trials and challenges offered up. More common are the
innumerable trials, difficulties, hardships, and tragedies that beset humanity no matter our station
in life. These become participative offerings whether they have been acknowledged as such or
not. The bearing of hardships and not the flight from them is itself a sacrifice.
The culmination of involuntary human suffering, death, has a unique place in Maximus’
theology of deification. In his study of the human body within the maximian corpus, Cooper
observes how Maximus’ thought connects bodily death to the realization of deification. 71
Deification puts death to active use as a means of detachment, purification, and witness. In this
sense, the long suffering of a terminally ill patient may be seen not as the defeat of medicine or a
meaningless event but as a witness to life beyond the physical. Without foregoing the
accompanying emotional experiences of sadness and grief we can see in death a participative
offering of the dying who point beyond the contingent creation in which the final manifestation
of deification is impossible.
In contrast to emotionally evocative events such as suffering, death, and motherhood is
the quintessentially mundane example of the day-to-day work of the faithful. As with suffering,
there are instances of this daily work that manifest themselves as explicit offerings. Those daily
tasked with a mission at the service of their moral or religious conscience can clearly draw the
tropological meaning shift we have proposed. Health and mental care workers, advocates for the
disenfranchised, and public servants, to name a few, may see their work to and for others as a
sacrificial offering. Connecting professions that are not commonly associated with service or
mission proves far more difficult.
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What do trash collection, fast-food service, or balancing a corporate budget have to do
with consecrating the world to God? Within these contexts we have individual opportunities for
explicit and participative offering. Explicitly those employed in occupations could see their own
activity as an explicit call to live out the logoi in their particular place of work. Justice remains
justice whether it is the collective bargaining for worker’s rights or if it is the manager’s decision
to ensure that a single parent has ample time off. An explicit offering might be made of
particular relationships based upon their employment and there are many who find their
Christian identity as a workplace evangelist.
Concurrent with these explicit opportunities is the participative offering that takes place
within the workplace by the simple virtue of the faithful living and working within it. These
manifestations of offering tend to be hidden and are often unacknowledged. They are made by
the simple living out of the logoi in the context of the world. As with the example of
transubstantiation, these lives are only noticeably different if analyzed at the level of meaning.
For instance, the person formed by the logoi of faithfulness and honesty may carry out their task
in the same manner as anyone else, their unexplored motivations inseparable from their life with
God. Similarly hidden is the resistance of temptation which from the perspective developed by
the Confessor is the free affirmation of the logoi which converts them back to God.
Manifestations of these virtues for Maximus point toward God in and of themselves. As
self-contained milieus in their own right, workplaces share many of the same raw experiences
represented in our other examples. Certainly, places of employment have proven to be a source
of stress and suffering for many. As such these spaces become stages for our life’s drama and
for the faithful this life is a manifestation of God’s presence.
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As participative offerings, the change in meaning does not require a conceptualization of
God’s presence or action but a uniting of that reality to our deepest selves. Though the change in
action is taken in relation to and for the sake of the Logos and logoi, the effectiveness of our
consecration of the world is not contingent upon the ability to draw conceptual connections from
the realities of life to God. If this were the case, the consecration of the world to God would be
indistinguishable from the pietistic habit of explicitly referencing every experience we have to
God. The reality we are attempting to recognize tends to be just as hidden as the lives that
undertake it daily. By acknowledging a change in meaning as a change in tropos I mean to say
that this change resonates to the very core of who we are as persons even if the presence of the
logoi can only be acknowledged in these situations during periods of introspection and prayer.

Proleptic Participation
From the maximian standpoint, the exercise of the common priesthood puts the laity
within a proleptic participation of the eschatological dynamic. Living in a manner that offers the
sum of human experience, in the Spirit, to God as a eucharistic offering constitutes a proleptic
participation in the deified life. Though ever mindful of a future eschatological consummation,
Maximus does not draw a sharp line of distinction between deified human activity in the present
and future eschatological fulfillment. Thus, the Confessor holds in tension an ever-accessible
realized eschatology with the promise that the foretaste will be perpetuated and fulfilled when it
enters the eternal dynamic of ever-moving-repose.
Upheld by the preservation of persons and God’s affirmation of human freedom, the
proleptic experience of deified life is itself the union of God and humanity through consecration
of the world. That this reality is present as a foretaste does not lead to the alleviation of any part
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of the human life or condition. As Lumen Gentium indicates in its list of human activity, this
does not inaugurate a cessation of human suffering, human work, human leisure, or human
creativity. Human freedom to undertake tasks, to hope, to dream, and to act is not stifled but
granted a new divine mode. This means that there is no quantifiable goal to deified human
action. Participation in eucharistic dialogic reciprocity means that at no point can we identify the
boarder or goal of the activity of mediation.
There is a tension here of eschatological hope. Proleptic participation in the eschaton
through the consecration of the world is not a discursive movement of progress from one point to
the next. At no time can a claim be made that God has fully been embodied in one created
reality or another. The task is an unquantifiable one. There is no territory to be definitively
conquered, no filling of vessels with a commodity of grace, no perfect society to establish.
There is only the perpetual communal offering. This understanding of world consecration avoids
two extremes contradictory to eschatological hope: triumphalism and futility. It avoids
triumphalism because neither can one say that the work has been completed in this or that sphere
nor can one claim that having completed a task, or that the final work of divine dialogue is
fulfilled. It avoids futility because the very point of the work is communion and not some
preconceived product. Deified life is not out to overtake, conquer, compete with, or cancel
human experience but to come into intimate communion with it. “The Logos of God (who is
God) wills always and in all things to accomplish the mystery of his embodiment.” 72
Eschatological hope is not for an accomplishing of this consecration once and for all but the
participation in the eternal communion that is the embodiment of the Logos.
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CONCLUSION

The goal of this dissertation was to develop a theological lens that is faithful to the
thought of Maximus the Confessor and to bring that lens to bear upon the continuing
conversation on the theology of the laity. As a result, I have addressed two major issues that
dominate the discussion of the laity since the Second Vatican Council. The first of these is the
perceived contradiction of terms in the conciliar language, that the task of the laity is to
“consecrate the world to God.” The second is ambiguity and non-specificity in the conciliar
teaching about lay life outside of explicitly ecclesial activities.
Maximus’ rich thought pressed our study beyond these questions and invited us to
consider the lay life as an individualized instance of the dialogic reciprocity between humanity
and God. Drawn from the Confessor’s vision of cosmological unity in Christ, this dynamic
reveals that the life of the laity is a performative participation in God’s desire to realize the
mystery of His embodiment in the cosmos. This understanding moves the task of the laity from
the periphery to the center. God’s plan to unite all things in Christ is made manifest by the daily
offerings made in every lay life, no matter how obscure.
To address the primary concerns of the post-conciliar literature, I had to first trace the
scholarly literature on the laity. In Chapter 1 I mapped out the formulations of lay theology
present in the documents of the Second Vatican council and the two schools of thought that
characterized the reception of the Council’s teachings. The Magisterial school reaffirmed the
conciliar teaching and continued to apply it to emerging situations within the Church without
addition. Pope St. John Paul II’s Christifideles Laici re-explored the conciliar teaching with an
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emphasis on complementarity between the laity and clergy but retained the themes and language
of the council.
A second voice that emerged from the post-conciliar discussion were those theologians
who saw the theology of the laity as it was expressed in the conciliar documents as a terminus a
quo from which further theological discussion was not only invited but necessary if the
theological identity of the laity was ever to be defined. These theologians make up what I call
the developmental school. A combination of identifying the documents of the Second Vatican
Council as a point of departure and the theological developments of the 20th century led these
thinkers to a number of shared conclusions and concerns. One crucial issue raised by the
development school addressed three corresponding dichotic pairs: the laity-clergy, secularsacred, world-God. They viewed the conciliar language as implying a set of distinct spheres
which, at best, implied that the laity had been relegated to a passive role and, at worst,
envisioned the laity and the secular as being completely cut off from God. This vision of the
laity was not only in contradiction with the claim that the Second Vatican Council recognized the
laity as equal sharers in the Church’s life and mission, the development school understood the
dichotic pairs as implying that creation itself is not good due to its need to be consecrated.
What is the purpose of a laity whose mission is the consecration of an already good world
to God? How can we understand the ecclesiological categories of laity and clergy in a manner
that does not relegate the laity to an exclusively passive role? Maximus’ cosmological vision is
uniquely suited for addressing these aporia. In Chapter 2 I provided a detailed description of the
Confessor’s cosmology. At the root of Maximus’ thought are the Chalcedonian adverbs used to
describe the hypostatic union. This union is distinct without separation, without change, without
division and without confusion. These enable the Confessor to make important distinctions

245

without implying a breakdown in unity or a shared identity that would result in assimilation. I
explained how this is key to his cosmological system since it allows Maximus to describe a
cosmos that is characterized by an ontological difference that is a necessary prerequisite for
communion with God.
This understanding framed my introduction of Maximus’ key cosmological term: the
logoi. As wills of God, the logoi are creation’s participation in God. All of creation was made
according to the logoi and has the logoi embedded within it. The logoi are God’s abiding
presence within creation understood in a Chalcedonian manner: God is united to creation as its
source and destiny. Creation is in itself good but is not to be confused with God. The good
character of creation can never be lost since it can never be separated from the logoi which
informs its nature. There is embedded within the logoi an eschatological invitation to return to
God. This may be fulfilled or resisted by the free action of created beings and is manifest in the
mode, tropos, through which they express their logoi. This mode may be in line with the logoi or
it may be opposed to the logoi as is the case with the corruption of sin. The movement of the
logoi on a trajectory back to God, conversion results in the eschatological consummation of
creation, the fulfillment of God’s desire to become embodied in creation through the logoi.
Maximus’ cosmological vision gives us some of the tools necessary to solve the problem of a
good creation offered back to God: participation in God through the logoi gives creation an
undeniably good character yet there is an invitation to return so that God’s intentions for creation
might come to consummation.
Building upon the cosmological vision laid out in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I reflected upon
Maximus’ description of deification. Deification provides the details of how the Confessor’s
cosmology unfolds in time as well as revealing humanity’s unique role in God’s plan. Maximus
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describes the change affected by deification as a communion with God through a change in
tropos. Deified humanity has Christ, the Logos himself, as its prototype. The Confessor
presents the hypostatic union as the key to reclaiming the original vocation for humankind: the
mediation of all creation to God. Humanity follows the Logos according to their particularized
logoi. Maximus explains that Christ united all of creation despite their apparent divisions in his
person, exercising activity that is the unified action of God and humanity, otherwise known as
theandric activity. By living their lives in union with God, humanity lives in accord with a new,
divine tropos and becomes individual manifestations of theandric activity. This activity is
expressed in the exercise of human freedom within the creation both in an individual way and
corporately as Church. Maximus’ formulation of this dynamic and the presence of the logoi in
all of creation make the whole world a participant in the cosmic liturgy. I outlined how this
liturgy is expressed on an individual level as a dialogue between God and the individual as a free
exchange of gifts, as Loudovikos has coined it, a eucharistic dialogic reciprocity. This
summation of Maximus is particularly well suited for theological reflection on the life of the
laity since it deals with mediation as individual micro-dialogues with God present within
particularized human experience.
In chapter 4, I applied Maximus’ theological framework to the problems raised by
contemporary theologies of the laity. Addressing the issues at the center of the developmental
school’s critique was central to this task, particularly whether or not Maximus would agree with
a view that the laity were passive receptacles of grace acted upon by the clergy. As I have
outlined above, this is connected to a host of issues including the goodness of creation and the
fittingness of using language of mediation and consecration. The solution I presented was
unique to Maximus’ adaption of Dionysius and Chalcedon.
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First, I distinguished between the sort of mediation the Confessor would have received
from the Dionysian tradition which recognizes only God, not the clergy, as the one from who the
whole Church receives the charisms. As mediators of this divine activity, the clergy are not set
over, above, or against the laity. Both participate in the charisms that belong only to God. I
contrasted this with the thought of Proclus whose ontological understanding of mediation
requires that members of the hierarchy retain a share of the power they communicate to those
below them and to whom they only impart a lesser share. From this I concluded that Maximus’
understanding of mediation, even as it would pertain to an ecclesial hierarchy, acknowledges an
equal share among all. Joined to the Confessor’s reception of Chalcedon, I highlighted the
participative nature of the communal share in the charisms. This allows for the clergy and laity
to express the charisms in their own manner, in their own situations without claiming that they
are in competition with one another.
Turning to how Maximus could develop and deepen the theology of the laity present in
the conciliar texts, I viewed the description of the laity found in Lumen Gentium 34 through the
lens of maximian dialogic reciprocity and explored a number of key insights. Among these were
the acknowledgement of the whole of creation as a eucharistic gift that could be offered to God.
The return of this gift is the act of consecration enacted through human freedom. I explored the
innumerable expressions of human freedom made possible by Maximus’ understanding of the
logoi of providence and judgement. As long as they are in accord with the proper nature gifted
to creation by God, the logoi, these acts of human freedom are received by God, as such they
become a human contribution to theandric activity that enter into eternity.
My attempt to create synergy between maximian thought and conciliar theologies of the
laity lead me to consider the life of the laity as it is manifest in different sorts of offerings as
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consecration: explicit and participative. The latter is an act of consecration by the living of
deified life in any circumstance. Though it may not be acknowledged it is not a lesser sacrifice
but consists of an offering due to the theandric activity that pervades the life of the faithful.
These particular acts of consecration, no matter how hidden or obscure, are themselves proleptic
foretaste of the definitive eschatological consecration – the unity of the logoi in the Logos.

A. Omitted Topics Related to this Study
There are many lines of inquiry related to the topic of this dissertation that may have
proven fruitful to discuss but I have omitted for the sake of focus on the interplay between
Vatican II, contemporary theologies of the laity, and the thought of Maximus. Some of these
topics are tangentially related to the topic of laity others run parallel to the argument.
Perhaps the most glaring omission is a detailed study of Karl Rahner’s theology of
grace. 1 As I noted several times in the text, no other theologian influenced the development
school as much as Rahner. Rahner is often cited by development school authors as the guarantor
of their formulation of the God-world relationship and by extension their concern regarding the
aforementioned dichotomies. 2
I believe a study of Rahner in relation to this topic would make a fitting dissertation on its
own and could be approached by various lines of inquiry: to what extent did Rahner’s theology
of grace influence the development school? Do the conclusions reached by the development
school accurately represent Rahnerian thought? A comparison of Rahnerian and maximian
1
See Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, trans. William V.
Dych (New York: Crossroad, 1978)., Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William V. Dych (New York:
Continuum, 1994)., helpful introductions to this and other aspects of Rahner’s thought include William V. Dych,
Rahner (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1992). and Leo O’Donovan, ed., A World of Grace: An Introduction to the
Themes and Foundations of Karl Rahner’s Theology (New York: Seabury, 1980).
2
This is particularly the case for O’Meara who has written extensively on Rahner’s thought see Thomas O’Meara,
God in the World: A Guide to Karl Rahner’s Theology (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2007).
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thought would also be fruitful: At what points do the thought of Rahner and Maximus intersect
and on what issues would they have differed? Human freedom and goodness of creation stand
out as fertile points of departure for a conversation that places these theological giants in
dialogue. 3
The voluminous nature of Rahner’s work on grace, along with the plethora of interpretive
literature proved prohibitive to incorporating it in the current project. Rahner’s substantial
writings on the lay vocation were pre-conciliar and were not representative of his mature
theology of grace. Any exploration of his thought on the laity would have had to include a study
of his theological development throughout the 20th century. 4 The discussion would have also
distracted from the nature of the project which was to view theologies of the laity through a
maximian lens.
Rahner’s contribution is evocative of the nature-grace conversation that dominated the
theological discourse of the 20th century and continues today. 5 The outstanding issue is the
possibility of a nature completely separate and bereft of grace. The debate has impacted almost
every facet of theological inquiry: theological anthropology, moral theology, and sacramental
theology to name a few. 6 The application of Maximus’ thought to the theology of the laity is, in a

For Rahner’s view of the interaction between grace and human freedom see Karl Rahner, "Questions on Theology
of History," in Theological Investigations 5: Later Writings (Herder & Herder, 1970). Rahner espouses a view of
charisms as individual manifestations in one whole charism similar to Maximus’ in Karl Rahner, "Observations on
the Factor of the Charismatic in the Church," in Theological Investications 12: Confrontations (New York: Seabury,
1974). For Rahner’s thought on the act of consecrating as it relates to clergy and laity see Karl Rahner,
"Consecration in the Life and Reflection of the Church," in Theological Investigations (Herder & Herder, 1983).
4
Examples of Rahner’s explicit thought on the lay vocation leading up the council include Rahner, Christian in the
Market Place. and Karl Rahner, "The Sacramental Basis for the Role of the Layman in the Church," in Theological
Investications VIII: Further Theology of the Spiritual Life 2 (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971).
5
The work of Henri de Lubac was precipitous to this conversation, one cannot approach it without being familiar
with the issues he raised: see Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York:
Crossroad, 1998). and Henri de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, trans. Richard Arnandez (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984).
6
For how a view of this debate nested within the greater development of theological anthropology see Stephen J.
Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectgives in Theological Anthropology (Collegeville: Litrugical Press, 1993).
3
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sense, an engagement of this problem in microcosm with an ecclesiological focus. Loudovikos,
Tollefsen, and von Balthasar have demonstrated that Maximus does not separate nature from
grace. 7 Due to his place in history and the theological method of the east, the Confessor stands
outside of the issue. An analysis of the nature-grace conversation through a maximian lens could
adopt a method akin to the present one which does not read Maximus into a debate but presents
him as an alternative that could speak into the conversation.
A third major thread that I have not broached within this dissertation is the sexual abuse
scandals and coverups that have called many aspects of the laity-clergy relationship into
question. A thorough study of Maximus on the subject would be fruitful. As a lay monk who
spoke out in opposition to a position adopted by a majority of the hierarchy, the Confessor stands
as an example of one who confronted the clergy from within the church. The witness of his life
underscores his understanding of charism and the church’s ability to preserve the fulness of the
one charism despite failures within the clergy. In his work on ecclesiology, Loudovikos
formulates Maximus’ position on charism as a consubstantial participation in a singular reality. 8
The understanding of a charism in which clergy participate but may render themselves unsuitable
to exercise may help the church grapple with grievous offenses and lead to further reflection.

B. Further Developing Maximian Lay Theology
In closing, I would like to highlight three avenues down with the conclusions of this
dissertation could be applied and further developed. These areas of study emerge within vastly
For an understanding of how this debate influences the development of virtues and the proper end of humanity,
specifically as formulated by Aquinas see Jean Porter, The recovery of virtue : the relevance of Aquinas for
Christian ethics (Louisville: John Know Press, 1990). Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on virtue : the legacy of the
splendid vices / Jennifer A. Herdt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
7
See Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology, 10., Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 122., Balthasar, Cosmic
Litrugy, 190.
8
Loudovikos, Church in the Making, 55.
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different frames of reference: philosophical, ecclesiological, and the self-contained milieu of
particularity.
Applying Maximus’ thought to the contemporary actions of the laity has, I believe,
indirectly addressed some of the core issues of post-modern philosophy. The deconstruction of
metaphysics fueled by the thought of Nietzsche and culminating in thinkers like Derrida and
Foucault are essentially based upon the great scandal that all human values, as expressed in
ideas, language, and culture, are subjective and correlative. The world we perceive, they
observe, is so greatly dependent on our linguistic categories and self-formed viewpoint that we
have no hope of attaining to an objective, absolute truth. We can summarize this post-modern
tenet as disillusionment at the realization that all meaning consists of subjective linguistic
constructions, or more colloquially, that it is all “made up.”
Common responses to this assertion are the direct denial of radical subjectivity in the
hope of coming upon some bed-rock objectivity. This is often sought by means of rational proof,
logic, or grounding philosophy in belief in God. 9 All of this is undertaken in order to grant some
form of objective meaning.
The dialogic reciprocity of divine communion found in Maximus does not go down such
a route. Maximus’ formulation of God’s embodiment as an accomplishment of theandric
activity shows a radical comfort with the human, the subjective, the relational. The logoi are not
principles that drop to the earth as granite monoliths. The will of God has at its center the
relationship it maintains and promises to fulfill. God’s openness to possibility, the respect for
freedom allows the logoi to be received and offered as the result of human meaning-making.

I believe that this accounts for the resurging popularity of thomism, embraced by some conservative leaning
groups as the exclusive orthodox form of philosophical and theological thought. For an exposition on different
strains of thomistic thought and their relation to the wider theological horizon see Tracey Rowland, Catholic
Theology (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017).

9
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The dialogue between God and humanity is not about coming to an objective view of the cosmos
but the participative communion of the cosmos with the divine. This process does not take the
subjective viewpoint as a chrysalis which will be discarded in favor of an objective realization in
the eschaton but is in fact the eternal ratification and affirmation of this subjectivity by
deification.
The most sacred realities of Catholicism reflect this worldview. The biblical corpus and
Tradition in general, are theandric works, God-inspired human words, couched as it is in cultural
and linguistic limitedness now rightfully received as the canon. Liturgically, the offering of
human words and actions that have ever-evolved over the past two-thousand years is the
theandric presence of God among humanity: sensible, corporate, corporeal, and real.
The nature of humanity and God’s relationship as a theandric dialogue and the
apophaticism that underpins the Confessor’s theology allows the dynamic as we have described
it to coexist alongside the post-modern critique of ontology. The mystical/apophatic rejection of
concepts and ideas evidences the maximian acknowledgement of the humanly conceivable as
contingent. Maximus’ taxonomy of the cosmos would certainly be rejected as a subjective
explication of phenomenon but the dialogic dynamic that emerges from his analysis would
remain. Theandric relationship, not human knowledge of objective reality, bears the weight of
maintaining humanity’s communion with God.
While I believe that the above represents a new dialogue between Maximus and
contemporary philosophy, it is not the first time the Confessor’s thought has been brought into a
conversation with post-modernism. Two notable authors who have applied the Confessor’s work
to contemporary philosophical issues are John Zizioulas and Jean-Luc Marion. On the topic of
otherness, personal communion, and desire, John Zizioulas compares the thought of Maximus
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and Pseudo-Dionysius to Emmanuel Levinas in order to show that the “other” of post-modern
philosophy and Patristic thought are not consonant with one another. Zizioulas notes a
fundamental difference between Levinas and Patristic thought. For Levinas, the human desire
for God only leads to desire itself, which is ultimately unfulfilled since God as Other does not
have any desire for humanity or anything at all. For Patristic thought, which for Zizioulas is best
represented by Maximus, God not only desires communion with humanity but provokes
humanity’s desire and is its ultimate destination, resulting in unending communion between
humanity and God. 10 As mentioned above in chapter 2 note 77, Jean-Luc Marion folds concepts
from Maximus’ mystical theology into his phenomenological explorations. Marion applies these
concepts as a substitute for traditional ontology which he rejects as a mere idol. He attempts to
forge a new path to theology in place of ontology, based upon the saturated phenomenon of gift
that leads to love and the affirmation of God as the giver of that love. 11

C. Descriptive Ecclesiology
A practical advantage of this theology of the laity is that it does not necessitate a radical
reconfiguration of ecclesiological structures. In many ways the actions that are done in every
facet of ecclesial life remain the same when viewed through the maximian lens. The refocusing
of the Church’s activity toward the consecration of the world does not require clergy, lay
minister, religious, or laity to cease what they are doing and take up some novel activity.
The maximian tempered lay theology, with the embodiment of God realized in communal
theandric activity as its hallmark, acts as a descriptive lens for what has already been the action

See John D. Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 48-51.
See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012). and Jean-Luc Marion,
Being Given Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2013).
10
11
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of the Church not only in the past sixty years but throughout the sum of her history. While
promoting the equality of all members of the body, the maximian schema places strong emphasis
on the participation of the whole with the dynamic of eucharistic offering. The goal of a
constantly renewed theandric communion, that is not manifest once and for all outside of the
eschaton, shifts the focus from intra-ecclesial life and work to the practice of this theandric
communion among those who may conceive of themselves as tangentially related to the
Church’s life and mission.
The activity necessary to fulfill each individual’s mission, their sharing in the mission of
the Church does not look like an ever-increasing devotion modeled after the lives of clergy and
religious. Transformed, deified human activity still looks like human activity. The
consummating liturgical action of transubstantiation may be a useful register for this point: the
bread and wine remain the same in outward appearance while now encompassing a new divine
reality. Likewise, the daily tasks of humanity in their banality can be lived in a theandric manner
without changing their constitutive tasks or appearance. The goal is the realization of divine
communion in every time and place.

D. Theandric Response in Radical Particularity
Our previous point about ecclesiology -- that the maximian lens does not offer a new way
of being church that requires a reconfiguration but is a descriptive lens that further assists us in
seeing a lay-lived theandric communion as a sign that the dynamic is being properly understood
and lived -- leads us to acknowledge the relevance of radical particularity. Grasping this point is
a matter of understanding the inestimable relevance of the peculiarities and eccentricities of
particular human milieus to the divine plan.
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Often the stage upon which the church’s life and mission are conceived are extracted far
beyond the mundane: what is important are the events of Calvary, the shifting of life and culture
of society, the influence of the Church upon the res publica or some other compounding of
human activity such that it is often difficult to see how individual relationships contribute to their
outcome.
In contrast, the stage of the dialogic exchange is the obscurity of individual communities
and lives. Dialogic reciprocity embraces the radically particular and elevates it to the stage upon
which the salvation of the world takes place. Perhaps it would be illustrative to reformulate the
return of the logoi in these contexts not as the salvation of the world but the salvation of worlds.
Changing the frame of reference here is not meant to deny the final unity of the cosmos but to
draw attention to the phenomenological experiences of humanity and our creation of our own
worlds which we inhabit. One has only to drive down a city street to become overwhelmed by
the innumerability of these worlds: the discount tire center, the fast-food restaurant, the corporate
office, the family of four huddled in a small apartment. Every instance comes with their own set
of self-centric concerns: how to solve this supply problem, will there be enough customers
tonight to pay the employees, how to resolve an ongoing interpersonal conflict, does this
diagnosis mean my daughter will never be happy…
To its inhabitants, every one of these worlds is of inestimable importance. They can
contain the hopes, fears, sufferings, and longings of generations. Each of these have nested
within them an infinitude of experiences, all of which may be brought to bear to the theandric
relationship of dialogic reciprocity. Inasmuch as these expressions of human particularity and
freedom do not run contrary to the logoi, they are the fertile ground for the fulfillment of God’s
desire to become embodied in every fissure of the cosmos.
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